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Certificate of Need Regulation in the Nursing Home Industry: 
Has it Outlived its Usefulness? 
Barbara J. Caldwell 
ABSTRACT 
The primary goals of the National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Act (P.L. 93-641) of 1974 were to (1) contain health care costs and (2) increase the 
accessibility and quality of health services.  Certificate of need (CON) regulation is one 
attempt to constrain health care costs by limiting the supply of certain medical care 
facilities.  With respect to the nursing home industry, prospective nursing home 
owners/operators are required to demonstrate that a “need” exists for more nursing home 
beds.  Some States also imposed a construction moratorium that prevented any expansion 
of existing facilities or construction of new facilities regardless of whether or not a 
“need” existed.  These CON/moratorium programs impose a supply side constraint that 
creates a potential barrier to entry and in the presence of excess demand may cause a 
nursing home bed shortage for those residents covered by Medicaid. 
Even though the Federal CON requirement lapsed in 1986, forty-two States and 
the District of Columbia continue to have a CON, a construction moratorium, or both for 
nursing home facilities.  Yet maintaining these regulations comes with a cost. 
This paper investigates if differences exist in the quality of care and the access to 
care between nursing homes in those States without CON and/or construction 
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moratorium and those States that still have such policies.  Using data for the years 1991 
through 2003 for all freestanding Medicaid-/Medicare-certified nursing home facilities in 
the United States and employing state and facility fixed effects models we find that 
Medicaid-eligible residents in those states without CON and/or construction moratorium 
policies have more access to a nursing home bed than those individuals in states with 
these policies.  With respect to quality of care the results are mixed depending on the 
measure of quality that is employed.  With the risk of becoming a nursing home resident 
at the age of 65 at 44 percent and at the age of 85 at 53 percent (Spillman and Lubitz 
2002) coupled with the aging of the current population, the areas of quality of care and 
access to care remain important policy issues in the nursing home industry. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 What is Certificate of Need Regulation? 
In 1974, the United States Congress passed The National Health Planning and 
Resources Development Act (P.L. 93-641).  The primary goals of this legislation were to 
(1) contain health care costs and (2) increase the accessibility and quality of health 
services (Harrington, et al. 1997a; Spillman and Lubitz 2002).  This federal regulation 
was passed at a time when health care costs were escalating at an alarming rate and 
accessibility to services for those who “needed it the most” as well as the quality of 
health services were considered poor.  Most importantly, the escalating health care costs, 
and the federal government’s growing proportion of these costs, were the driving force 
behind the certificate of need (CON) regulation requirement imposed by this Act. 
CON was one approach to containing health care costs by limiting the supply of 
certain medical care facilities.  In general, a CON program involves the regulation of the 
building, expansion, and modernization of health care facilities and capital equipment on 
the part of institutional health care providers, including hospitals, nursing homes, and 
home health agencies.  Oversight of these programs is provided at the state level through 
designated agencies who at their discretion set the specific criteria within the program for 
their State (Blumstein and Sloan 1978).  During the mid-1960’s and early 70’s, some 
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states began establishing CON programs.  The National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act required that all states adopt a certificate of need program and by 1980 
all states had some form of CON regulation.  
The impetus for this Act was the escalation of public medical care expenditures 
following the passage of the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act.  These 
amendments established the Medicare and Medicaid programs that are responsible for 
certain medical care requirements of the elderly and the needy.  The primary explanation 
for this rapid increase in costs is the presence of third-party payment for medical care 
expenses through Medicare and Medicaid, which enabled what has become known as the 
Medical Arms Race (MAR). 
Even though Medicare and Medicaid require deductibles or co-payments, a 
resident does not pay the full marginal cost of the last unit of care received.  CON 
regulation imposed a supply side constraint that limited capacity, with the intention of 
reducing the growth of fee-for-service reimbursements and combating the classic 
problem of moral hazard.  Implicit in this regulation, (as noted by Norton (2000)), is the 
assumption that an unregulated market results in an excess of capital expenditure and 
capacity.   
The MAR hypothesis is considered a special case of quality competition in which 
it is asserted that quality is overproduced by competitors in medical care markets.  This 
hypothesis supports the idea of increased expenditures due to excessive capital 
investment.  It begins by noting that physicians, acting as agents for residents in search of 
hospital care, influence their residents’ choice of hospital.  Hospitals, wanting to increase 
their admissions, attempt to attract physicians by offering the latest technology.  Under 
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this scenario, duplicate services, i.e., services that are in excess of what the market would 
demand, become the norm (Dranove, et al. 1992).  During the time of the MAR, a 
retrospective payment system was the prevailing method of cost reimbursement by 
Medicare and Medicaid.  This type of system pays providers on the basis of incurred 
costs.  Hence, the costs of these additional services were passed through to insurers who 
then cost-reimbursed the hospitals (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000).  With widespread 
coverage of medical care services for new, technically sophisticated services as well as 
the increase in the proportion of elderly and indigent individuals qualified for care 
through Medicare and Medicaid, CON regulation was considered to be the countervailing 
force needed to offset this rapidly expanding segment of governmental expenditures. 
 
1.2 The Nursing Home Industry and CON 
In the decade following the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid, public 
medical care expenditures on nursing homes alone, just one part of what is termed long-
term care, exceeded that for any other medical care service, accounting for 25 percent of 
total health expenditures in 1975 as compared to 15 percent in 1966 (Feder and Scanlon 
1980).  Additionally, between 1965 and 1973, the number of nursing home beds 
increased by 650,000, an increase of 139 percent in less than a decade (Hawes and 
Phillips 1986).  By 1977, the U.S. government, through Medicare, Medicaid, and other 
smaller government-funded programs, had purchased approximately 62 percent of all 
nonprofit nursing home services and 60 percent of all proprietary nursing home services 
(Gertler and Andreano 1982). 
  4
With the passage of P.L. 93-641, in order to be eligible for federal funds available 
through the U.S. Public Health Service prospective nursing home owners/operators are 
required to demonstrate that a “need” exists for more nursing home beds.  Additionally 
during the same time frame, some states imposed a construction moratorium that 
prevented any expansion of existing facilities or construction of new facilities regardless 
of whether or not a “need” existed.  These CON/moratorium programs protect existing 
nursing homes from potential entry by new competitors. 
Most of the economic research studying nursing homes employs the work of 
Scanlon (1980b) which views the industry as monopolistically competitive with nursing 
homes providing the same level of quality to both Medicaid and private-pay residents.  
Scanlon hypothesizes that CON and construction moratorium policies act as a binding 
bed constraint, leaving certain individuals who demand nursing home services unable to 
gain access to care.  Since nursing homes typically charge a higher rate for private-pay 
residents than the Medicaid reimbursement rate, private-pay residents will be admitted 
first and then Medicaid residents will fill any remaining empty beds1.  Since the private-
pay demand is still met under a binding bed constraint, the literature has referred to this 
unmet demand as “excess Medicaid demand” (Nyman 1985). 
During the period of federal CON, the issues of quality, access, and cost came 
under deeper scrutiny.  Many proponents of the nursing home industry declared that 
quality was “low” because Medicaid reimbursement rates were too low.  Raising the 
                                                 
1 According to the MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home & Home Care Costs, the statewide average 
private-pay per diem rate in 2005 was $191in 2003 dollars (MetLife 2005).  The statewide average 
Medicaid per diem rate for 2003 in this study was $122.  The average per diem rate for 2003 for each state 
in this sample was less than the statewide average private pay per diem rate (Alaska’s private pay per diem 
was $500 in 2003 dollars and its Medicaid per diem rate in this sample was $321). 
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reimbursement rate seems to be the obvious solution.  However, early studies find that an 
increase in the reimbursement rate, under conditions of excess demand, actually leads to 
the counterintuitive result of lower quality.  When the number of prospective residents is 
greater than the supply of nursing home beds, the nursing home provides care to private-
pay residents first since the private-pay price is typically greater than the Medicaid 
payment rate.  Therefore, raising quality only benefits the nursing home by attracting 
additional private-pay residents since at any quality level a sufficient number of Medicaid 
residents are available to fill an empty nursing home bed.  However, in order to attract an 
additional private-pay resident, a Medicaid resident must be displaced.  The foregone 
Medicaid payment associated with that displaced resident becomes a cost to the nursing 
home attributed to increasing quality.  Furthermore, an increase in the reimbursement rate 
increases this opportunity cost of providing higher quality.  Therefore an increase in the 
reimbursement rate may actually lower quality (Nyman 1985). 
With respect to the goal of supply-side constraint, between 1976 and 1980 the 
supply of nursing home beds increased at an annual rate of approximately 3 percent, but 
between 1981 and 1983 the growth rate was only about 1.75 percent (Hawes and Phillips 
1986).  However, one result of this supply constraint is that under conditions of excess 
demand access to nursing home care is constrained for Medicaid residents but not for 
private-pay residents (Ettner 1993; Holahan and Cohen 1987; Nyman 1985; Scanlon 
1980b).  Again, this is due to the fact that with a limited supply of beds nursing homes 
prefer to admit the higher paying private resident than the Medicaid resident.   
With respect to cost containment, between 1960 and 1983 nursing home 
expenditures increased from $480 million to $28.8 billion, with Medicaid’s share 
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increasing from 28 to 55 percent over the same time period (Holahan and Cohen 1987).  
One explanation given for this increase was that the certificate of need cost containment 
initiative led to higher private-pay prices.  These higher prices then resulted in private-
pay residents becoming Medicaid-eligible sooner than they would otherwise.  As a 
consequence, any cost saving from CON will in actuality be net of an increase in the 
proportion of nursing home days-of-care paid for by Medicaid (Nyman 1994). 
 
1.3 The Period After Federal CON Elimination 
In 1986, during the deregulation era of the Reagan administration, Congress 
allowed the federal CON requirement to lapse due to its perceived anticompetitive and 
excessively regulatory nature.   However, even after its removal forty-five States and the 
District of Columbia continued to have a CON, a construction moratorium, or both a 
CON and construction moratorium for nursing home facilities (Harrington, et al. 1997a).  
Yet maintaining these regulations comes at a cost.  Since quality remains a controversial 
subject, access to care for Medicaid-eligible individuals remains an issue in many States, 
and medical care expenses for nursing homes continue to climb, one might question the 
effectiveness of retaining these regulations. 
Today eight states no longer have certificate of need or construction moratorium 
regulations in effect for nursing home facilities.2  The existing literature concerning the 
nursing home industry does not tell us if any differences in quality of care or access to 
care exist between those states without CON policies and those States that have the 
                                                 
2 The eight states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, New Mexico, and 
Pennsylvania.  Nevada has no regulation in its two largest counties. 
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regulation.  With the risk of becoming a nursing home resident at the age of 65 at 44 
percent and at the age of 85 at 53 percent (Spillman and Lubitz 2002), coupled with the 
aging of the current population, the areas of quality of care and access to care remain 
important policy issues in the nursing home industry. 
The results from this study show that Medicaid-eligible individuals in those states 
without have some type of CON regulation have more access to a nursing home bed than 
in those states with this type of supply constraint.  The results of the models measuring 
the quality of care are not as consistent; each result is dependent on the choice of quality 
measure which supports the idea that there is no real standard by which to measure 
quality of care.  In conjunction with the work of Grabowski et al.(2003) that shows the 
repeal of CON regulations has not significantly increased the Medicaid cost of nursing 
home care, the results of this research further suggest that perhaps the use of supply-side 
constraints are not as effective in increasing the accessibility of nursing home care for 
Medicaid-eligible individuals and that there are still some aspects of the quality of 
nursing home care that remain questionable. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed look at the background and legislative history of the nursing home industry; 
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature with regard to the issues of quality of care and 
access to care in nursing homes; Chapter 4 states the objectives of this study and 
describes the data and methodology, including the specification of the models utilized in 
this research; Chapter 5 presents and describes the results of the analysis; and Chapter 6 
summarizes the main findings of this study, potential policy implications, limitations of 
the study, and areas for further research.
  8
Chapter Two 
The Background of the Nursing Home Industry 
 
Today’s nursing home industry originates from the development during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries of five types of facilities classified as county poorhouses, 
state mental hospitals, voluntary homes for the aged typically run by religious 
organizations, proprietary boarding houses, and hospital-affiliated nursing homes 
(Waldman 1983).  The county poorhouse, or the county “almshouse,” was operated and 
financed by local governments for those children and adults who were poor, old, 
disabled, and mentally challenged.  Later in the nineteenth century reformers were able to 
segregate the occupants of these almshouses into specialized institutions such as 
orphanages and mental hospitals.  The remaining occupants of these poorhouses were 
primarily the poor and the aged. 
 
2.1 Legislative History 
The initial, most significant influence on the nursing home industry was the 
passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, which provided income maintenance to the 
disabled and aged.  The Old Age Assistance (OAA) program was a means-tested old age 
pension fund financed by states on a matching basis with the federal government for 
persons age 65 and over.  Through this income assistance, these residents of the 
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poorhouses were able to afford alternative living arrangements (Waldman 1983).  
However, this legislation specifically disallowed funding to public institutions, thus 
encouraging the development of the proprietary nursing home sector (Vladeck 1980). 
The 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act eliminated the restriction on 
OAA payments to residents of public medical facilities and allowed payments to be made 
directly to the vendors of medical care.  These direct medical vendor payments were 
limited under a sharing formula used to determine the federal portion of the cost of the 
assistance program.  These payments were available only to persons whose income was 
at or below the eligibility level for the assistance program.  Many states used a “spend-
down” method to determine who was eligible for the payments.  Persons whose income 
was above the specified level were ineligible for money payments but could become 
eligible for medical vendor payments if the amount they spent for medical care from their 
own funds brought their net income down to the eligibility levels.  The methods of 
reimbursing nursing homes under this program were left to the states.  Additionally, the 
amendments also mandated that states establish licensing requirements for nursing homes 
(Giacalone 2001; Waldman 1983).   
Enacted in 1960, the Medical Assistance for the Aged (MAA) program began as a 
possible substitute for the Medicare program that was under consideration at the time.  
The MAA was an expansion of the direct vendor payment program that included two 
important differences.  The first allowed states to provide assistance to those whose 
income was above the OAA standard but below what was considered insufficient to pay 
for medical care.  The second difference was that the federal matching contributions had 
no ceiling.  Between 1960 and 1965, vendor payments associated with nursing home care 
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had risen tenfold and the number of persons receiving nursing home care under MAA had 
reached 300,000 (Vladeck 1980; Waldman 1983). 
Other important legislation of the 1940s and 1950s impacted the supply side of 
the nursing home industry.  Several pieces of important legislation were enacted to 
encourage the construction and modernization of nursing homes in the proprietary, 
nonprofit and public sectors.  First, the 1954 amendment to the Hill-Burton Act provided 
financial support for the construction and renovation of government and nonprofit 
nursing homes based on the ability to show need.  Additionally, this amendment required 
that certain construction and operational standards be met in order to provide “quality” 
care (Vladeck 1980).   
In 1956, under the auspices of the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
proprietary nursing homes became eligible for government loans (Giacalone 2001).  
Probably the most important piece of legislation for the proprietary sector was the 
passage of Section 232 of the Housing Act of 1959, which provides a program of 
mortgage insurance for proprietary nursing homes.  The Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insures lenders against losses for loans for construction or renovation of nursing 
homes.  However, a condition of the loan insurance is that the proposed project receives a 
certificate of need from the appropriate state agency indicating that a need exists for the 
proposed beds (Waldman 1983). 
Perhaps the most influential impact on the nursing home industry was the passage 
of the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act establishing the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs.  Medicare is a federal health insurance program for people 65 years 
of age and older, some people with disabilities under age 65, and people with End-Stage 
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Renal Disease.  Specific to nursing home care, Part A of Medicare provides skilled 
nursing care on a limited basis to those individuals recently discharged from a hospital.  
The intent is to provide continued care to those who still require assistance during their 
recovery but not at the same level provided in a hospital.  In order to participate as a 
Medicare provider, a nursing home must be certified as a Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF).  
SNFs typically serve post-operative residents requiring a considerable amount of therapy 
and nursing assistance to facilitate the recovery of an acute illness.  Certified nursing 
homes are paid the reimbursement rate set by the Federal government. 
Replacing the medical vendor payment and MAA programs, Medicaid is a 
federal/state vendor payment program that pays for medical assistance for certain 
individuals and families with low incomes and limited resources.  While restricted by 
guidelines established by federal statutes, each state establishes its own eligibility 
standards, determines the type, amount, duration and scope of services, sets the payment 
rate for services, and administers its own program.  Additionally, states have the option 
of providing care to those considered “medically needy.”  These individuals are eligible 
for Medicaid except that their income and/or resources are above the eligibility level set 
by their state.  They may qualify immediately or may “spend down” by incurring medical 
expenses that reduce their income to or below their state’s medically needy income level.   
Under Medicaid nursing home care must be provided for individuals aged 21 or 
older who qualify as “categorically needy.”  For those who qualify as “medically needy,” 
residents must pay all of their income except for a small spending allowance.  A 
Medicaid-certified nursing facility may be classified as either a SNF, as an Intermediate 
Care Facility (ICF), or as dually certified.  An ICF typically provides less rehabilitative 
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care and assistance while providing basic nursing care, therapy, and social activities to 
those considered chronically ill. 
In 1972 Public Law 92-603 established the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 
program, replacing the OAA program.  Similar to OAA, SSI is an income maintenance 
program which provides monthly payments to aged and disabled persons but, unlike 
OAA, it is a federally financed and administered program (Waldman 1983).  Eligibility 
for SSI automatically assures Medicaid eligibility.  Additionally, Section 249 of the law 
required states to reimburse nursing home care under Medicaid on a “reasonable cost-
related basis,” as was required by Medicare (Vladeck 1980; Waldman 1983).  This 
reimbursement requirement was later repealed and states were then given the authority to 
set their own reimbursement method with the stipulation that the rates be “reasonable and 
adequate to cover the costs of an efficiently operated facility” (Waldman 1983).   
Although not originally intended to be the mechanism for paying for long-term 
care, Medicaid has become the major public method for funding nursing home care.  
Between 1965 and 1973, the number of nursing home beds increased by 650,000, an 
increase of 139 percent (Hawes and Phillips 1986).  Expenditures grew even more 
rapidly.  Just prior to the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, expenditures on 
nursing home care totaled $1.328 billion.  By 1978, the nation spent $15.8 billion on 
nursing homes, with the government paying 53 percent of the total (Hawes and Phillips 
1986).   
In an attempt to control the escalating health care costs, and the federal 
government’s growing proportion of these costs, the United States Congress passed the 
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (P.L. 93-641) of 1974.  As a 
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part of this Act, states required potential nursing home operators as well as existing 
nursing homes that were interested in expansion to acquire a certificate of need (CON) 
prior to new construction.  This legislation has a supply side effect on the industry by 
limiting the number of nursing home beds available to prospective residents.  Even 
though this federal legislation was repealed in 1986, today 42 States and the District of 
Columbia still maintain CON and/or construction moratorium policies. 
The Nursing Home Reform Act of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987 (OBRA 87) mandated extensive legislative requirements affecting the delivery of 
care to residents in nursing homes (Marek, et al. 1996).  This Act repealed the SNF and 
ICF benefits (except for the ICF benefits for persons with mental retardation or related 
conditions) under Medicaid and replaced them with a mandatory nursing facility (NF) 
benefit that combines the total services previously covered under the ICF and SNF 
benefits.  This change became effective in 1993.  This legislation also imposed the 
standards of care that facilities must meet in order to receive both federal and state 
funding.  It also defined the state survey and certification process that determines 
compliance with the federal standards.  Additionally, sanctions were established for 
facilities that fail to meet the established standards (Harrington and Carrillo 1999).  Many 
of the requirements under OBRA 87, most significantly the survey inspection procedures 
and the required nurse’s aide training, increased the cost structures of nursing home 
facilities (Giacalone 2001). 
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2.2 The Market for Nursing Home Care 
The nursing home industry has many properties of a perfectly competitive market.  
Information failures common to other sectors of the medical care industry (Arrow 1963) 
seem rare in nursing home care.  Consumers have the ability to observe many of the 
features of a nursing home’s services, such as room conditions, staff and resident 
interaction, organized activities and other available services.  Start-up costs are not a 
significant barrier to entry, as plant and equipment costs are significantly below those of 
a hospital (Bishop 1988).  In addition, substitutes such as family or in-home care are 
readily available for many individuals. 
However, other features of the nursing home industry deviate from the perfectly 
competitive standards.  The decision to enter a nursing home often occurs at a time of 
crisis, thus dramatically reducing the ability to gather and process existing information.  
Location quite often is an important criterion when selecting a nursing home.  Residents 
want to remain close to family and friends making it unlikely that they will “vote with 
their feet” and move to a new nursing home.  Additionally there are also switching costs, 
termed the “transfer trauma,” resulting in much less movement between homes than 
expected (Bishop 1988; Nyman 1985; Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986).  It follows then 
that most researchers have modeled the nursing home industry as monopolistically 
competitive.  Homes differentiate themselves with respect to location and types of 
services offered. 
Another important feature of the nursing home industry is the major presence of 
the government, both as the largest purchaser of services (through Medicaid) and as the 
industry’s regulator.  As regulator, the government imposes the reimbursement rate on 
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those homes that meet the certification requirements.  This rate becomes a price ceiling 
for the home for its public-pay residents.  When this rate is below the market-clearing 
price, a shortage of nursing home beds will exist.  Moral hazard resulting from the 
Medicaid subsidy increases demand for nursing home care, while CON and moratorium 
policies restrict supply.  It is very common for the nursing home market not to clear, with 
a shortage of beds the norm. 
Nursing homes typically have a mixture of private-pay and public-pay (Medicaid) 
residents.  With two types of customers, price discrimination arises.  The firm (a nursing 
home) faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its private-pay residents and a 
perfectly elastic demand at the government reimbursement rate for its public-pay 
residents.  The nursing home then chooses its total output, how to allocate this output 
between private-pay and public-pay residents, and what price to charge its private-pay 
residents (Palmer and Vogel 1983). 
For-profit homes are assumed to maximize profits by equating marginal revenue 
and marginal cost while equalizing the level of marginal revenue of private-pay and 
public-pay residents.  Nonprofit homes are assumed to maximize output subject to a 
break-even constraint and a quality constraint (Palmer and Vogel 1983; Scanlon 1980b).  
This is accomplished by equating average revenue and average cost and allocating the 
total output between private-pay and public-pay residents such that the marginal revenue 
from each is equal.  For both types of homes, the result is typically the private-pay price 
being higher than the Medicaid reimbursement rate. 
Scanlon (1980b) hypothesizes that CON and construction moratorium policies act 
as a binding bed constraint where there exist certain individuals who demand nursing 
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home services yet are unable to gain access to care.  Since nursing homes typically 
charge a higher rate for private-pay residents than the Medicaid reimbursement rate, 
private-pay residents will be admitted first and then Medicaid-eligible individuals will fill 
any remaining empty beds.  Since the private-pay demand is still met under a binding bed 
constraint, the literature has referred to this unmet Medicaid demand as “excess Medicaid 
demand” (Nyman 1985). 
The nursing home industry is comprised of for-profit, nonprofit and government 
facilities.  As of June 2005, there were 16,023 total facilities, of which 65.86 percent 
were for-profit, 28.04 percent were nonprofit, and 6.1 percent were government owned; 
5.31 percent were Medicare-certified only, 6.72 percent were Medicaid-certified only, 
and 87.97 percent were both Medicare- and Medicaid-certified.  These facilities provided 
1,748,001 beds of which 71,960 were Medicare-certified only, 225,710 were Medicaid-
certified only, 1,382,395 were dually certified, and 67,936 were non-certified.  The mean 
occupancy rate of these facilities was 85.58 percent while the median rate was 88.61 
percent (AHCA 2005).   
 
2.3 Payment for Nursing Home Care 
National health expenditures for nursing home care in 2003 were $110.8 billion.  
Private payment accounted for 39 percent of these expenditures, Medicare accounted for 
12 percent while both federal and state Medicaid payments were 46 percent of the total 
(CMS 2003).  Nursing homes typically do not charge the same rate for all payer types 
(private, Medicare, or Medicaid residents).  Traditionally, private-pay rates are based 
upon charges determined by the nursing homes themselves while the federal government 
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determines the Medicare rate and each state determines its own Medicaid rate; each rate 
is dependent on the type of reimbursement method utilized.  Due to the differences 
between Medicare and Medicaid in the determination of rates, the difference between the 
care needs of acute and chronic care residents, as well as the differences in the methods 
of defining reimbursable costs, most often the private-pay rate is higher than both the 
Medicare and Medicaid rates and the Medicare rate is higher than the Medicaid rate. 
 
2.3.1 Reimbursement Methods 
Reimbursement methods refer to the way in which Medicare and Medicaid 
programs pay for nursing home care.  Medicare reimbursement for nursing home services 
was originally based upon the “reasonable cost” formula that originated for hospital 
payments.  This methodology covers retrospectively the actual costs of providing care 
and places no ceilings on reimbursement rates (Hawes and Phillips 1986; Swan and 
Harrington 1985).   
Escalating health care costs during the 1970s, fueled by the MAR and moral 
hazard caused the government to reassess its Medicare payment system.  In 1983, a 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) was put in place for hospitals.  This type of 
reimbursement method sets the rate to be paid for each type of service prospectively with 
the intent of providing an incentive to reduce costs.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
implemented this same method for nursing homes such that today the Medicare 
reimbursement system is a prospective method of payment (Dranove and Satterthwaite 
2000). 
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When Medicaid was first established, states were given much discretion in setting 
nursing home rates while remaining within the federal guidelines.  In 1972, the Social 
Security Amendments required states to implement “reasonable cost-related” 
reimbursement plans for nursing homes (Social Security Amendments of 1972).  
However, there was no specific requirement for this method to be a retrospective 
reimbursement method (Cotterill 1983).  Part of the reason these changes were 
implemented was because providers complained that states were too restrictive in their 
policies (Harrington and Swan 1984; Swan and Harrington 1985) and that nursing homes 
were not able to cover the cost of providing care to their public-pay residents.  While the 
method of reimbursement was not clearly defined in order to meet the reasonable cost-
related criteria, most states chose their own reimbursement policies while some states 
used the Medicare reimbursement formula to meet the Medicaid requirement. 
With the ensuing escalation in health care costs as well as pressure from states to 
allow more discretion in interpreting reasonable costs, the Federal Boren Amendment of 
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 gave states the authority to set rate methods and 
standards that are  
“reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently 
and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in 
conformity with applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and quality and 
safety standards” (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980). 
 
This reimbursement policy increased the authority as well as the flexibility of states by 
giving them greater discretion in setting rates.  The intent was to provide the incentive to 
constrain costs while still recognizing the concept of cost-related rates (Cotterill 1983).  
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States typically used this discretion by setting their Medicaid rates below those of 
Medicare and private payers (Swan and Harrington 1985).   
Medicaid expenditures for nursing home services are usually described on a cost 
per diem basis.  The rates that are paid are determined in part by the reimbursement 
method chosen.  States attempt to control these rates by developing reimbursement 
methods that restrain their overall expenditures on nursing homes.  Several 
reimbursement methods exist under Medicaid.  While state Medicaid programs are 
required to set reimbursement policies with some relationship to cost which requires a 
periodic adjustment for inflation, much discretion is allowed in what other options they 
include in the per diem rate that results from the reimbursement method of choice.  
A retrospective system utilizes a reimbursement formula that pays after the 
services have been provided, based on the actual costs incurred by the nursing home.  
This type of system tends to encourage providers to increase their expenditures in order 
to increase their revenues (Swan and Harrington 1985).  Additionally, states that have 
this type of reimbursement system face little incentive to minimize costs. 
Prospective reimbursement systems utilize a formula, usually based on past costs, 
that sets the payment rate for services prior to the provision of care and before the costs 
are actually incurred.  This type of methodology gives providers an incentive to keep 
their costs aligned with or lower than the reimbursement allowances.  However, one 
criticism of this type of reimbursement method is that it may also provide incentives for 
services and quality to be lowered in order to stay within the allowable costs.  Prospective 
methods have been shown to lower the per diem rate as compared to retrospective 
methods (Harrington and Swan 1984; Swan, et al. 1993). 
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Within the prospective methods of reimbursement, a distinction may be made as 
to whether facilities are reimbursed based on an individual basis (facility-specific) or on a 
class or group basis (flat-rate).  States using a facility-specific method apply a 
reimbursement formula based on historical cost reports that results in a reimbursement 
rate for each facility in the state.  States using flat-rate methods also use a formula usually 
based on past expenditures to set the reimbursement rate.  States with this type of system 
then pay each facility a per diem rate that is based on the median per diem rate of the 
group of facilities in the class.  Consequently, each individual facility cannot significantly 
adjust the rate it receives by adjusting its own costs (Cotterill 1983).  An “adjusted” 
prospective method allows the rate to be adjusted upward during the rate period 
(Harrington, et al. 2000b). 
Some states have implemented what are called combination methods.  This 
method of reimbursement is often based on cost centers, some of which are reimbursed 
prospectively and some of which are paid retrospectively (Harrington, et al. 2000b; 
Swan, et al. 1993).  In addition, some states have moved to a “case-mix” reimbursement 
method.  This type of system allows a state to adjust their rates for resident 
characteristics.  The intent of this type of method is to recognize the level of care that is 
required for different types of residents and to compensate providers accordingly.  
Regardless of the method of reimbursement, the intent is to provide an incentive 
to nursing home owners or operators to lower their cost of providing care to public-pay 
residents.  The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 repealed the Boren Amendment 
giving states even more flexibility in setting nursing home payment rates and causing the 
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nursing home industry to raise concerns that lower Medicaid reimbursement rates would 
adversely affect quality of care (Wiener and Stevenson 1998). 
In 2003, no states were using a retrospective reimbursement method, twenty-one 
states were using a facility-specific method, four states were using a prospective class 
(flat-rate) method, twenty-four states were using a prospective-adjusted method, and one 
state was using a combination method.  The dilemma for most states in deciding upon 
which type of reimbursement method to employ and the subsequent rate setting is how to 
ensure quality and access while controlling costs (Swan and Harrington 1985). 
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter is intended to provide an overview of the literature relating to two 
distinct characteristics of the nursing home industry investigated in this dissertation; 
quality of care and access to care.  Each section summarizes those studies that have 
analyzed the effects of CON and/or moratorium policies with separate subsections that 
describe some of the other variables considered important predictors of nursing home 
quality and access within the relevant literature.  Additionally, a brief description of the 
impact of supply regulations on the cost of nursing home care is included to support the 
findings of this research that CON/moratorium policies may no longer be achieving their 
original intent. 
 
3.1 Nursing Homes and Quality 
Quality of nursing home care has been a concern for the public as well as 
policymakers for the last thirty years and still remains a concern today.  Providing the 
first real insight into the problems that were occurring throughout the industry, Vladeck 
(1980) documents instances of abuse, neglect, and a general “lack of concern” in the care 
of nursing home residents.  During the 1980s, reports still found the quality of nursing 
home care to be low (IOM 1986; GAO 1987).  As of November 1985, 25 percent of 
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SNFs and 16 percent of ICFs were noncompliant for two or more of the requirements to 
be Medicare and Medicaid certified (GAO 1987).  As a result of the Institute of 
Medicine’s (IOM) report in 1986 (IOM 1986), the Nursing Home Reform Act of OBRA 
87 altered the focus of the standards that nursing homes were required to meet in order to 
participate in Medicare and Medicaid.  Not only were the standards for the delivery of 
care emphasized but also the results of that care.  Stricter requirements were established 
to maintain compliance along with an expansion of enforcement sanctions that could be 
placed on those homes found to be noncompliant.   
Although improvement has been documented in some instances after the passage 
of OBRA 87 (IOM 1996), throughout the last decade many reports continue to document 
what is considered unacceptable treatment of nursing home residents (CMS 2001; U.S. 
House of Representatives 2002; GAO 1998; GAO 1999; GAO 2002).  Between July 
1995 and February 1998, 407 of 1,370 nursing homes in California were cited for care 
violations considered as “serious” under federal or state deficiency categories (GAO 
1998).3  The number of abuse violations of all homes increased every year from 5.9 
percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 2000 (CMS 2001).  Between March 2001 and August 
2002, 39 percent of nursing homes in Texas were cited for “potential-to-harm” violations 
and 47 percent had “actual harm” violations or worse (U.S. House of Representatives 
2002). 
A recently issued report states that for the 18-month period ending January 2002, 
20 percent of nursing homes “were cited for deficiencies involving actual harm or 
                                                 
3 Prior to 2001, CMS was known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).  The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has regulatory authority overseeing nursing homes’ compliance 
with Medicare and Medicaid participation requirements.  See Table A.1 in Appendix A for the list of 
CMS’s Deficiency Classification System. 
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immediate jeopardy to residents” (GAO 2003).  Although this percentage is down from 
29 percent in the previous survey period, violations continue to occur and residents are 
still being harmed.  Nursing home quality continues to be an important issue of concern 
worthy of continued assessment and analysis. 
Often considered a value-based construct, a universally accepted definition of 
health care quality does not exist.  Policymakers, health care professionals, 
administrators, owners, investors, third-party insurers, and consumers base their 
definition of quality on their own subjective criteria resulting from their preferences for 
desired outcomes from such care (Davis 1991).  It is often difficult to reach a consensus 
on what defines technical medical quality.  It is even harder to define the less tangible 
characteristics of what is considered “caring and decent” treatment of residents in nursing 
homes (Nyman 1987).  Consequently the literature on nursing home quality is widely 
disparate in its measurement of quality as well as in the results of measuring the effects of 
different policies and facility characteristics on nursing home quality.   
The following subsections discuss the measurement of nursing home quality, the 
effect of CON and/or construction moratorium on the quality of care, the effect of a 
change in the reimbursement rate under excess demand on the quality of care, and the 
effect of other predictor variables commonly used in the literature on the quality of care 
in nursing homes. 
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3.1.1 Measuring Nursing Home Quality 
Perhaps the most widely accepted paradigm for measuring health care quality was 
developed by Donabedian and describes three distinct categories of quality assessment: 
structure, process, and outcome (Donabedian 1966, 1988).  This framework was 
originally developed for the study of medical care delivery and has been widely used in 
the literature on nursing homes.  Structural evaluation looks at the attributes of the setting 
in which the care is being provided.  Examples of this type of measurement include the 
physical amenities of the facility, qualifications of the staff, and the administrative 
organization of the facility (Ullmann 1981).  Process evaluation measures the types and 
quantities of services actually provided to residents against the professionally accepted 
standards of appropriate care for specific problems or conditions.  Included in this type of 
measurement are the therapy services offered, the use of physical restraints, and the use 
of urethral catheterization.  Outcome evaluation assesses the actual health and well being 
of the resident.  Measurements of this type include mortality, change in functional status, 
and facility-acquired pressure sores.4 
According to Donabedian, his three-part approach to quality measurement does 
not depend more heavily on one aspect than another but that its effectiveness is possible 
“only because good structure increases the likelihood of good process, and good process 
increases the likelihood of a good outcome” (Donabedian 1988).  Most of the nursing 
home literature focuses on structural and process measures of quality.  Ideally the use of 
outcome measures of quality is considered the “gold standard.”  However, data on these 
types of measurements have been difficult to obtain.  Furthermore, care must be given in 
                                                 
4 Table A.2 in Appendix A details common measurements of structure, process, and outcome as referenced 
by the Institute of Medicine (1996). 
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recognizing that measures such as mortality and a decline in health status are often 
natural occurrences with the elderly and frail residents in nursing homes.  Additionally, 
often times the same variable is used as a predictor of quality in one study and as an 
indicator of quality in another (Davis 1991).  Staff-to-resident ratios and expenditures are 
two examples of variables that have served both as predictors of quality as well as 
indicators of quality.  Higher staff-to-resident ratios are often considered an indicator of 
higher quality in some studies (Birnbaum, et al. 1981; Bishop 1980; Elwell 1984; Fottler, 
et al. 1981; Nyman 1988b) while used as a predictor of higher quality (e.g., lower 
mortality) in another (Linn, et al. 1977).  Likewise, expenditures on nursing home care is 
considered an indicator of higher quality, i.e. higher expenditures implies higher quality, 
in some studies (Meiners 1982; Nyman 1988a; Ullmann 1984) while used as a predictor 
of higher quality (e.g., use of rehabilitation services) in others (Birnbaum, et al. 1981; 
Ullmann 1985).  As a result, no consensus really exists on a comprehensive set of 
outcome measures of quality of care in nursing homes to be used as a substitute for 
structure or process measures (Shaughnessy, et al. 1990).  While not necessarily true 
measures of health status, process measures are often considered measures of substandard 
care (IOM 1986; Spector and Takada 1991) and therefore, most of the early studies on 
quality in nursing homes utilize structural and process measures of quality while more 
recent work includes several outcome measures of quality. 
 
3.1.2 Nursing Home Quality and CON 
Most of the early empirical research on nursing home quality utilizes Scanlon’s 
model of a monopolistically competitive market providing the same level of care to both 
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private-pay and public-pay residents.  When the number of prospective residents is 
greater than the supply of nursing home beds, the nursing home provides care to private-
pay residents first since the private-pay price is typically greater than the Medicaid 
payment rate.  Therefore, under the conditions of a binding CON policy, a nursing home 
has no real incentive to compete for Medicaid residents on the basis of quality since at 
any quality level a sufficient number of Medicaid residents are available to fill an empty 
nursing home bed. 
Currently, the literature does not include any investigation into the differences in 
quality, if any, between those states without CON and/or moratorium policies and those 
states that have such a policy in place for nursing homes.  In one study that analyzes the 
effects of competition on nursing home quality, the presence of a statewide nursing home 
construction moratorium results in a lower level of quality of care (Zinn 1994).  Viewed 
as a barrier to entry, a moratorium reduces competition and provides no incentive to 
provide higher quality.  Using data from the 1987 Medicare and Medicaid Automated 
Certification Survey (MMACS) and the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS), Zinn 
finds that a moratorium on nursing home construction leads to lower RN staffing and a 
higher percentage of residents physically restrained thus implying lower quality while 
controlling for market concentration, area demographics, and Medicaid policies as well 
as resident and facility characteristics (Zinn 1994).  
 
3.1.2.1 Nursing Home Quality and Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
During the period of Federal CON many proponents of the nursing home industry 
declared that quality was “low” because Medicaid reimbursement rates were too low.  
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One part of the literature on nursing home quality investigates the effects of Medicaid 
reimbursement rates and CON on nursing home quality.  Although not employing a direct 
measure of the presence of a CON and/or moratorium policy, but rather a measure of 
excess demand (indicating the presence of a binding CON policy), an influential series of 
papers assess the impact of a change in the Medicaid reimbursement rate on nursing 
home quality.  Because a binding CON policy provides no incentive to nursing homes to 
compete for Medicaid residents on the basis of quality, the theory argues that under such 
a binding constraint a higher payment level actually leads to lower quality (Gertler 1989, 
1992; Nyman 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1989b).   
Under conditions of excess demand, the proportion of Medicaid and private-pay 
residents in a nursing home are found to be endogenous with quality.  Recognizing the 
joint determination of quality and the number of private-pay residents and the bias that 
would result from using ordinary least squares (OLS), two studies using 1978-79 data 
from the state of Wisconsin employ the method of 2SLS (Nyman 1985, 1988b).  
Additionally, Nyman uses OLS for comparative purposes since most of the early 
literature studying the nursing home industry uses OLS.  The main equation of interest, 
the quality equation, estimates the weighted number of Medicaid certification violations 
in a home (a negative measure of quality) as a function of the number of private-pay 
residents in the home, the average number of unfilled beds in the county in which the 
home is located (represents the likelihood that a home is not operating in a market with 
excess demand), a measure for the Medicaid reimbursement rate, as well as several 
demographic and facility characteristics as control variables.  Nyman’s results show that, 
under excess demand, an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate decreases quality.   
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Using 1983 data from Wisconsin, Nyman (1988a) uses OLS to estimate the 
relationship between excess demand and nursing home expenditures.  In this study, 
nursing home expenditures serve as a proxy for quality.  When excess demand exists, 
nursing homes are able to lower costs by lowering quality without reprisal since 
prospective residents, especially Medicaid-eligible individuals, are usually forced to 
accept the first bed that becomes available regardless of the quality of the home.  
Separating the data into two groups, those homes in a county with a tight bed supply and 
those homes in a county with a surplus bed supply, the results show that nursing homes in 
counties with a tight bed supply spend significantly less on resident care than those with a 
surplus bed supply.  Utilizing the same data set and employing OLS as well as 2SLS, 
Nyman (1989b) finds that nursing homes in counties with a tighter bed supply have more 
Medicaid violations than those counties with a surplus bed supply. 
To account for the same endogeneity issue but using 1980 New York state-level 
data, two studies estimate a reduced-form equation of the effect of a change in 
reimbursement rate on quality (Gertler 1989, 1992).  At the time of the studies, New 
York utilized a cost-plus method of reimbursement.  Additionally, even though no direct 
or proxy measure for CON was utilized, the data were from a time when New York was 
under CON regulation and was considered as facing excess demand conditions.  Gertler 
(1989) uses three input measures of quality: hundreds of nursing labor hours, hundreds of 
other labor hours, and a supplies quantity index.  The two labor hours measures are 
adjusted for productivity differences across the nursing homes to eliminate the concern 
that a nursing home spending more labor hours on care may not necessarily mean the 
home is of higher quality; perhaps the nursing home is simply more inefficient.  While 
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controlling for resident, facility, economic, demographic, and market characteristics, the 
results show that an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate improves access for 
Medicaid residents but lowers quality.  Similarly, Gertler (1992) finds the same result 
using total Medicaid expenditures as the measure of quality. 
In later work, Cohen and Spector (1996) use the 1987 Institutional Population 
Component (IPC) of the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) to assess the 
effect of the Medicaid reimbursement rate on quality.  The NMES IPC is a nationally 
representative sample of residents in or admitted to nursing and personal care homes as 
well as homes for the mentally retarded.  In this study, two different strategies are used to 
assess the effects of the Medicaid reimbursement rate on quality.  First, the effect of the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate on staff intensity is estimated, and then the effect of staff 
intensity on resident outcomes is examined to see if more intense staffing results in better 
outcomes.  Second, the authors estimate a “global effect” of reimbursement on outcomes 
by measuring the direct effect of the Medicaid reimbursement rate on outcomes without 
using staff intensity as a right-hand side variable. 
Quality is first proxied by three structural measures adjusted for case-mix: RNs 
per 100 residents, licensed practical nurses (LPNs) per 100 residents, and total nursing 
staff per 100 residents.  Then three outcome measures are estimated: mortality, the 
presence of a pressure sore, and a change in functional status.  The three staffing 
equations are estimated with 2SLS to account for the endogeneity of the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate.  The other explanatory variables include the number of empty beds 
per 1,000 aged 75 and over by county (used as a measure of market tightness to represent 
excess demand), the statewide average level of Medicaid reimbursement, a vector of 
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facility characteristics, a vector of supply and demand factors, and several policy 
variables.  The mortality and pressure sore models are estimated using logistic regression 
while the functional status model is estimated using OLS with resident health and 
demographic characteristics, RN, LPN, and aide staffing levels, state quality regulation 
policies, and ownership type serving as control variables.  The “global” effect is 
estimated for each of the outcome measures including as right-hand side variables the 
reimbursement variables and the exogenous variables from the staffing and outcome 
equations.  The results indicate that an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate has a 
positive and significant impact on the number of LPNs per 100 residents but not RNs or 
total staffing.  The results of the outcome equations indicate that a higher RN staffing 
intensity leads to lower mortality, fewer pressure sores, and improvements in functional 
status, all indicating higher quality.  However, in the “global” effects model, an increase 
in the reimbursement rate does not have a significant impact on outcomes. 
More recent work employs a three-part methodology to empirically test the effect 
of a change in the Medicaid reimbursement rate on nursing home quality (Grabowski 
1999, 2001a, 2001b).  Noting that the previously cited work by Scanlon, Nyman, and 
Gertler assumes that nursing homes are integrated facilities, i.e., they serve both private-
pay and public-pay residents, the first stage of Grabowski’s methodology models the 
choice of payer mix regime (public-only, integrated, private-only); the second stage 
models the choice of payer mix conditional on the home choosing to be an integrated 
facility, and finally, the third stage models the quality decision.  In these studies quality is 
proxied by an outcome measure: the proportion of residents with facility-acquired 
pressure sores (Grabowski 1999, 2001b);  structural measures: the number of RNs 
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(Grabowski 2001b) and professional and non-professional staffing levels (Grabowski 
2001a); process measures: medication error rates, use of physical restraints, use of 
catheters, and use of feeding tubes (Grabowski 2001a) and a composite of process and 
outcome measures: the number of nursing home deficiency citations (Grabowski 1999, 
2001a).  The explanatory variables include measures of resident case-mix, various facility 
characteristics, state-level Medicaid reimbursement policies, and market-based (county) 
characteristics including the number of empty beds per elderly population to represent the 
measure of excess demand.   
Using 1995-96 data on all U.S. Medicaid-certified nursing homes, Grabowski’s 
results show that an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate leads to a small, but 
significant increase in nursing home quality.  Additionally, replicating Gertler’s reduced-
form model using all U.S. nursing homes in 1981 and all nursing homes in the state of 
New York for the 1995-96 time period, the OLS results also indicate that an increase in 
the Medicaid reimbursement rate increases quality.  These results are contrary to the 
results obtained by Nyman and Gertler.  Grabowski attributes this result in part to the fact 
that occupancy rates of nursing homes, an indirect measure of excess demand, have been 
declining over the time period between the earlier studies and his studies.  Using multiple 
waves of the National Nursing Home Survey (NNHS), the national occupancy rate was 
92.9 percent in 1977, 91.8 percent in 1985 and 87.4 percent in 1995 (Strahan 1997).  This 
shift in the tightness of the market, which may represent a change in the prevalence of 
excess demand conditions, may help to explain the differences in the results between 
earlier studies (Gertler 1989, 1992; Nyman 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1989b) and Grabowski’s 
more recent studies. 
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3.1.3 Other Predictors of Nursing Home Quality 
 The literature concerning the nursing home industry is quite extensive beyond the 
use of CON and the Medicaid reimbursement rate as predictors of nursing home quality.  
Among those reviewed in this section are the ownership, size, and staffing levels of a 
facility, the resident mix and case-mix of a facility’s residents, and the method of 
Medicaid reimbursement.  While recognizing that each of the studies included in this 
portion of the literature review utilizes different data sets and methods of analysis, this 
section provides a summary of the results obtained when utilizing several of the other 
more important predictors of nursing home quality. 
 
3.1.3.1 Nursing Home Ownership 
 The ownership of a facility refers to whether the nursing home is established as 
for-profit, nonprofit, or government-owned.  A subset of the for-profit classification is 
corporate nursing home chains.  Economic theory provides a framework for analyzing the 
effect of ownership on nursing home behavior.  For-profit nursing homes’ motivation is 
assumed to be profit maximization, subject to various regulatory constraints, while a 
common assumption is for nonprofit homes to maximize their size, subject to quality and 
break-even constraints (Scanlon 1980b).  The tie-in of ownership with quality is often 
analyzed through the costs that nursing homes experience.  With higher costs indicating 
higher quality (and not less efficiency), cost minimization on the part of for-profit nursing 
homes may render profits and quality as conflicting objectives.  Much of the early 
empirical evidence using expenditures as a measure of quality supports a pattern of lower 
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expenditures in for-profit nursing homes thus indicating lower quality (Birnbaum, et al. 
1981; Frech III 1985; Frech III and Ginsburg 1981; Meiners 1982; Ullmann 1984). 
Utilizing various structural, process, and outcome measures of quality have led to 
inconclusive results concerning the effect of ownership on nursing home quality.  Using 
various structural indicators of quality, as well as various data sets and methods, some 
studies have found no significant difference between nonprofit and for-profit nursing 
homes (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Cohen and Spector 1996; Harrington, et al. 1998; Lee, et 
al. 1983; Winn 1974),  while others have found that nonprofits have higher quality 
(Aaronson, et al. 1994; Elwell 1984; Grabowski and Hirth 2002; Zinn 1994).  Likewise, 
the use of process measures of quality (Grabowski and Hirth 2002; Lee, et al. 1983; 
Nyman 1988c; Zinn 1994) as well as outcome measures of quality (Bliesmer, et al. 1998; 
Chou 2001; Cohen and Spector 1996; Harrington, et al. 2002; Harrington, et al. 2000c; 
Mukamel 1997; Nyman 1985, 1988c, 1989b; Porell, et al. 1998; Spector, et al. 1998; 
Spector and Takada 1991) have led to the same inconclusive evidence.  Finally, two 
studies utilizing composite measures of quality, one that includes structural and 
expenditure measures (Greene and Monahan 1981) and one that includes structural and 
outcome measures (Davis 1993), find that nonprofits have higher quality than for-profits. 
 
3.1.3.2 Nursing Home Size 
The literature on the relationship between quality of care and the size of a nursing 
home facility also provides conflicting results.  Quality of care and the size of a nursing 
home facility are often found to have a positive relationship.  This relationship is usually 
justified by one of two different explanations.  The first argues that larger homes tend to 
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have more highly trained and professional administrators, who in turn maintain higher 
resident standards.  In this case, size is seen as a proxy for administrative 
professionalism.  Secondly, it has been suggested that certain economies of scale exist in 
nursing home operations.  With a greater number of beds, nursing homes should be able 
to attract better personnel and provide a broader selection of services and hence provide 
higher quality.    With either explanation, size is expected to be related positively to the 
quality of care provided (Greene and Monahan 1981).  On the other hand, quality of care 
and the size of a nursing home facility are often found to have a negative relationship.  
Larger homes may provide less personal care, experience more problems, and experience 
management inefficiencies (Harrington, et al. 2000c; Nyman 1985). 
Most analyses of the relationship between quality and the size of nursing home 
facilities use the number of beds in the facility as the predictor of quality.  Inconsistent 
results occur regardless of whether a structural, process, or outcome measure of quality is 
used in the analysis.  Studies that have used a structural measure of quality, such as 
nursing hours per resident day, find that either a significant relationship does not exist 
(Cohen and Dubay 1990; Cohen and Spector 1996; Fottler, et al. 1981; Lee, et al. 1983) 
or that a negative relationship exists indicating that larger homes provide a lower level of 
quality (Aaronson, et al. 1994; Harrington, et al. 1998).  Nyman (1988c) shows that size 
does not have a significant relationship with two process measures of quality, resident 
care plans and diet plans, while Ullmann (1981) and Lee et al. (1983) show size has a 
positive relationship with an index of rehabilitation services indicating that larger homes 
provide a higher level of quality.  Size and outcome measures of quality, such as 
mortality and improvement in functional status are not significant in some studies (Linn, 
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et al. 1977; Porell, et al. 1998; Spector and Takada 1991) while size and deficiency 
citations or certification violations exhibit a positive relationship in other studies (Graber 
and Sloane 1995; Harrington, et al. 2000c; Nyman 1985, 1988b, 1989b).  
 
3.1.3.3 Nursing Home Staffing 
As a result of the IOM’s 1986 report on the poor quality of care in nursing homes 
and the subsequent passage of the Nursing Home Reform Act of OBRA 87, increased 
nurse staffing became a requirement for all Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing 
home facilities.  RNs, LPNs, licensed vocational nurses (LVNs), and NAs make up 
approximately 60 percent of total nursing home personnel (Harrington, et al. 1999) and 
provide the majority of care that nursing home residents receive.  Many studies 
consistently find a positive relationship between higher nurse staffing levels, especially 
RNs, and outcome measures of quality of care. 
One of the first studies to investigate the relationship between nurse staffing and 
outcome measures of quality finds that more RNs per resident are associated with lower 
mortality rates, improved resident health, and higher discharge rates (Linn, et al. 1977).  
More RN hours (Braun 1991), more RN hours per 100 residents (Cohen and Spector 
1996), more licensed nursing hours (Bliesmer, et al. 1998) and more LPN staffing levels 
(Porell, et al. 1998) result in lower mortality rates and less likelihood of death.  Higher 
nursing staff levels per resident (Spector and Takada 1991), more RNs and LPNs per 100 
residents (Cohen and Spector 1996), and more licensed nursing hours (Bliesmer, et al. 
1998) also result in improved functional status.  Harrington et al. (2000c) show that more 
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RN hours per resident day lead to lower levels of various measures of nursing home 
deficiencies.  While recognizing that health is not the only desirable outcome to be 
produced by nursing homes, Nyman (1988c) uses a measure of “quality of life” to 
represent good quality and finds that more nursing hours per resident day increases the 
quality of life.  Recognizing the importance of these findings, the IOM (1996) issued a 
committee report recognizing the importance of nurse staffing levels and recommended 
adding more RNs to the staff of nursing homes.  
 
3.1.3.4 Nursing Home Resident Mix 
Resident mix refers to the proportions of public-pay (Medicaid or Medicare) and 
private-pay residents in a nursing home facility.  Policymakers, nursing home industry 
proponents, and researchers often assert that nursing homes with higher numbers of 
public-pay residents are constrained by lower per diem rates.  As a consequence, it is 
reasoned that these nursing homes provide a lower level of quality since the public-pay 
reimbursement rates are usually lower than the rate charged to private-pay residents.  
Many studies investigate the relationship between resident mix and nursing home quality.  
Again many early studies use expenditures to represent nursing home quality.  
With the idea that higher expenditures imply higher quality, many of these studies find 
that the proportion of public-pay (Medicaid) residents results in nursing homes providing 
a lower level of quality (Birnbaum, et al. 1981; Elwell 1984; Nyman 1988a; Ruchlin and 
Levey 1972; Schlenker and Shaughnessy 1984).  However, as Davis (1991) notes, a very 
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important question to answer is whether lower expenditures impede structural, process 
and outcome quality. 
Assessing this relationship between quality and resident mix, some studies use 
various staffing measures to represent a structural measure of quality with the percentage 
of Medicaid, Medicare, or private-pay residents as the predictor variable.  Fottler et al. 
(1981) and Zinn (1994) find that an increase in the percentage of Medicaid residents 
leads to a lower level of RN staffing, thus implying lower quality.  Conversely, 
Harrington et al. (1998) find that an increase in the percentage of Medicaid residents 
leads to an increase in the average number of LVN and LPN hours per resident day 
implying that these two types of nursing services improve quality.  Alternatively, Zinn 
(1993) finds that an increase in the percentage of Medicare residents as well as an 
increase in the percentage of private-pay residents increases the number of LPNs per 
resident and the number of RNs per resident, respectively.  
Fewer studies have investigated the relationship between process measures of 
quality and resident mix.  Nyman (1988c) finds no significant relationship between the 
percentage of Medicaid residents and ratings of resident care plans, diet plans or 
medication plans.  Likewise, Zinn (1994) finds a nonsignificant relationship between the 
percentage of Medicaid residents and the percentage of residents catheterized as well as 
the percentage restrained but finds a positive relationship between the percentage of 
Medicaid residents and the percentage not toileted.   
The results using outcome measures of quality, such as facility deficiencies and 
changes in functional status tend to be more consistent across studies.  Several studies 
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find that the percentage of Medicaid residents is associated with worse outcomes 
(Harrington, et al. 2002; Harrington, et al. 2000c; Nyman 1988b) while the percentage of 
Medicare and/or the percentage of private-pay residents is typically associated with better 
outcomes (Nyman 1985, 1989b; Porell, et al. 1998; Spector and Takada 1991). 
 
3.1.3.5 Nursing Home Case-Mix 
Nursing homes serve different types of residents requiring different levels of care.  
Studies usually include measures of case-mix to serve as an indicator of the severity of a 
resident’s functional condition.  One of the most widely used measures of resident case-
mix is the activities of daily living (ADL) index developed by Katz (1963).  This index 
summarizes a resident’s over-all performance in six functions: bathing, dressing, 
toileting, transferring, continence, and eating.  The higher the index value the more 
severe is the resident’s functional condition.  Another measure of case-mix frequently 
used in the literature is the Resource Utilization Groups (RUG).  The RUGs approach 
categorizes residents according to the amount of resources required for their care.  By 
classifying residents into homogeneous categories based on their resource utilization, this 
type of case-mix index represents, at least relatively, the time or cost of the average 
resident in the group (Fries 1990).  Now in its third version, a higher RUG index 
indicates a greater degree of complexity and, consequently, a greater need for input 
resources (Fries, et al. 1994).  Additionally, certain process measures as well as the 
percentage of SNF residents in the nursing home facility are used in some studies as 
measures of resident case-mix. 
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Various measures of nursing home staffing are the predominant structural 
measure of quality within the nursing home literature when examining the effect of case-
mix.  One might conclude that a more severe resident case-mix requires greater staffing.  
However, once again the literature gives conflicting evidence.  Using a long-term care 
index representing functional severity of nursing home residents as the indicator of case-
mix, Cohen and Dubay (1990) find a positive relationship between case-mix and nurses 
per bed while Aaronson et al. (1994) find a negative relationship with care staff per bed.  
However, two studies employing a modified ADL index both find that a more severe 
case-mix leads to higher staffing levels (Grabowski 2001b; Harrington, et al. 1998).  
Using process measures of quality, the evidence is also mixed concerning the 
relationship between quality of care and case-mix.  Nyman finds that more residents with 
special needs is not a significant predictor of quality (Nyman 1988c) while Zinn (1994) 
finds higher functional severity has a positive relationship with the percentage of 
residents catheterized but a negative relationship with the percentage restrained.  Two 
other studies find a positive relationship between a more severe case-mix and several 
process measures representing “poor” quality of care indicating that homes with a more 
severe case-mix provide lower levels of quality (Aaronson, et al. 1994; Mukamel 1997). 
The use of deficiencies as an outcome measure of quality also presents opposing 
results.  In several studies, a more severe case-mix leads to more nursing home violations 
(“lower” quality) (Graber and Sloane 1995; Grabowski 2001b; Harrington, et al. 2002) 
while leading to less deficiencies (“higher” quality) in another (Harrington, et al. 2000c).   
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3.1.3.6 Nursing Home Reimbursement Methods 
Reimbursement methods refer to the way in which Medicare and state Medicaid 
programs pay for nursing home care.  Setting Medicaid reimbursement rates for nursing 
home care is one way that states attempt to control expenditures.  However, states focus 
not only on the overall level of reimbursement but also on the payment method by which 
they pay nursing home providers.  As described previously in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1, 
reimbursement policies differ most fundamentally on two issues: whether rates are set 
retrospectively or prospectively and if the resulting prospective rate is based on facility-
specific costs or on a flat-rate set independently of an individual facility’s costs (Wiener 
and Stevenson 1998). 
A retrospective reimbursement method provides the least cost containment 
incentives because the resulting reimbursement rate is based on actual costs incurred.  In 
contrast facility-specific and flat-rate systems provide the greatest incentive for nursing 
home facilities to be efficient because with these methods a nursing home’s profits are 
the difference between its payment and its expenses.  However, if facilities limit their 
services in order to increase their profits, quality of care may be adversely affected.  
Additionally, with a retrospective reimbursement method Medicaid revenue increases 
when more quality is provided because costs are assumed to increase with quality, an 
incentive may exist to provide more quality.  In contrast, a facility reimbursed by a 
facility-specific or flat-rate method does not receive an increase in the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate when more quality is provided and therefore has no financial 
incentive to increase its quality of care. 
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Most of the empirical studies using structural measures of quality lend support to 
the theoretical expectations of lower nursing home quality in states that employ a facility-
specific or flat-rate reimbursement system.  Cohen and Dubay (1990) find that nursing 
homes in states using a flat-rate reimbursement method have fewer nurses per bed than 
those homes in states using a retrospective reimbursement method.  However, these 
authors find no significant difference between those homes in states using a facility-
specific reimbursement method and those homes in states using a retrospective method.  
Compared to a retrospective method, Zinn (1994) finds this same negative relationship 
for both a facility-specific and flat-rate reimbursement method and the number of RNs 
per resident.  Cohen and Spector (1996) find the same negative relationship between a 
flat-rate reimbursement method compared to a retrospective method for the number of 
RNs but a positive relationship for the number of LPNs.  In a more recent study, 
Grabowski (2001b) finds the same negative relationship between a facility-specific 
reimbursement method and the number of RNs compared to a retrospective method and 
an even lower level of quality associated with a  flat-rate method compared to a facility-
specific method.  However, under conditions of excess demand, Grabowski finds that the 
method of reimbursement becomes nonsignificant. 
Studies using process measures of quality provide inconclusive results.  Lee et al. 
find that retrospective and flat-rate methods, compared to facility-specific, lead to lower 
levels of rehabilitation services offered to residents.  Zinn finds that a prospective method 
leads to a greater percentage of residents restrained while a flat-rate method leads to a 
greater percentage of residents not toileted.   
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Unlike the structural and process measures of quality, outcome measures are 
typically not significant different across reimbursement methods.  Cohen and Spector 
(1996) find no significant difference between reimbursement methods and mortality, 
presence of a pressure sore, or a change in functional status.  Likewise, Grabowski 
(2001b) finds similar results using the percentage of residents with facility-acquired 
pressure sores as the measure of quality. 
Case-mix reimbursement systems are designed to mitigate the disincentives of 
flat-rate and facility-specific methods of reimbursement to limit nursing home services in 
order to lower operating costs and to limit the temptation of only admitting lighter-care 
nursing home residents.  Under case-mix reimbursement, nursing homes receive a higher 
reimbursement rate when individuals require more services.  The major theoretical 
strength of case-mix reimbursement is that it should make nursing homes indifferent to 
the relative care needs of the individuals they admit.  One major criticism of this type of 
reimbursement system however is that it creates a disincentive for nursing homes to 
provide rehabilitation to its more disabled residents (Wiener and Stevenson 1998). 
With respect to structural measures of quality, Cohen and Dubay (1990) find that 
use of case-mix reimbursement does not have a significant effect on the number of nurses 
per bed.  In contrast, Zinn (1994) finds that use of  case-mix reimbursement leads to an 
increase in the number of RNs per resident.  In two separate studies, Grabowski finds that 
case-mix does not show a significant relationship with the number of RNs in one study 
(Grabowski 2001b) and finds a nonsignificant relationship for the number of RNs, a 
negative relationship with the number of LPNs, and a positive relationship with the 
number of NAs in the second study (Grabowski 2002).   
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With process measures of quality, Zinn (1994) finds that use of  case-mix 
reimbursement leads to a decrease in the percentage of residents not toileted.  However, 
Grabowski (Grabowski 2002) finds that a case-mix reimbursement method has a 
nonsignificant relationship with both the percentage of residents with catheters and the 
percentage of residents with feeding tubes but a positive relationship with the percentage 
of residents with physical restraints.  However, when separating the data into the most 
and least tight markets, the number of RNs has a positive relationship with case-mix 
reimbursement in the most and least tight markets (the measure of excess demand), the 
number of LPNs is not significant in either market and the number of NAs is positive in 
the tightest market and negative in the least tight market.  Also in the tightest market, 
there is a decline in the percentage of residents with catheters as well as the percentage of 
residents with feeding tubes when case-mix reimbursement is used (Grabowski 2002). 
Few studies have investigated the relationship of case-mix reimbursement and 
outcome measures of quality.  Two studies by Grabowski show that, although the 
resulting coefficient is negative, there is no significant relationship between case-mix 
reimbursement and the percentage of residents with facility acquired pressure sores for 
the full sample as well as the most and least tight markets (Grabowski 2001b, 2002).   
One possible interpretation of these results between reimbursement method and 
quality of care is that prospective and flat-rate methods of reimbursement may result in 
more adverse quality of care than a retrospective method while case-mix reimbursement 
may not adversely affect the quality of care and in some cases improve the quality of care 
provided to nursing home residents. 
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3.2 Nursing Homes and Access to Care 
Access to nursing home care is typically defined in the literature as the ability of 
an individual seeking nursing home care to obtain admission to a nursing home facility.  
As quoted by Blumstein and Sloan (1978) one of the major goals of the 1974 National 
Health Planning and Resources Development Act include achieving “equal access to 
quality health care at a reasonable cost” and improving the “maldistribution of health care 
facilities and manpower” and one of the Act’s  first priorities is the “provision of primary 
care services for medically underserved populations”.  While the main goal of CON 
regulation is the containment of the share of medical care expenditures paid for by the 
federal and state governments one of the perhaps unintended consequences of this type of 
regulation in the nursing home industry is reduced access to care for public-pay and 
“heavy-care” residents (Cotterill 1983; Feder and Scanlon 1980; Greenlees, et al. 1982; 
Scanlon 1980a, 1980b; Schlenker 1986).  The two reasons most often cited by 
researchers of the nursing home industry are (1) the excess demand for nursing home 
beds caused by CON and/or construction moratorium and (2) the low level of the public-
pay reimbursement rate. 
 
3.2.1 Nursing Home Access and CON 
Although CON and construction moratorium policies are designed to control 
government expenditures by limiting the number of nursing home beds, they also create 
potential barriers to entry for new providers.  As a consequence, when a constraint such 
as CON is binding, excess demand for nursing home care may result in many markets.  
As described by Scanlon (1980b) in his excess demand model of the nursing home 
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market, a profit-maximizing facility first admits the higher-paying private residents and 
then fills the remaining empty beds with lower-paying Medicaid residents.  Thus, when 
the number of nursing home beds is constrained the private-pay demand is satisfied first 
and any remaining demand becomes “excess Medicaid demand.”  As a result, Medicaid 
residents will have access to those homes least capable of competing successfully for 
private-pay residents, perhaps due to lower quality of care; and with such a limited 
choice, public-pay residents often have no option but to enter whatever facility will 
accept them, even though it may provide undesirable quality of care (Hawes and Phillips 
1986).  Additionally, there is what is referred to in the literature as “cream-skimming”; 
when a Medicaid-eligible individual is admitted to a nursing home, it will be the lighter-
care individual that will be admitted before a heavy-care individual since the former 
represents a more profitable resident (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Frech III 1985; Hawes and 
Phillips 1986). 
As with the relationship between quality of care and CON and/or construction 
moratorium policies, the existing literature does not provide insight into any differences 
in access to nursing home care that may exist between those states without CON policies 
and those states that have such policies.  Nor does the existing literature shed much 
insight into the direct effect of these types of policies on nursing home access for public-
pay residents.  Feder and Scanlon (1980) attribute the access problem for Medicaid 
residents directly to the excess demand caused by CON regulation.  Conducting 
interviews in eight states in 1978, many of the states they visited reported access 
problems for their Medicaid-eligible individuals, especially those with heavy-care needs.  
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The authors attribute the problem to a bed shortage that enables nursing home operators 
to discriminate in favor of light-care residents. 
Early work by Lee et al. (1983) estimates a multi-equation simultaneous model of 
nursing home behavior using data from the National Center for Health Statistics’ 1973-
1974 Nursing Home Survey.  One of the equations estimates the effect of the presence of 
CON on a nursing home’s occupancy rate and then this result is used as one of the 
explanatory variables to estimate the percentage of total resident days provided to 
private-pay residents.  The study finds a positive relationship between CON and 
occupancy rates as well as a positive relationship between occupancy rate and the 
percentage of total resident days provided to private-pay residents.  This result indicates 
that, at the time, public-pay residents had less access to nursing home care relative to 
private-pay residents.  
Again, although not a direct measure of CON, many studies estimate the effect of 
excess demand on access to nursing home care for public-pay residents.  Many of these 
studies analyze data from the time of Federal CON regulation and when nursing homes 
were experiencing high occupancy rates (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Ettner 1993; Gertler 
1992; Harrington and Swan 1987; Nyman 1989a; Reschovsky 1996).  While each of 
these studies employs a different data set, methodology, measure of excess demand and 
measure of access, the results consistently show that public-pay residents have less access 
to nursing home care than private-pay residents.   
Nyman (1989a) utilizes county-level data for nursing homes in the state of 
Wisconsin from 1983 to assess the impact of excess demand on access to nursing home 
care for Medicaid recipients.  While controlling for demographic and Medicaid policy 
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variables as well as a measure of quality, the OLS result for the effect of excess demand 
(the number of beds per thousand elderly) on the number of Medicaid residents (the 
number of Medicaid residents per thousand elderly) is negative indicating that an increase 
in excess demand decreases Medicaid-eligible individuals’ access to care.  Gertler 
(1992), using data from New York State in 1980 which at the time had a high occupancy 
rate and what was considered a binding CON, estimates a reduced-form equation of the 
effect of the number of beds in a facility on the number of Medicaid residents.  While 
controlling for several demand, supply, and policy variables as well as a measure of 
resident case-mix, the results indicate that a decrease in the number of beds, i.e., an 
increase in excess demand, leads to a decrease in the number of Medicaid residents. 
Utilizing a panel data set from 42 states for the entire period of 1978-1983, 
Harrington and Swan (1987) estimate the effect of nursing home beds per 1,000 aged 
(their measure of excess demand) on the number of Medicaid nursing home recipients per 
1,000 aged (their measure of access) at the state level using a fixed effects estimator.  
While controlling for several Medicaid policies and demographic variables, an increase in 
excess demand causes a decrease in nursing home access for Medicaid-eligible 
individuals.  Performing a cross-sectional analysis, Cohen and Dubay (1990) estimate a 
reduced-form regression equation of the effect of the number of Medicare-certified beds 
per elderly population aged 65+ (a measure of the tightness of the market) on the 
percentage of Medicaid residents in a nursing home facility.  Using data from the 1981 
Medicare cost reports and Medicare/Medicaid Automated Certification System 
(MMACS) files for 1,020 nursing homes throughout the United States, the results 
indicate a negative but nonsignificant relationship. 
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Pursuing a different technique, Ettner (1993) uses a probit model to estimate the 
impact of Medicaid status on the probability of being on a waiting list for a nursing home 
bed while controlling for resident mix, case-mix, and bed supply.  Using data from the 
1982-1984 National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS) Ettner finds that Medicaid-
eligible individuals have a greater probability of being on a waiting list and that these 
individuals face greater access problems than non-Medicaid individuals in areas where 
bed supply is constrained and that on the margin, Medicaid-eligible individuals benefit 
the most from an increase in the bed supply.  
Utilizing data from the National Long-Term Care Channeling Demonstration, 
Reschovsky (1996) uses a probit model to estimate the effect of the number of empty 
beds per 1,000 population aged 75+ on the probability of a Medicaid-eligible individual 
entering a nursing home, specified as the product of the probability of demand for such 
care and the probability that a nursing home admits the person conditional on demand.  
Using the interaction between the measure of bed availability and the expected net 
revenue from the sample person as a measure of market tightness, the results again 
indicate that the tighter the market condition the lower the probability of admission for 
Medicaid-eligible individuals. 
Furthermore, by limiting the number of nursing home beds, CON and 
construction moratorium not only provide nursing homes with the potential ability to 
choose which payer type (Medicaid or private) to admit but also with the potential ability 
to choose which type of Medicaid resident to admit.  Because every Medicaid-eligible 
individual will not be able to find an empty bed in the presence of excess demand, 
“heavy-care” Medicaid-eligible individuals may experience the most difficulty in gaining 
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access to nursing home care (Grabowski 2002).  Using a health status index representing 
severity of illness and the need for heavy-care, studies show that excess demand leads to 
fewer heavy-care residents being admitted to nursing homes while controlling for 
Medicaid policies as well as facility and area characteristics (Cohen and Dubay 1990; 
Nyman, et al. 1987). 
 
3.2.2 Other Predictors of Nursing Home Access 
In the existing literature, several variables are consistently used as predictors of 
nursing home access.  Among those reviewed in this section are the reimbursement rate, 
reimbursement method, case-mix, resident mix, and ownership of a nursing home 
facility.  While recognizing that each of the studies included in this portion of the 
literature review utilizes different data sets and methods of analysis, this section provides 
a summary of the results obtained when utilizing several of the other more important 
predictors of nursing home access. 
 
3.2.2.1 Nursing Home Reimbursement Rates and Methods 
In addition to the excess demand theory many researchers have attributed the 
difficulty of gaining access to nursing home care for Medicaid residents to lower-than-
cost Medicaid reimbursement rates.  Besides providing an incentive for nursing homes to 
admit private-pay residents before public-pay residents, a Medicaid rate that is lower than 
the private-pay rate also potentially provides nursing homes with a possible incentive to 
selectively admit those individuals with the fewest functional disabilities.  This incentive 
is particularly strong under reimbursement systems that provide the same Medicaid rate 
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for every resident regardless of the resident’s degree of physical impairment (Hawes and 
Phillips 1986).  Therefore, if all Medicaid residents in a given home bring in the same per 
diem reimbursement, nursing homes will be relatively reluctant to admit the most 
severely impaired residents, i.e., those needing “heavy care” (Holahan and Cohen 1987; 
Nyman, et al. 1987).  Even though at least one study finds that the marginal cost of the 
most dependent SNF resident is lower than the average Medicaid reimbursement rate for 
SNF residents, most studies of nursing home access include a measure of the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate (Mukamel and Spector 2002; Nyman 1988d).5  Using various 
measures to represent demand for nursing home care as well as measures of 
demographic, resident, and facility characteristics as control variables, the results from 
various studies suggest that an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate improves 
access to nursing home care for public-pay residents (Aaronson, et al. 1994; Gertler 
1992; Greenlees, et al. 1982; Reschovsky 1996). 
Other papers have looked at the effect of the reimbursement method on access to 
nursing home care for public-pay residents and in particular those residents considered 
heavy-care.6  Many studies focus on four methods of reimbursement, retrospective, 
prospective-class (flat-rate), prospective-facility-specific, and prospective-case-mix 
adjusted, and their effect on access to nursing home care for Medicaid-eligible 
individuals.  In contrast to a retrospective reimbursement, which encourages nursing 
homes to increase expenditures, flat-rate and facility-specific reimbursement methods 
encourage nursing homes to minimize expenditures and produce efficiently while the 
                                                 
5 Nyman’s study uses data from New York State in 1983, which was at the time of Federal CON while 
Mukamel and Spector’s study uses data from New York State in 1991, which was still under CON 
regulation. 
6 The various Medicaid reimbursement methods are described in detail in section 2.3.1. 
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intended purpose of a case-mix adjusted reimbursement method is to make facilities 
indifferent to residents’ care needs when they seek admission.   
Since each state’s Medicaid reimbursement rate actually results from the choice 
of reimbursement method, Medicaid rates tend to be higher under retrospective 
reimbursement and lower as cost containment incentives increase under facility-specific 
and flat-rate methods (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Harrington and Swan 1984).  Therefore, it 
is expected that states with a retrospective reimbursement method will provide greater 
access to nursing home care than those states with a facility-specific or flat-rate 
reimbursement method.  Furthermore, those states with a facility-specific reimbursement 
method are expected to provide greater access for Medicaid residents than those with a 
flat-rate reimbursement method.   
Nyman (1990) suggests that simply covering the costs of each resident is 
insufficient to ensure access for heavy-care residents, particularly under conditions of 
excess demand.  The purpose of a prospective-case-mix-adjusted reimbursement method 
is that the use of case-adjusted rates would permit governments to pay higher 
reimbursement rates for heavier-care residents, thus creating an incentive for nursing 
homes to admit these types of residents.  Thus the main policy designed to insure that 
heavy-care residents gain access to nursing homes is represented by these case-adjusted 
prospective reimbursement systems.  The expected result of case-mix reimbursement is 
improved access to nursing homes for heavy-care Medicaid residents (Nyman, et al. 
1987; Weissert and Musliner 1992). 
The results in the literature however, are inconclusive.  Several studies find that 
states using a retrospective method actually have fewer Medicaid residents compared to 
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those that use a facility-specific method (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Lee, et al. 1983) but 
that those states that use a flat-rate method admit fewer Medicaid residents compared to 
those that use a retrospective method as the theory suggests (Cohen and Dubay 1990).   
Several studies have researched the effect of a case-mix reimbursement method 
on access to nursing homes for heavy-care Medicaid residents (Cohen and Dubay 1990; 
Grabowski 2002; Holahan and Cohen 1987; Norton 1992; Nyman, et al. 1987; Thorpe, et 
al. 1991).  Using various indexes to represent a measure of the severity of residents’ 
disability levels to represent access for heavy-care Medicaid residents, most studies find 
that the use of a case-mix reimbursement method leads to an increase in access for heavy-
care Medicaid residents (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Grabowski 2002; Holahan and Cohen 
1987; Norton 1992; Thorpe, et al. 1991).  However, Grabowski (2002) finds that the 
increase is not as large under conditions of excess demand while Nyman et al. (1987) find 
that under conditions of excess demand heavy-care residents have less access to nursing 
home care which supports the idea that homes located where they can choose among 
residents will select the lighter-care residents.  Overall, the literature seems to provide 
support to the theory that reimbursement methods that pay higher rates provide greater 
access to Medicaid residents and in particular to those residents requiring heavy-care. 
 
3.2.2.2 Nursing Home Resident Mix 
Studies that include a measure of a nursing home’s resident mix primarily use this 
variable to serve as an indicator of access for heavy-care residents rather than as an 
indicator of access for Medicaid residents in general.  The idea is to test whether or not 
nursing homes are able to “cream-skim.”  If an increase in the number of Medicaid 
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residents leads to an increase in a measure of disability or severity of illness, for example, 
then it could be said that the nursing home was not practicing “cream-skimming” by 
admitting only lighter-care residents.  On the other hand, if an increase leads to a 
decrease in the severity of illness or disability level then this result would support the 
notion that nursing homes prefer admitting lighter-care Medicaid residents for all the 
aforementioned reasons.  The few studies that have investigated this relationship do 
indeed find that an increase in the percentage of Medicaid residents results in a decrease 
in the severity of illness of nursing homes’ residents suggesting that nursing homes 
practice “cream-skimming” (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Nyman, et al. 1987).   
 
3.2.2.3 Nursing Home Ownership 
Studies also examine whether or not any differences exist between for-profit and 
nonprofit nursing home facilities with respect to the number of Medicaid residents 
admitted.  One theory suggests that: (1) since nonprofit nursing homes tend to have 
higher costs than for-profit nursing homes, (2) since Medicare residents tend to cost more 
relative to Medicaid and private-pay residents due to the “subacute” rather than the long-
term nature of their required care, and (3) since private-pay residents’ demand is a 
function of price and quality and increasing quality increases costs, nonprofit homes will 
be more oriented toward private-pay and Medicare residents than Medicaid residents and 
that for-profit homes will be more inclined to admit Medicaid residents.  Several studies 
support this result by finding for-profit nursing homes have more Medicaid residents 
compared to nonprofit nursing homes (Cohen and Dubay 1990; Lee, et al. 1983; Vladeck 
1980). 
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Indicating a different result, another theory suggests that nonprofits may rely 
more heavily on Medicaid residents as a source of revenue and therefore have more 
Medicaid residents than private-pay.  Supporting this theory, Gertler (1989) and Davis 
(1993) find that nonprofit nursing homes have a greater percentage of Medicaid residents 
compared to for-profit nursing homes while specifically accounting for nursing home 
case-mix. 
 
3.3 Nursing Homes and Costs 
The containment of public expenditures on medical care, due to their rapid growth 
after the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid, was one of the main goals of CON 
regulation.  Specific to the nursing home industry, although studies have shown that the 
rate of growth of nursing home beds has slowed with the use of CON and/or construction 
moratorium (Harrington, et al. 1997b; Swan and Harrington 1990), the evidence is not 
conclusive that CON and/or construction moratorium policies have been effective in 
reducing public expenditures for nursing home care or for long-term care in general.   
 
3.3.1 Nursing Home Costs and CON 
Early work typically examines the effects of CON policies on bed capacity (Feder 
and Scanlon 1980; Harrington, et al. 1997a; Harrington, et al. 1992; Harrington, et al. 
1997b) or the effects of bed capacity on Medicaid expenditures (Harrington and Swan 
1987; Swan 1990).  Other studies have looked at the effect of excess demand on 
Medicaid nursing home expenditures with most results indicating that under conditions of 
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excess demand nursing homes are able to lower their costs with impunity due to the lack 
of competition for residents (Davis and Freeman 1994; Nyman 1988a, 1988b). 
Although limiting the supply of nursing home beds is intended to constrain 
nursing home expenditures, Medicaid expenditures for all long-term care may not 
decrease due to the availability of community-based care, including home health care, as 
a substitute for nursing home care.  Two recent studies address the direct impact of 
nursing home supply regulations on Medicaid nursing home expenditures as well as 
Medicaid long-term care expenditures.  The first study investigates the effect of nursing 
home CON and/or moratorium policies on Medicaid nursing home per capita 
expenditures, as well as Medicaid long-term care per capita expenditures, using a random 
effects model for 1991 through 1997 with the state as the unit of analysis (Miller, et al. 
2002).  Data on nursing home and long-term care expenditures are from annual Medicaid 
Financial Management Reports, CMS Form 64, and include all states except Arizona.  
Included in the model are several variables to control for the demand for and the supply 
of nursing home care as well as state policies, including the type of reimbursement 
method, and state political factors.  The results indicate that the presence of either a 
nursing home CON, a nursing home moratorium or both a CON and moratorium has a 
positive, although not significant, effect on nursing home care per capita expenditures.  
Additionally, using Medicaid long-term per capita expenditures as the dependent variable 
and the same explanatory variables, this same study finds that the presence of a nursing 
home CON, a nursing home moratorium and both a CON and moratorium has a positive 
and significant effect on Medicaid long-term per capita expenditures.   
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The second study investigates the repeal of CON or moratorium policies on 
Medicaid nursing home expenditures as well as Medicaid long-term care expenditures 
(Grabowski, et al. 2003).  Unlike the study by Miller et al. (2002) that does not control 
for state or year fixed effects, Grabowski’s study uses a fixed effects model, for 1981 
through 1998, to control for the presence of unobserved state-specific as well as 
unobserved time-specific attributes that may influence both the elimination of CON or 
moratorium regulation and the level of nursing home and long-term care expenditures.  
The expenditure data include information on all states except Arizona from CMS’ Office 
of the Actuary.  Controlling for demographic and economic variables as well, the results 
indicate that those states without CON or moratorium policies have a very small, but 
statistically insignificant, increase in Medicaid nursing home expenditures as well as 
Medicaid long-term care expenditures.  Additionally, when the nursing home Medicaid 
expenditure data are decomposed into the per diem Medicaid rate and Medicaid recipient 
days, the results indicate that the repeal of CON did not statistically increase the 
Medicaid per diem rate or the number of Medicaid recipient days. 
These two studies are the first to actually investigate the effect of nursing home 
supply regulations on nursing home costs during the time period during which the 
Federal CON regulation was eliminated and in which some states eliminated their CON 
policy while other states kept their policy in place.  These studies provide supporting 
evidence to early studies that suggest that CON and/or moratorium policies are not 
having the intended effect of controlling Medicaid nursing home expenditures 
(Birnbaum, et al. 1981; Lee, et al. 1983).  These results also suggest that this type of 
regulation may not be having the intended effect of reducing Medicaid long-term care 
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expenditures.  One possible explanation is that market conditions have changed with 
respect to the lessening of excess demand and the increased availability of substitutes for 
nursing home care (Grabowski, et al. 2003). 
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Chapter Four 
Research Design 
 
This chapter focuses on the data and methods utilized in this dissertation.  The 
first section describes the objectives and hypotheses.  The second section describes the 
various sources of data as well as the procedures utilized to clean and merge the various 
data files.  The third section describes the variables included in each of the models.  The 
last section describes the methodologies applied and includes the specification of the 
models in the analysis of the differences in the quality of nursing home care and the 
access to nursing home care for those states with and those states without CON and/or 
construction moratorium regulation. 
 
4.1 Objectives and Hypotheses 
Since the elimination of Federal CON regulation in the nursing home industry, 
little empirical analysis has been performed to see if the quality of care and the access to 
care is any different between those states without CON and/or construction moratorium 
policies and those states that still have these policies in place.  The question remains if 
CON is effectively meeting its original intent of improving quality of care for nursing 
home residents, increasing the accessibility of nursing home care for public-pay 
residents, and containing public expenditures for nursing home care.  The specific 
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objectives of this dissertation are to investigate if CON regulation is achieving the goals 
of improving quality and increasing accessibility by analyzing whether or not any 
differences exist between those states without and those states with CON and/or 
moratorium policies in place.  These results, taken together with the results of Miller et 
al. (2002) and Grabowski et al. (2003) and, may shed some light on the effectiveness of 
retaining state-level CON and/or construction moratorium policies.   
The hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation are based on Scanlon’s (1980b) 
model of a monopolistically competitive market which provides the same level of care to 
both private-pay and public-pay residents and Nyman’s excess demand paradigm 
(Nyman 1985, 1988b, 1989b).  When the number of prospective residents is greater than 
the supply of nursing home beds, the nursing home provides care to private residents first 
since the private-pay price is typically greater than the Medicaid payment rate.  If CON is 
an effective barrier to entry and excess demand exists, and since the private-pay price is 
typically higher than the public-pay reimbursement rate, nursing homes will not have to 
compete for Medicaid-eligible individuals on the basis of quality since at any quality 
level a sufficient number of these individuals are available to fill an empty nursing home 
bed.  As a result, nursing homes are able to provide minimal quality of care and still 
attract as many Medicaid-eligible individuals as they desire.   
By eliminating CON and/or moratorium policies, nursing homes may have to 
compete on quality in order to attract private-pay as well as public-pay individuals.  
Additionally, elimination of these policies will lead to an increase in supply which will 
increase access for public-pay individuals since these are the ones who face the excess 
demand condition.  And since nursing homes are also able to discriminate between light-
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care and heavy-care individuals, elimination of a supply constraint may also increase 
access for heavy-care individuals.   
Formally stated, the following hypotheses will be tested in this dissertation: 
Hypothesis 1:  Quality of care is higher in nursing homes in states without CON and/or 
moratorium policies.  
Hypothesis 2: Access to care for Medicaid-eligible individuals is greater in nursing 
homes in states without CON and/or moratorium policies.  
 
4.2 Description of Data 
The data for this dissertation comes from five main sources: (1) the On-Line 
Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) system,7 (2) state-level Medicaid 
reimbursement data from the 1998 State Data Book on Long Term Care Program and 
Market Characteristics (Harrington, et al. 2000b), (3) surveys of state Medicaid offices 
and regulation departments conducted during this study, (4) the Area Resource File 
(ARF), and (5) the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional Economic 
Information System (REIS).  Sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.4 describe in detail each of these 
data sources while section 4.2.5 describes the construction of the data set utilized in this 
research. 
 
                                                 
7 Prior to OSCAR, the reporting mechanism was the Medicare/Medicaid Automated Certification System 
(MMACS). 
  62
4.2.1 The OSCAR Data System 
The OSCAR data system is a repository for data that is collected by state 
surveyors for all federally certified Medicare and Medicaid nursing home facilities in the 
United States.  These data are collected and maintained by CMS in order to determine 
whether or not nursing homes are in compliance with federal regulatory requirements.  In 
order to become certified every facility must have an initial survey to verify compliance.  
After the initial certification, states are surveyed no less than every 15 months to ensure 
continued compliance as well as verification of the correction of any previous 
deficiencies.  A nursing home is also required to be surveyed when there is a change in 
management or organization.  Finally, a home may be surveyed as part of a follow-up 
when a complaint has been filed that alleges substandard care (Harrington, et al. 2000a). 
The OSCAR data are collected in three separate files: (1) facility characteristics 
and staffing data, (2) resident characteristics, and (3) survey deficiencies.  Facility 
characteristics include measures such as size, ownership, certification status, and resident 
mix while staffing data consists of measures such as the number of full-time equivalent 
(FTE) RN, LPN, and aide nursing hours.  Resident characteristics include measures such 
as the average number of ADLs of the nursing home’s residents and the number of 
residents with physical restraints.  Survey deficiencies are classified into 17 major 
categories which include resident rights, quality of life, nursing services, and quality of 
care (Harrington, et al. 2000c).  
Recognizing the importance of the accuracy and reliability of survey data used in 
research, OSCAR data are collected in a two-part process.  First, nursing home personnel 
use standardized forms to record the facility characteristics, resident characteristics and 
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staffing levels at the beginning of each survey.  These reports are then certified by the 
facility as being correct.  This information is given to the state surveyors who audit the 
data by comparing the facility report with individual resident medical records, staffing 
records, and observations of residents.  Once the review is complete, the state staff enters 
the data into the OSCAR system.  In the second part of the process, the state surveyors 
decide if the facility has or has not met each federal standard based on information from 
several sources including, but not limited to, interviews with a sample of residents, family 
members, and staff as well as a review of resident and facility records.  Once a judgment 
concerning compliance is made, the state surveyor enters the data for each standard into 
OSCAR.   By using standard forms as well as sampling and survey procedures to ensure 
accuracy, this two-part process assures that state surveyors are determining deficiencies 
independently of the facility’s staff.  Furthermore, team members and state supervisors 
subsequently review the decisions of the state surveyor.  Additionally, facilities have the 
option to challenge and appeal decisions through an administrative review process 
(Harrington, et al. 2000a).   
The use of a database such as OSCAR always brings concerns about survey 
procedures and the reliability of surveys both across and within states in judging the 
quality of nursing home facilities.   In order to mitigate some of this concern, federal 
regulations were implemented in 1990 to improve the sampling procedures and survey 
methods used by the survey teams.  The federal procedures require state surveyors to use 
a stratified random sample of residents to conduct face-to-face interviews, closed record 
reviews, and individual as well as group structured interviews.  CMS also implemented 
new federal training for state surveyors.  Additionally since July 1995, federal surveyors 
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accompany and observe state surveyors on a selected number of surveys.  Through the 
Health Care Standards and Quality Bureau of CMS, federal survey teams resurvey a 
sample of facilities within sixty days of the state survey.  A “survey concurrence index” 
is created for what are considered key components from OSCAR for each state.  Any 
state that falls below the concurrence standards are then evaluated and monitored by 
CMS (Harrington, et al. 2000a). 
Although OSCAR is not considered an “ideal” database for research it is currently 
the most comprehensive, longitudinal information available for all Medicare/Medicaid 
certified nursing homes in the United States.8  Section 4.2.5 and its subsections discuss 
the construction of the sample used in this research, the elimination and cleaning of the 
OSCAR data, and the merging of the four data files. 
 
4.2.2 State-level Medicaid Reimbursement Data and Certificate of Need and 
Construction Moratorium Policies 
 
The 1998 State Data Book on Long Term Care Program and Market 
Characteristics (Harrington, et al. 2000b) is a book summarizing the findings from a 
project on state long-term care program and market characteristics conducted by 
researchers at the University of California, San Francisco, and Wichita State University 
under a cooperative agreement with CMS and the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development.  This 1998 version is an update of earlier releases which builds 
upon a cross-sectional longitudinal data set on long-term care program characteristics for 
                                                 
8 The Minimum Data Set (MDS) provides a comprehensive assessment of each resident's functional 
capabilities in each Medicare or Medicaid certified nursing home.  A Quality Indicator Report (QI) presents 
data on 24 “indicators” of quality at the state level.  However, this information is only available beginning 
in 2000. 
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each state that includes the years 1978-1998.  Collected by telephone survey, the data 
consist of information from three sources: (1) state long-term care providers, (2) state 
CON and moratorium programs, and (3) Medicaid reimbursement agencies.  This book 
provides the state reimbursement method as well the status of any CON and/or 
moratorium policy by year.  This dissertation uses information for the years 1991-1998 
from this book.  
For the years 1999-2003 I conducted a survey through telephone and e-mail of 
each state’s Medicaid reimbursement agency and CON/moratorium regulatory agency.  
For every state I obtained information for each year on whether or not the state had a 
CON, a moratorium, both, or neither type of regulation.  Additionally, I obtained the 
annual, average Medicaid per diem reimbursement rate for freestanding nursing facilities 
for every state except New Mexico.9  Lastly, I obtained the type of reimbursement 
method utilized for every state for each year which included whether or not the state 
adjusted the rate based on the case-mix of the residents.  Appendix A contains Tables 
A.3, A.4, A.5, and A6 which display the information on states’ CON policies, Medicaid 
reimbursement methods, whether or not case-mix adjustment is utilized, and Medicaid 
reimbursement rates for the years 1991-2003, respectively. 
The data utilized from these first two sources are not without drawbacks.  The 
primary issue is that the unit of observation in the empirical analysis is the individual 
nursing home while the reimbursement method, reimbursement rate, and CON policy are 
measured at the state-level.  While the reimbursement method and CON policy are 
typically assigned at the state-level, using the state-specific average annual 
                                                 
9 The econometric strategy used to control for the unavailability of New Mexico’s rate is discussed in 
section 4.3.4.3 of this chapter. 
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reimbursement rate for each nursing home in a state is not ideal.  However, using the 
average, annual per diem rate for the state eliminates the concern of potential endogeneity 
with a facility’s quality level, resident mix and case-mix that would exist if a facility-
level reimbursement rate was utilized.  The other issue associated with the rate 
information is that the rates are not necessarily measured with the same precision across 
states.   
 
4.2.3 The Area Resource File 
The Area Resource File (ARF) is a national, county-level health resources 
information database maintained by Quality Resource Systems, Inc. (QRS) under 
contract to the National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (NCHWA), Bureau of 
Health Professions within the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), 
which is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (QRS 2006).  
The file contains statistics on categories of health resources such as: health professions, 
health facilities, health professions training, and utilization.  It also contains specific 
geographic codes and descriptors as well as information on economic activity, 
population, and environmental characteristics.  These variables come from over 50 
primary sources of data including the American Medical Association, the National Center 
for Health Statistics, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
ARF is updated annually and provides data on over 6,000 variables for all 
counties in the United States.  Some variables are carried “historically” while others are 
“updated” and appear for only a few years.  The 2003 version of ARF was used in this 
study.  Previous to the 2001 version, data for Alaska and some independent cities in 
  67
Virginia were not assigned to a county.  However beginning with the 2001 version, data 
are broken out for all Virginia independent cities and Alaska boroughs/census areas for 
all data from 1992 through the current year.  Therefore as explained in section 4.2.5.3, I 
was able to match every OSCAR observation in the final data set with ARF data.  The 
population aged 65 and up per county was used to construct the variable that serves as a 
proxy for market tightness discussed below in section 4.3.4.2.10   
 
4.2.4 The Regional Economic Information System  
The Regional Economic Information System (REIS) contains estimates of 
personal income and employment for local areas that is prepared by the Regional 
Economic Measurement Division of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  The 
variable I obtained is the county per capita personal income for the years 1991-2003 
which I then adjusted using the 2003 CPI as the base.  Personal income is defined as “the 
income received by, or on behalf of, all the residents of an area (nation, state, or county) 
from all sources” (REIS 2005).  It consists of the income received by persons from 
participation in production, government and business transfer payments to persons, and 
government interest payments to persons.  Personal income is the “sum of wage and 
salary disbursements, supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors’ income, dividends, 
interest, and personal current transfer receipts, less contributions for government social 
insurance” (REIS 2005).  County per capita personal income is then calculated as the 
                                                 
10 The population data for 2003 was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Fact Finder at 
www.census.gov since the 2003 ARF file only contains data through 2002. 
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personal income of the residents of the county divided by the population of the county as 
of July 1 of the respective year.   
The estimates of county per capita personal income used in this dissertation 
incorporate the results of a comprehensive revision to the national income and product 
accounts (NIPAs) released in December 2003 and the annual revision released in July 
2004 (REIS 2005).  The data come from a new table, CA04 County income and 
employment summary, 1969-2003, which provides one table with the entire time series of 
the summary estimates including per capita personal income. 
 
4.2.5 Sample Construction 
As described in section 4.2.1, the accuracy of the OSCAR data is dependent upon 
the accuracy of the facility personnel as well as the state survey team and data entry 
personnel.  Even though CMS attempts to ensure accurate data collection as well as 
accurate data entry, there was some additional data cleaning required for the final data 
set.  Section 4.2.5.1 describes the procedure used to identify and eliminate duplicate 
records in the OSCAR data and other data cleaning steps; section 4.2.5.2 describes the 
procedure used to examine and eliminate observations for obvious reporting errors in the 
OSCAR data; and section 4.2.5.3 describes the merging of the various data files. 
 
4.2.5.1 Elimination of Duplicate Records and Data Cleaning 
The OSCAR data used in this study encompass the years 1991-2003 where each 
yearly file is a result of a download of the database at a particular point in time.  The final 
data set is a result of appending each of the individual years together into one file.  Since 
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the federal requirement is for each facility to be surveyed every nine to fifteen months it 
is possible for the same survey date to be in more than one OSCAR file dependent on the 
point in time that the file download was created.   
In order to identify duplicate observations the appended data set was sorted by 
provider number, facility name, facility address, city, state, and survey date.  The 
observations that had matching values for each of these six variables were identified and 
marked for further analysis of the actual values of the variables.  The record that came 
from the most recent survey download was kept in the final data set.  Additionally, if the 
values of data were the same for those observations with the same provider number, 
facility name, and survey date the latest survey date was retained.  Otherwise neither 
observation was eliminated.  This process eliminated 16,223 observations. 
The data were then analyzed for observations that came from different survey 
dates but were performed in the same calendar year.  Since it is possible for a nursing 
home to be surveyed anywhere between 9 and 15 months after the initial certification 
(Harrington, et al. 2000c), rather than simply keeping the observation that came from the 
latest survey I calculated the number of months between the two surveys in the same year 
as well as the difference between the last survey in the current year and the last survey in 
the previous calendar year.  If the number of months was greater than 9, both 
observations were retained.  For those observations where the number of months between 
the surveys in the same year was less than 9 but the difference between the last survey of 
the current year and the last survey of the prior year was greater than or equal to 16, both 
observations were also retained.  Otherwise only the latest survey in the calendar year 
was retained.  This process eliminated 577 observations from the data set. 
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4.2.5.2 Data Errors 
The OSCAR data were examined for missing values as well as values that 
appeared to be obvious errors.  The means and standard deviations of the data were 
computed and examined for the main variables of interest.  Most of the missing data and 
errors were found primarily in the reporting of the total number of beds, the total number 
of residents, and the various staffing variables. 
Two problems were associated with the total number of beds.  Since the focus of 
this study is on the Medicaid population, if the total number of beds or the total number 
of certified beds was equal to the number of Medicare beds the observation was 
eliminated.  Additionally an observation was eliminated if the total number of beds was 
either missing or less than five. 
Several problems were detected with respect to resident data.  First, some 
facilities had missing or zero observations for their total number of residents.  These 
observations were eliminated from the data.  Second, some facilities reported extremely 
low numbers of residents.  Observations with less than a 10 percent occupancy rate were 
considered to be erroneous and were eliminated from the data.  Third, some facilities 
reported more residents than the number of beds, which suggests more than 100 percent 
occupancy.  These observations were eliminated from the data.  Finally if the percentage 
of Medicaid residents was zero or if the percentage of Medicare residents was greater 
than 70, the observation was eliminated.  The latter implies that the facility is considered 
to be of a primarily rehabilitative care nature (Grabowski 2001a, 2001b). 
Several problems were identified with facility staffing data.  To create the various 
staffing measures, the total number of staff hours reported in a two week period was 
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divided by the total number of residents and by the 14 days in the reporting period to 
create hours per resident day for each type of staffing measure , RNS, LPNS, AIDES, 
LICNUR (RNs and LPNs), and NURSTAFF (RNs, LPNs, and aides).  Some facilities 
reported very high levels of staffing hours while others reported very low or no staffing 
hours.  The following decision rules were used to eliminate observations with values that 
appeared to be either too high or too low. 
First, observations with values that exceeded 24 hours per resident day for the 
staffing variables RNS, LPNS, or AIDES were eliminated.  Second, since all facilities are 
required to have some licensed nurses, observations with values of zero for the variables 
LICNUR or NURSTAFF were also eliminated because they were thought to be erroneous 
inputs.  Lastly, since current minimum federal standards require that all certified nursing 
homes with 60 or more beds have an RN on duty for 8 hours a day seven days a week and 
a licensed nurse (either an RN or LPN) on duty evening and nights (Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987), observations with total beds greater than 60 and RNS equal 
to zero were eliminated as well. 
The final adjustment to the OSCAR data was the elimination of hospital-based 
nursing homes.  Since the reimbursement rate used in this study is the annual, average per 
diem rate for freestanding nursing homes, 24,217 observations on hospital-based nursing 
homes were eliminated from the final data set.   
 
4.2.5.3 Merging of the Various Data Files 
The OSCAR, ARF, and REIS data files were merged together based on the 
Federal Information Processing Code (FIPS) county code and state code for each 
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observation.  Since the OSCAR data contains a county identifier, it was possible to match 
the data files together based on the county name, zip code, and FIPS identifiers. The final 
merged panel data set contains 150,705 observations for the years 1991-2003. 
Panel data corrects for several of the issues involved with working with only 
cross-sectional or time-series data.  As noted by Kennedy (Kennedy 2003), two of the 
most beneficial aspects of panel data are that researchers are able to deal with omitted 
variable bias and that more variability is created through combining variation across units 
with variation across time helping to alleviate multicollinearity problems. 
 
4.3. Description of the Variables 
The following sections describe the dependent and independent variables selected 
for the models of quality of care and access to care for nursing homes in the United 
States. 
 
4.3.1 Nursing Home Quality 
Since there is no universally accepted measure of health care quality, this study 
follows the paradigm of Donabedian and utilizes process, structure, and outcome 
measures of quality.  The process-based measures of quality are the proportion of 
residents with catheters (PROPCATHETER), the proportion of residents with feeding 
tubes (PROPPARENTERAL), and the proportion of residents with physical restraints 
(PROPMOBLREST).  While these measures are not actual measures of health status, 
they are widely used as indicators of negative quality because they suggest that 
substandard care is being provided to nursing home residents (IOM 1986; Spector and 
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Takada 1991).  For instance, urethral catheterization places residents at greater risk for 
urinary tract infections often leading to hospitalization while longer-term complications 
are associated with bladder and renal stones, abscesses, and renal failure (Zinn 1993).  
Spector and Takada (1991) found that residents in facilities with moderate to high use of 
urethral catheterization had twice the probability of functional decline compared to 
residents in low use facilities.  The use of feeding tubes often results in complications 
including self extubation, infections, aspiration, clogging, and pain (Galindo-Ciocon 
1993; Zinn 1993).  The Institute of Medicine (2001) suggests that as little feeding tube 
use as possible is beneficial to residents.  Finally, the immobility associated with the use 
of physical restraints may increase the likelihood of pressure ulcers, incontinence, and 
depression (Zinn 1993).  One study finds that physical restraint use is associated with an 
increased risk of morbidity and mortality in nursing home residents (Phillips, et al. 1993).  
Besides physical consequences associated with restraints there are often psychological 
consequences as well (Castle and Mor 1998).  Therefore lower levels of physical restraint 
use indicate higher quality of care. 
The structure-based measures of quality are the number of registered nurse hours 
per resident day (RNS), the number of licensed practical nurse hours per resident day 
(LPNS), the number of aide hours per resident day (AIDES), the number of licensed 
nurse hours per resident day (LICNUR), and the number of nursing staff hours per 
resident day (NURSTAFF).  The first three staffing measures are not considered 
substitutes for one another since they require different levels of training and certification 
and each type actually has various levels of care that they are permitted to administer.  
The second two measures of staffing are included to give a more general measure of the 
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types of care available to residents.  Staffing intensity is often used as an indicator of 
positive nursing home quality since more staffing is likely to be associated with an 
improved quality of life for residents since they are receiving more individual attention.  
As is the case of most of the nursing home quality literature, the use of these structure-
based measures assumes that more staffing implies higher quality rather than more 
inefficiency since the majority of nursing homes are for-profit facilities which focus on 
cost minimization (Zinn 1994). 
The outcome measure of quality is the proportion of residents with pressure sores 
(PROPPRESSORE).  Pressure sores (decubitis ulcers) are an injury to the skin and 
nearby tissue.  They occur most often in bony areas such as the hips, heels, or tailbone 
and are caused by constant pressure on the skin.  People confined to a bed or chair and 
unable to move are at greatest risk for developing pressure sores, which makes the elderly 
population in a nursing home vulnerable to such a condition.  Pressure sores are found to 
be associated with an increased rate of morbidity and mortality (Allman 1989; Brandeis, 
et al. 1990).  Pressure sores are often used as a measure of negative nursing home quality 
since they are treatable and preventable conditions even though they occur frequently 
(Grabowski 2001b; Harrington, et al. 2000c; Smith 1995). 
The final measure of quality is the total number of facility deficiencies 
(DEFS1TOT).  This measure is considered composite-based because it is based on 180 
survey items that include structural, procedural, and outcome measures of quality that 
represent the standards of nursing home quality (Harrington, et al. 2000a).  When a 
facility fails to meet one of the standards, a deficiency or citation is given to the facility.  
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Penalties are often severe depending on the type and number of deficiencies and can 
result in civil penalties as well as the extreme outcome of facility closure. 
Unfortunately the OSCAR data do not allow a determination of how much of the 
proportion of residents with a urethral catheterization, with tube feeding, with a physical 
restraint, with pressure sores, or how many deficiencies or staffing hours are attributable 
to Medicaid residents and which are attributable to private-pay residents.  It is assumed 
therefore that the measures are distributed proportionally among public and private-pay 
residents in a facility.  This seems to be a plausible assumption since there is a legal 
restriction that facilities provide the same level of quality to all nursing home residents.11 
 
4.3.2 Nursing Home Access 
The percentage of Medicaid residents in a facility (PCTMCAID) is the measure of 
access in this dissertation.  Based on Scanlon’s model of a monopolistic competitor, a 
nursing home will admit a private-pay individual before a Medicaid-eligible individual 
due to the higher private-pay price.  If a CON or moratorium is binding, excess demand 
will exist and it will be Medicaid-eligible individuals who are unable to obtain a nursing 
home bed (Scanlon 1980b).  Therefore it is expected that the elimination of CON and/or 
moratorium policies will lead to a higher percentage of Medicaid residents. 
Additionally, I use the variable ADLINDEX which is a measure of resident acuity 
(described in detail in Section 4.3.4.1 below) as a measure of access to care for heavy-
care residents.  I expect to find that if CON and/or moratorium policies are effective in 
                                                 
11The State Operations Manual Guideline §483.12(c) states “Identical policies and practices concerning 
services means that facilities must not distinguish between residents based on their source of payment when 
providing services that are required to be provided under the law” (Health Care Financing Agency 1995) 
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constraining supply the ADLINDEX will be lower in those states retaining these types of 
policies. 
 
4.3.3 Certificate of Need and Construction Moratorium Policy 
The main variable of interest in this dissertation is the presence of a CON and/or a 
moratorium policy.  The primary goal of CON and construction moratorium policies is to 
retard the growth of health care costs by preventing the “unnecessary” expansion of 
nursing home beds.  In effect these types of policies imply that fewer nursing home beds 
will lead to fewer Medicaid residents in the nursing homes which in turn lead to lower 
Medicaid expenditures.  However a recent study has shown that these types of policies do 
not have a large impact on constraining Medicaid expenditures (Grabowski, et al. 2003).   
Although these policies theoretically restrict or prohibit growth in the nursing 
home market it is not always the case in practice.  Many states have exceptions for their 
moratorium policy that allows for additional beds or expansion if it is deemed a critical 
need.  Additionally, my survey of states’ regulatory agencies indicates that states vary on 
the restrictiveness of their CON policies.  In some states the CON actually acts as a 
moratorium while in other states it appears that the CON is simply a formality and most 
applications for additional or new beds get approved.  For this dissertation I use a dummy 
variable to represent whether or not a state does not have a CON and/or moratorium 
policy (CON_MORT) for each year since the time it would take to ascertain the degree of 
complexity of each state’s policies was prohibitive.  Table A.3 in Appendix A shows the 
compilation of information on states’ regulatory policies for the years 1991-2003.  I 
expect to find higher quality and more Medicaid residents in nursing homes in states 
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without a CON and/or moratorium policy relative to those states with this type of 
regulation. 
 
4.3.4 Other Independent Variables 
Several facility, market, and state-level exogenous variables are included to 
control for economic and demographic conditions that may influence the quality of care 
and access to care in nursing homes.  The following sections describe these variables in 
detail. 
 
4.3.4.1 Facility-level Characteristics 
The first facility-level characteristic is the total number of beds in a facility 
(TOTBEDS).  This variable represents the size of the facility.  As described in the 
literature review on quality, size has been shown to be both a positive and negative 
indicator of quality.  With respect to access, previous research has not directly controlled 
for the size of the facility.  However, one might expect that a facility with a greater 
number of beds will have more Medicaid residents relative to a facility with fewer beds if 
excess demand is not an issue.  Therefore I control for the total number of beds in the 
facility since the facilities in the data set are of varying sizes. 
The second facility-level characteristic represents the nursing home’s ownership 
type.  Two dummy variables represent if the facility is nonprofit (CONTROL2) or 
government owned (CONTROL3) with for-profit the omitted category.  With respect to 
access, previous research either supports the theory that nonprofit homes will be more 
oriented toward private-pay and Medicare residents than Medicaid residents and that for-
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profit homes will be more inclined to admit Medicaid residents or that that nonprofits 
may rely more heavily on Medicaid residents as a source of revenue and therefore have 
more Medicaid residents than private-pay as discussed in section 3.2.2.3 of the literature 
review.  In conjunction with ownership type, I include a dummy variable that controls for 
whether or not the nursing home is part of a multi-chain facility (MULTI).  While there is 
not much literature that addresses the impact of chain ownership on quality of care or 
access to care, the industry has moved in the direction of mergers in the last several years 
and therefore I control for this feature.   
The final variable to control for facility-level characteristics is really a resident-
level characteristic.  Nursing homes serve different types of residents requiring different 
levels of care.  Studies usually include a measure of “resident acuity” to serve as an 
indicator of the severity of a resident’s functional condition.  One of the most widely used 
measures of resident acuity is the activities of daily living (ADL) index developed by 
Katz (1963).  This index summarizes a resident’s over-all performance in six functions: 
bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring, continence, and eating.  The measure of resident 
acuity used in this dissertation (ADLINDEX) is calculated by summing various levels of 
dependencies in eating, toileting, transferring, and mobility which are weighted by the 
respective proportion of residents.12  The result is an index of the average functioning 
level for the residents in each facility for each year.  The higher the value of the index the 
more dependent the resident is in the functions mentioned above. 
 
                                                 
12 This index is calculated based on the formula used in the 2002 Nursing Home Statistical Yearbook 
published by Cowles Research Group. 
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4.3.4.2 Market-level Characteristics 
The county in which the nursing home is located is used to approximate the 
market in this dissertation.  Most economic studies have used the county as a proxy for 
the nursing home market (Cohen and Spector 1996; Gertler 1992; Nyman 1985; Zinn 
1994).  Nyman found that 80 percent of residents in facilities in Wisconsin chose a 
nursing home in the same county in which the resident had previously lived.  Gertler 
found that 75 percent of residents in New York facilities had previously lived in the same 
county as the nursing home.  As noted by Banaszak-Holl, et al. (1996) the county can be 
considered a good approximation of the market for nursing home care based on the 
patterns of funding and resident origin.  For instance, federal block grants for long-term 
care services are distributed at the county level.  While it has been argued that resident-
origin data are preferable to county boundaries in delineating nursing home markets 
(Zwanziger, et al. 2002), the OSCAR data do not provide resident-origin data. 
The first market-level characteristic, EMPTYELDERLY, is the number of empty 
nursing homes beds per 1,000 noninstitutionalized elderly (aged 65+) in a county.  This 
variable serves as a proxy for the presence of excess demand and attempts to account for 
the tightness of the market.  A bed constraint is assumed to be more restrictive in those 
markets with fewer empty beds and less restrictive in those markets with more empty 
beds.  While it would be desirable to control for the number of Medicaid-eligible 
individuals in a given market who are waiting to obtain a nursing home bed due to a 
CON or construction moratorium law, this information is not available in the data used in 
this dissertation and other economic analyses.  Since it is not clear that CON and 
moratorium policies are always binding and that the occupancy rates in many areas are 
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declining, controlling for excess demand helps alleviate the concern that nursing home 
occupancy rates fluctuate from state to state and from year to year.  In 2003, the three 
states with the highest occupancy rate were Hawaii (97.6%), Vermont (98.8%), and 
Rhode Island (92.3%) while the three with the lowest rate were Oregon (70.1%), 
Montana (70.1%), and Oklahoma (67.1%).  It is also true that each of these states had 
CON or moratorium policies in place during the entire study period demonstrating that 
these policies do not imply a condition of excess demand for nursing home beds. 
The other two market characteristics included in this analysis represent exogenous 
demand variables.  The first is the county per capita personal income, adjusted for 2003 
dollars (INCOME).  The average per capita personal income during the time of this study 
was $27, 280.  The second characteristic is a Herfindahl index to measure the 
concentration of the market (HHI).  This index is constructed by summing the squared 
market shares of all nursing home facilities in the county.  The index ranges from 0 to 1 
with higher values signifying a more concentrated market. 
 
4.3.4.3 State-level Characteristics 
Two variables represent state-level characteristics.  The first is the type of 
Medicaid reimbursement method utilized by the state in which the nursing home is 
located.  The five basic methods of reimbursement are described in detail in Chapter 2, 
section 2.3.1.  In this study a retrospective method is represented by METHOD0; 
prospective facility-specific is METHOD1; prospective class (flat-rate) is METHOD2; 
adjusted is METHOD3 (the omitted category); and combination is METHOD4.  Since 
the retrospective method is the most generous type of reimbursement and prospective 
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class the least generous, these dummy variables provide a test of the effect of 
reimbursement on quality of care and access to care.  Additionally, a dummy variable is 
included for those states that employ case-mix reimbursement methods which pay 
different rates based on a nursing home’s mix of resident acuity and the costs of caring 
for those residents’ needs.  While each state’s reimbursement method can be quite 
complex, these variables attempt to capture the main differences in reimbursement 
methodologies.  Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively, in Appendix A display the 
reimbursement method and whether or not case-mix is utilized for the years 1991-2003.  I 
expect to find that those nursing homes in states that employ a more restrictive 
reimbursement method have fewer Medicaid residents and lower quality than those 
nursing homes in states with a more generous method. 
The second state-level characteristic is the annual, average per diem Medicaid 
reimbursement rate (RATE).  The use of each facility’s specific reimbursement rate 
would be endogenous to that facility’s quality level.  Since no one nursing home can 
influence the state’s reimbursement rate, using the average state Medicaid rate is 
exogenous at the facility level.  In order to account for the fact that I was unable to obtain 
1999-2003 rates for the state of New Mexico, I created a dummy variable 
(RATEMISSING) that equals one for each of the observations with a missing 
reimbursement rate.  For those same observations the variable RATE is set equal to zero. 
I expect to find that an increase in the reimbursement rate leads to an increase in 
the access to care for Medicaid residents.  With respect to quality, early literature showed 
that an increase in the reimbursement rate lead to a decrease in quality (Gertler 1989, 
1992; Nyman 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1989b) while more recent evidence suggests that an 
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increase in the payment rate leads to an increase in quality (Grabowski 2001a, 2001b, 
2004).  This later result has been attributed to changes over time in the market for nursing 
home care related to the decline in nursing home utilization (Bishop 1999) possibly due 
to the availability of nursing home substitutes.  I expect to find that an increase in the 
reimbursement rate has a positive effect on quality of care.  Table A.6 in Appendix A 
displays the average, annual Medicaid per diem rate for each state for the years 1991-
2003. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
The first part of the analysis conducted is the summary statistics of the final 
sample.  This information provides a general idea of the population under study through 
the means and standard deviations of the variables of the access to care and quality of 
care models.  The next two sections describe the methods as well as the specification of 
the models used in this study.  
 
4.4.1 State Fixed Effects and Model Specification 
In order to examine the effect of CON and/or construction moratorium policies on 
quality of care and access to care, I first estimate a state fixed effects model of the 
following form: 
yist = α + βCON_MORTist + δxist + dt + γs + υit, (1)  
where yist  is the outcome (quality or access) of nursing home i in state s at time t, 
CON_MORTist is a binary variable indicating if the nursing home is in a state s without a 
CON and/or moratorium policy at time t; xist  is the vector of  facility, market, and state-
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level characteristics discussed above;  dt is a vector of year dummy variables, γs is a 
vector of state dummy variables; and υit ≡ ci + μit which is often referred to as the 
composite error term.  In panel data analysis and in this model in particular ci represents 
an unobserved, time-constant variable for the individual nursing home such as 
administrative ability or location.  For each t, υit is the sum of the unobserved effect (ci) 
and the idiosyncratic error (μit).  The year dummies control for factors that are common 
across all states in a particular year such as federal nursing home policies and 
technological advances in health care.  The state fixed effects control for any factors that 
are specific to a state that remain invariant over time such as political sentiments and 
geographic characteristics.  This strategy purges the unobserved and potentially 
confounded cross-sectional heterogeneity by relying on within state variations in CON 
and moratorium policies over time, and by using those states that did not change policy as 
a control for unrelated time-series variations (Grabowski, et al. 2003). 
Estimation of equation (1) is achieved by using pooled OLS which ignores the 
panel structure of the data and treats the observations as being serially uncorrelated for a 
given nursing home with homoskedastic errors across nursing homes and years.  The 
restrictive assumption of OLS when estimating equation (1) is that not only are the 
idiosyncratic error terms uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in each time period 
but the unobserved effect, ci, is also uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  The 
resulting estimated coefficient of β will be the difference over time in the average of the 
outcome of interest between those states without CON and/or moratorium policies and 
those states that still have these policies.  An alternative interpretation is that β measures 
the change in the outcome of interest when a state eliminates its CON and/or moratorium 
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policy.  Based on the underlying identification of the models, the resulting coefficient is 
the effect of CON_MORT. 
 
4.4.2 Facility Fixed Effects and Model Specification 
Quite often the point of using panel data is to allow the unobserved effect (ci) to 
be arbitrarily correlated with the xist.  The second method of estimating the effect of CON 
and/or construction moratorium policies on quality of care and access to care is based on 
this concept.  This method starts with equation (1) written as: 
yist = α + βCON_MORTist + δxist + dt + ci + μit.  (2) 
The fixed effects transformation, also called the within transformation, is obtained by 
first averaging equation (2) over t = 1,…., T to get the cross section equation  
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model, is estimated using the panel data fixed effects command (xtreg, fe) in Stata S/E 9.  
The resulting fixed effects estimator is the pooled OLS estimator from equation (4).  The 
same results are obtained as those that would be returned if equation (2) was modified to 
include a vector of facility dummy variables and then estimated by OLS. 
This model assumes strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables conditional on 
ci: E(μit|xis,ci) = 0, t=1,…T.  In other words, the explanatory variables in each time period 
are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term in each time period.  The difference 
between the state fixed effects model and the facility fixed effects model is that the fixed 
effects estimator allows for arbitrary correlation between ci and the explanatory variables 
in any time period.  However, one drawback of this type of model is that time-constant 
explanatory variables cannot be included in xist.  The strategy for estimating β (and δ) is 
to transform the original equation to eliminate the unobserved effect ci.  However, this 
also results in the elimination of any other time-invariant variables.  This is the reason 
why equation (2) does not include the vector of state dummy variables.  This type of 
transformation is commonly referred to as the within transformation because the 
unobserved effect is differenced out of the equation and exploits the panel nature of the 
data set and relies on variation within facilities.  While equation (4) is the estimating 
equation, “the interpretation of β comes from the (structural) conditional expectation 
E(yit|xi,ci) = E(yit|xit,ci) = xitβ + ci” (Wooldridge 2002).  This implies that the resulting 
estimated coefficient of β is interpreted based on equation (2).13  This fixed effects 
estimator, referred to as the within estimator, will be the difference over time in the 
average of the outcome of interest between those nursing homes that are in states that do 
                                                 
13 It is important to recognize that the interpretation of β is the same for equations (1) and (2). 
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not have a CON and/or moratorium policy and those nursing homes in states that have 
such a policy. 
The estimation strategy in both the state fixed effects and facility fixed effects 
models as described above are variants of the difference-in-differences model.  A study 
that uses a difference-in-differences model examines an outcome measure for 
observations in treatment groups and comparison groups that are not randomly assigned.  
The treatment group is the one that experiences an exogenous event, such as a policy 
change, and the control group is the one that does not experience the event.  This method 
allows a researcher to examine the difference before and after the treatment between 
those in the treatment groups and those in the comparison groups for the outcome 
variable of interest.  In this dissertation, the outcome variable is either quality of care or 
access to care and the treatment is the removal of a state’s CON and/or construction 
moratorium policy.  As a result of this definition, the treatment groups are states without 
CON and/or moratorium policies and the comparison groups are states with a CON 
and/or construction moratorium policy in place. 
Using the specification in Meyer (1995), the following equation represents the 
general form of the difference-in-differences estimation with a treatment group and a 
comparison group before and after the treatment: 
yitj = α + α1dt + α1dj + βdtj + δzitj + εitj,   (5) 
where yitj is the outcome of individual i at time t indexed by j for the group, dt = 1 if t =1 
(after treatment) and 0 otherwise, dj = 1 if j = 1 (in the treatment group) and 0 otherwise, 
dtj = 1 if t = 1 and j = 1 and 0 otherwise, zitj is a vector of characteristics of the unit under 
study, and εitj is the random error term.  The resulting estimated coefficient of β is the 
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difference-in-differences estimator, i.e., βˆ is the difference over time in the average 
difference of the outcome of interest between the treatment group and the control group.   
For the models in this study the term βCON_MORTist captures the intended effect 
of α1dt + α1dj + βdtj from equation (5) since it represents whether or not the nursing home 
is in a state without a CON and/or moratorium policy at time t (whether or not the 
nursing home is in the treatment group at time t).  The resulting coefficient of β 
represents the difference over time in the average of the outcome of interest between 
those nursing homes that are in states without a CON and/or construction moratorium 
policy and those states still retaining such policies. 
One last point concerning the resulting inference statistics must be mentioned.  
The “grouped” nature of the explanatory variable of interest may have introduced 
heteroskedasticity and biased the estimates of the standard error.  Moulton (Moulton 
1990) shows that when aggregate variables are regressed on micro units (a “grouped” 
structure) the estimates of the standard errors will be biased downward.  For both the 
state and facility fixed effects models, I use the cluster option which adjusts the standard 
errors using the Hubert-White robust estimator and corrects for intra-home cluster 
correlations.  The cluster option relaxes the assumption of independence of the 
observations and requires that the observations only be independent across the clusters (in 
this study the individual nursing homes). 
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Chapter Five 
Research Results 
 
This chapter describes the estimation results of the quality of care and access to 
care models.  The first section of this chapter describes the summary statistics of the final 
data set.  Sections 5.2 and 5.3 describe the results of the effect of CON and/or 
construction moratorium policies on the quality of care and access to care in the nursing 
home market, respectively.  For brevity, the partial results of the models are shown in 
Tables 2 through 6 in the respective sections while the full results of the models are 
included in Appendix A.  Subsections 5.2.1.1, 5.2.2.1, 5.2.3.1 and 5.3.1 discuss other 
interesting findings while section 5.4 discusses the results of an alternative model and an 
alternative method of identifying excess demand to check for robustness.   
 
5.1 Nursing Home, County, and State-level Characteristics (1991-2003) 
Table 1 on the following page shows the descriptive statistics for the final data 
set.  Between 1991 and 2003 there were 150,705 surveys of 15,892 free-standing nursing 
homes in the United States.  Each facility was surveyed an average of 9.48 times between 
1991 and 2003.  The mean number of surveys in each year was 11,593, with a high of 
12,817 in 1996 and a low of 8,623 in 200314.  The average number of nursing home
                                                 
14 The lower number of surveys in 2003 is due to the timing of the 2003 OSCAR file download. 
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Table 1 
Nursing Home, County, and State-level Characteristics (1991-2003)a 
Variable Description N Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Access Measure 
PCTMCAID Percent of Medicaid residents  150,705 68.94 18.59 8.45 
Quality Measures 
PROPPRESSORE Proportion of residents with decubitus ulcer 150,571 0.07 0.05 0.04 
PROPPARENTERAL Proportion of residents with feeding tubes 150,571 0.06 0.06 0.03 
PROPCATHETER Proportion of residents with catheters  150,571 0.07 0.05 0.04 
PROPMOBLREST Proportion of residents with physical restraints  150,571 0.16 0.15 0.12 
DEFS1TOT Number of health deficiencies  150,670 6.81 7.24 5.81 
RNS Registered nurse (RN) hours per resident day  150,705 0.34 0.31 0.19 
LPNS Licensed practical nurse (LPN) hours per resident day  150,705 0.68 0.41 0.28 
AIDES Nurses’ aides hours per resident day 150,705 2.14 1.01 0.73 
LICNUR RN and LPN hours per resident day 150,705 0.94 0.43 0.29 
NURSTAFF RN, LPN, and aide hours per resident day 150,705 2.91 1.08 0.77 
Facility Characteristics 
TOTRES Number of residents  150,705 94.17 49.69 11.50 
CENMCAID Number of Medicaid residents  150,705 65.50 41.16 11.25 
CENMCARE Number of Medicare residents  150,705 6.48 7.80 4.74 
CENOTHER Number of private-pay residents  150,705 22.19 19.49 8.62 
TOTBEDS Total number of beds  150,705 109.59 55.64 9.42 
CONTROL1 =1 if for-profit facility (base) 150,705 0.74 0.44 0.12 
CONTROL2 =1 if nonprofit facility 150,705 0.22 0.41 0.12 
CONTROL3 =1 if government facility 150,705 0.04 0.20 0.05 
MULTI =1 if chain facility  150,705 0.56 0.50 0.24 
ADLINDEX ADL index  150,571 9.80 1.52 0.89 
Market (County) Characteristics 
POP65UP Elderly population (aged 65+)b  150,705  77,761 165,169  5,937 
EMPTYELDERLY Number of empty beds per 1000 noninstitutionalized elderlyd 150,705 8.39 10.00 4.57 
INCOME Per capita personal income (2003 $)c 150,705  27,280 7,114  2,193 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index 150,705 0.25 0.27 0.08 
State-level Characteristics 
CON_MORT 
State does not have CON and/or moratorium 
policy (=1 if yes)e 150,705 0.15 0.36 0.14 
RATE Average, annual Medicaid per diem reimbursement rate (2003 $)e 150,705 104.00 25.70 11.42 
RATEMISSING =1 when New Mexico’s rate is missing 150,705 0.002 0.04 0.03 
METHOD0 =1 if state uses retrospective reimbursemente 150,705 0.03 0.16 0.11 
METHOD1 =1 if state uses prospective, facility-specific reimbursemente 150,705 0.34 0.47 0.24 
METHOD2 =1 if state uses prospective, class reimbursemente 150,705 0.14 0.35 0.13 
METHOD3 =1 if state uses prospective, adjusted reimbursemente (base) 150,705 0.43 0.49 0.20 
METHOD4 =1 if states combines retrospective and prospective reimbursemente 150,705 0.06 0.25 0.12 
CASEMIX =1 if state uses case-mix Medicaid reimbursemente 150,705 0.53 0.50 0.25 
 
 
 
aThe data are from the Online, Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) system unless otherwise noted. 
bThis variable is from the Area Resource File (ARF). 
cThis variable is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional Economic Information System (REIS). 
dThis variable is constructed using OSCAR and ARF files. 
eThese variables are from the 1998 State Data Book on Long-Term Care Program and Market Characteristics (Harrington, et al. 
2000b) and the author’s state surveys. 
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residents is 94, with 25 percent private-pay residents, 69 percent Medicaid residents, and 
6 percent Medicare residents. 
The percentage of for-profit, nonprofit, and government nursing homes in the 
sample is 74 percent, 22 percent, and 4 percent respectively.  In recent years there has 
been quite a bit of merger activity in the nursing home industry.  In this sample 56 
percent of the nursing facilities were owned by a chain. 
The average, annual per diem Medicaid reimbursement rate between 1991 and 
2003, in 2003 dollars, was $104.00.  With respect to the reimbursement method utilized 
to set rates, 3 percent of the sample used a retrospective method, 34 percent used a 
prospective, facility-specific method, 14 percent used a prospective, class method, 43 
percent used a prospective, adjusted method, and 6 percent used a combination method.  
Additionally, 53 percent of the states in the sample adjusted for the case-mix of the 
facility’s residents.15 
 
5.2 The Effect of Certificate of Need and Construction Moratorium Policies on the 
Quality of Care in Nursing Homes 
 
The results for the process, structure, and outcome measures of quality are 
discussed separately in the following sections.  Section 5.2.1 discusses the results of the 
process-based measures of quality, section 5.2.2 the outcome and composite-based 
measures, and section 5.2.3 the structure-based measures. 
 
                                                 
15 Descriptive statistics by CON_MORT are in table A.7 in Appendix A. 
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5.2.1 Process Measures of Quality 
The results for each of the estimations for the process-based measures of quality 
in the state and facility fixed effects models show that nursing homes in those states 
without a CON and/or construction moratorium policy (CON_MORT) have a lower 
proportion of residents that have urethral catheters (PROPCATHETER), a lower 
proportion of residents with feeding tubes (PROPPARENTERAL), and a lower 
proportion of residents with physical restraints (PROPMOBLREST).  Alternatively the 
resulting coefficient of CON_MORT in both models can be interpreted as those nursing 
homes in states eliminating a CON and/or moratorium policy have an improvement in 
quality.  As shown in Table 2 on the following page, all of the results (except for the state 
fixed effect model for PROPPARENTERAL) are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level or better.  Using this type of quality measure, these results suggest that nursing 
homes in states without CON and/or moratorium policies have higher quality than those 
states with this type of regulation.  These results hold while controlling for the excess 
demand of the nursing home’s market and support the hypothesis that the elimination of 
CON leads to higher quality of care. 
 
5.2.1.1 Other Findings 
The annual, average per diem Medicaid reimbursement rate (RATE) is negative 
for all models.  However, the coefficient is only statistically significant for the 
PROPARENTERAL facility fixed effects model and both the state and facility fixed 
effects for the PROPMOBLREST models.  While early studies investigating the
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Table 2 
Main Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
Dependent 
Variable       PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
CON_MORT -0.00957 
(0.00132)*** 
-0.01037 
(0.00133)*** 
-0.00096 
(0.00111) 
-0.00194 
(0.00099)** 
-0.05028 
(0.00321)*** 
-0.04827 
(0.00325)*** 
RATE -0.00002 
(0.00003) 
-0.00002 
(0.00003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00002)* 
-0.00061 
(0.00008)*** 
-0.00063 
(0.00008)*** 
CONTROL2 -0.01008 
(0.00072)*** 
-0.00278 
(0.00111)** 
-0.01040 
(0.00093)*** 
-0.00091 
(0.00093) 
0.00309 
(0.00151)* 
0.01006 
(0.00324)*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00772 
(0.00141)*** 
-0.00069 
(0.00282) 
-0.00241 
(0.00252) 
-0.00098 
(0.00165) 
0.01414 
(0.00339)*** 
0.01138 
(0.00791) 
METHOD0 -0.00122 
(0.00172) 
-0.00133 
(0.00171) 
-0.00119 
(0.00149) 
-0.00034 
(0.00127) 
0.01015 
(0.00451)** 
0.013562 
(0.00457)*** 
METHOD1 0.00154 
(0.00080)* 
0.00094 
(0.00077) 
-0.00275 
(0.00067)*** 
-0.00274 
(0.00057)*** 
0.01518 
(0.00183)*** 
0.01701 
(0.00183)*** 
METHOD2 -0.00370 
(0.00158)** 
-0.00567 
(0.00154)*** 
0.00236 
(0.00135)* 
0.00121 
(0.00126) 
0.04824 
(0.00357)*** 
0.04961 
(0.00360)*** 
METHOD4 -0.00177 
(0.00132) 
-0.00214 
(0.00129)* 
0.00114 
(0.00120) 
0.00079 
(0.00105) 
0.00679 
(0.00337)** 
0.00772 
(0.00339)** 
CASEMIX 0.00195 
(0.00064)*** 
0.00252 
(0.00061)*** 
-0.00380 
(0.00059)*** 
-0.00181 
(0.00049)*** 
0.01002 
(0.00166)*** 
0.01198 
(0.00168)*** 
N   150,571    150,571    150,571    150,571    150,571    150,571 
R2 0.1449 0.0535b 0.2941 0.0785b 0.2351 0.1571b 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 
clusters.  
bThis value is the R2 within. 
*p < .10   **p < .05  ***p < .02 
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relationship between reimbursement rate and quality found that under conditions of 
excess demand an increase in the rate actually decreased quality (Gertler 1989, 1992; 
Nyman 1985, 1988b, 1989b), these results support the findings of more recent work that 
uses panel data and finds that an increase in the reimbursement rate actually improves 
quality (Cohen and Spector 1996; Grabowski 2001a, 2001b).  While the absolute 
magnitude of the results is relatively small, the relative size of the estimates is fairly 
substantial.  The Medicaid rate elasticity of quality implied by the estimate from the 
PROPMOBLREST model is -0.40 which says that a 10 percent increase in the Medicaid 
rate is associated with a 4 percent decrease in the proportion of residents with physical 
restraints.16 
Ownership appears to be a significant determinant of process-based quality of 
care.  The results indicate that nonprofit nursing homes (CONTROL2) have fewer 
residents with catheters and feeding tubes compared to for-profit nursing homes (the base 
group).  However, nonprofit facilities have more residents with physical restraints.  
Government-owned nursing homes (CONTROL3) follow the same pattern as nonprofit 
facilities.  Perhaps these results support the belief that since nonprofit nursing homes 
experience higher costs and higher costs indicate higher quality (and not less efficiency) 
money is being spent on providing more personal care to residents rather than the use of 
more mechanical methods of care.  The positive result on PROPMOBLREST is perhaps 
attributed to a higher level of resident dependency. 
In the PROPCATHETER model, a prospective, facility-specific reimbursement 
method (METHOD1) leads to a higher proportion of residents with urethral catheters 
                                                 
16 The elasticity is calculated at the mean of the Medicaid reimbursement rate.  
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compared to an adjusted method (the base group) but only in the state fixed effects 
model.  A prospective, class reimbursement method (METHOD2) leads to a lower 
proportion in both the state and facility fixed effects models.  Having a retrospective or 
combination method has no significant impact on the proportion of residents with 
catheters compared to an adjusted method. 
In the PROPPARENTERAL model, states that use a prospective facility-specific 
reimbursement method (METHOD1) have a lower proportion of residents with a feeding 
tube compared to an adjusted method in both the state and facility fixed effects models.  
Having a prospective class method leads to a higher proportion of residents with feeding 
tubes but is only significant in the state fixed effects model.  Once again having a 
retrospective or combination method has no significant impact on the proportion of 
residents with catheters compared to an adjusted method.  
In the PROPMOBLREST model all the methods have a statistically significant 
higher proportion of residents physically restrained than compared to those states using 
an adjusted method.  These results indicate that all methods other than adjusted lead to 
lower quality. 
Additionally, the coefficients on CASEMIX tell us that states that use a case-mix 
adjustment in setting their rates have a lower proportion of residents with feeding tubes 
but a higher proportion of residents with catheters and physical restraints.  The results are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in each of the state and facility fixed effects 
models.  Based on the process-based measures of quality used in this study, the evidence 
is not conclusive that one method of reimbursement encourages higher quality than 
another or that having case-mix adjustment always improves quality of care. 
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5.2.2 Outcome and Composite Measures of Quality 
The results for both the outcome and composite-based models are displayed in 
Table 3 on the following page.  The results of the outcome-based model of quality show 
that there is no significant effect of CON and/or construction moratorium policy on the 
proportion of residents with pressure sores (PROPPRESSORE).  These results hold for 
both the state and fixed effects models.  This result is not consistent with the hypothesis 
that there will be higher quality of care in those states without CON policies.  One 
possible explanation is that the emphasis placed on the importance of the prevention and 
treatment of pressure sores (IOM 2001; OEI 1999; Smith 1995) leads to more attention to 
this condition by nursing staff in all states. 
For the composite-based facility fixed effects model, nursing homes in those 
states that do not have a CON and/or moratorium policy have more total deficiencies 
(DEFS1TOT), which indicates lower quality, than those states with these policies.  This 
result does not support the hypothesis of higher quality in nursing homes in states without 
CON and/or construction moratorium policies.  Perhaps those states that have CON 
and/or moratorium policies place greater emphasis on training nursing home staff or have 
strong local attitudes toward the importance of maintaining quality of care in nursing 
homes, such as ombudsman programs, than those states without such policies. 
 
5.2.2.1 Other Findings 
The annual, average per diem Medicaid reimbursement rate is negative in both the 
outcome and composite-based models.  An increase in the rate decreases the proportion 
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Table 3 
Main Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
Dependent 
Variable       
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based    
DEFSITOT 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
CON_MORT 0.00081 
(0.00109) 
0.00032 
(0.00104) 
0.11049 
(0.15330) 
0.34217 
(0.14785)** 
RATE -0.00018 
(0.00002)*** 
-0.00018 
(0.00002)*** 
-0.00801 
(0.00370)** 
-0.11655 
(0.00366)* 
CONTROL2 -0.00752 
(0.00048)*** 
0.00036 
(0.00106) 
-1.33765 
(0.06161)*** 
0.10461 
(0.16863) 
CONTROL3 -0.00701 
(0.00102)*** 
0.00244 
(0.00201) 
-1.46497 
(0.11455)*** 
-0.74093 
(0.44590)* 
METHOD0 -0.00213 
(0.00144) 
-0.00191 
(0.00143) 
-0.34340 
(0.19223)* 
-0.09740 
(0.19073) 
METHOD1 9.75e-06 
(0.00073) 
0.00015 
(0.00072) 
1.04717 
(0.11105)*** 
1.18294 
(0.11003)*** 
METHOD2 -0.00112 
(0.00123) 
-0.00165 
(0.00123) 
1.11955 
(0.17030)*** 
1.32699 
(0.17023)*** 
METHOD4 -0.00085 
(0.00110) 
-0.00094 
(0.00111) 
-0.01786 
(0.16576) 
0.01779 
(0.16702) 
CASEMIX 0.00008 
(0.00058) 
0.00090 
(0.00057) 
0.46302 
(0.08352)*** 
0.49594 
(0.08272)*** 
N   150,571   150,571   150,537   150,537 
R2 0.1209 0.0142b 0.1830 0.0441b 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
of residents with pressure sores and the total number of facility deficiencies.  This 
negative relationship is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better in each of 
the state and facility fixed effects models.  These results provide further evidence that 
increasing the reimbursement rate improves quality of care in nursing homes.  Once again 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home correlation using the 
cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
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while the absolute magnitude of the results is relatively small, the relative size of the 
estimates is significant.  The Medicaid rate elasticity of quality implied by the estimate 
from the PROPPRESSORE model is -0.29 while the elasticity for the DEFS1TOT model 
is -.12. 
Nonprofit and government-owned nursing homes have a lower proportion of 
residents with pressure sores than for-profit facilities.  The results of the state fixed 
effects model are significant at the 1 percent level.  The coefficients in the facility fixed 
effects model are positive but not statistically significant.  Nonprofit and government-
owned facilities also have fewer deficiencies in the state fixed effects model.  Only the 
coefficient for government-owned facilities is negative and significant in the facility 
fixed effects model.  Once again these results indicate that nonprofit and government-
owned nursing homes provide higher quality than for-profit nursing homes. 
Unlike the process-based models, in the PROPPRESSORE model the type of 
reimbursement method and whether or not a state uses case-mix adjustment are not 
statistically significant.  However, in the DEFS1TOT model three of the reimbursement 
methods and CASEMIX are significant.  Use of a retrospective method results in fewer 
deficiencies in the state fixed effects model and is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  The relationship is also negative in the facility fixed effects model but is 
not statistically significant.  Both prospective, facility-specific and class reimbursement 
methods lead to more deficiencies than having an adjusted reimbursement method in both 
the state and fixed effects models.  The coefficient on the combination method is not 
significant in either the state or facility fixed effects model.   
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The coefficient on CASEMIX is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in both the state and fixed effects models.  Since more costs are covered 
when a facility is reimbursed based on a resident’s level of severity, one would expect 
fewer residents with pressure sores and fewer facility deficiencies.  While not expected, 
perhaps this result can be explained by the baseline level of residents’ dependencies.  
Nursing homes in states without CON and/or construction moratorium polices have 
residents with a higher level of dependency as measured by ADLINDEX (see Table A.7).  
Due to the increased care needs of their more functionally disabled population, perhaps 
these homes face an increased opportunity for being cite for a violation and this in turn 
causes more deficiencies. 
 
5.2.3 Structure Measures of Quality 
The five structure-based measures of quality used in this study, RNS, LPNS, 
AIDES, LICNUR, and NURSTAFF, are all measured in hours per resident day and 
represent “good” quality.  As seen in Tables 4 and 5 on the following pages, for each of 
the models in which CON_MORT is statistically significant a pattern emerges among the 
five measures of structure-based quality; nursing homes in those states without a CON 
and/or construction moratorium policy have more registered and licensed practical nurse 
hours per resident day and less aide hours per resident day than those states that still have 
a policy.  These results support the hypothesis that those states without CON policies 
have a higher level of quality.  These results indicate a possible substitution effect is 
occurring.  For those states continuing with these supply restrictions, while maintaining 
the minimum requirement of RNs and LPNs, the presence of a CON restriction allows 
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Table 4 
Main Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Dependent 
Variable       RNS LPNS AIDES 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
CON_MORT 0.00638 
(0.00548) 
0.00998 
(0.00489)* 
0.02957 
(0.00844)*** 
0.03114 
(0.00705)*** 
-0.05294 
(0.01833)*** 
-0.04119 
(0.01646)** 
RATE 0.00028 
(0.00015)* 
0.00050 
(0.00013)*** 
0.00081 
(0.00020)*** 
0.00093 
(0.00018)*** 
-0.00203 
(0.00051)*** 
-0.00200 
(0.00049)*** 
CONTROL2 0.05902 
(0.00472)*** 
-0.00428 
(0.00481) 
0.02486 
(0.00587)*** 
0.00214 
(0.00703) 
0.24987 
(0.01392)*** 
-0.00376 
(0.01855) 
CONTROL3 0.03751 
(0.00909)*** 
0.00289 
(0.00805) 
0.02317 
(0.01017)** 
-0.00374 
(0.01696) 
0.25495 
(0.02299)*** 
0.07022 
(0.04590) 
METHOD0 0.00055 
(0.00915) 
0.00417 
(0.00790) 
0.00711 
(0.01065) 
0.00382 
(0.00952) 
-0.21510 
(0.02744)*** 
-0.20872 
(0.02595)*** 
METHOD1 0.01893 
(0.00407)*** 
0.01398 
(0.00348)*** 
-0.00109 
(0.00506) 
0.00132 
(0.00457) 
-0.03343 
(0.01333)*** 
-0.03751 
(0.01214)*** 
METHOD2 0.02780 
(0.00548)*** 
0.02154 
(0.00503)*** 
0.03998 
(0.01221)*** 
0.01061 
(0.00933) 
-0.05716 
(0.02830)** 
-0.12369 
(0.02445)*** 
METHOD4 0.00961 
(0.00664) 
0.00950 
(0.00572)* 
-0.00171 
(0.00865) 
-0.00374 
(0.00777) 
-0.04944 
(0.02158)*** 
-0.05187 
(0.01879)*** 
CASEMIX 0.00019 
(0.00391) 
-0.00016 
(0.00357) 
-0.01649 
(0.00453)*** 
-0.01119 
(0.00427)*** 
-0.08810 
(0.01114)*** 
-0.07188 
(0.01076)*** 
N    150,571    150,571    150,571    150,571    150,571    150,571 
R2 0.1954 0.0130b 0.1266 0.0273b 0.0944 0.0105b 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 
clusters.  
bThis value is the R2 within. 
*p < .10    **p < .05   ***p < .01 
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Table 5 
Main Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Dependent 
Variable       LICNUR NURSTAFF 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
CON_MORT 0.03481 
(0.00933)*** 
0.03915 
(0.00788)*** 
-0.00769 
(0.02114) 
0.00704 
(0.01845) 
RATE 0.00111 
(0.00021)*** 
0.00134 
(0.00019)*** 
-0.00066 
(0.00055) 
-0.00052 
(0.00052) 
CONTROL2 0.08555 
(0.00639)*** 
0.00402 
(0.00748) 
0.34693 
(0.01591)*** 
0.00929 
(0.02027) 
CONTROL3 0.08903 
(0.01234)*** 
0.01347 
(0.01682) 
0.39290 
(0.02981)*** 
0.10864 
(0.05227)** 
METHOD0 -0.00234 
(0.01300) 
0.00311 
(0.01167) 
-0.22118 
(0.03186)*** 
-0.20223 
(0.02967)*** 
METHOD1 0.00896 
(0.00554) 
0.00934 
(0.00506)* 
-0.03159 
(0.01429)** 
-0.03033 
(0.01311)** 
METHOD2 0.04853 
(0.01068)*** 
0.02981 
(0.00626)*** 
-0.02749 
(0.02894) 
-0.08105 
(0.02468)*** 
METHOD4 0.00476 
(0.00962) 
0.00582 
(0.00880) 
-0.03836 
(0.02250)* 
-0.03369 
(0.02013)* 
CASEMIX -0.01297 
(0.00288)*** 
-0.00810 
(0.00149)*** 
-0.08851 
(0.01241)*** 
-0.06977 
(0.01193)*** 
N   150,571   150,571   150,571   150,571 
R2 0.1127 0.0174b 0.1193 0.0109b 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
facilities in these states to hire less costly inputs without sacrificing market share. 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home correlation using 
the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
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5.2.3.1 Other Findings 
The coefficient of the average, annual Medicaid per diem reimbursement rate is 
positive and statistically significant for the number of registered nurse, licensed practical 
nurse, and licensed nurse hours per resident day indicating that an increase in the 
reimbursement rate provides higher quality.  Again it appears that an increase in the rate 
causes a substitution effect since the coefficient for the AIDES model is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level; facilities are able to provide a more 
qualified level of staffing, which costs more, when there is an increase in the payment 
rate. 
The results of ownership on the structure-based measures of quality are very 
consistent; nonprofit and government-owned facilities provide a higher level of staffing 
than for-profit facilities.  These results support the findings of earlier work (Aaronson, et 
al. 1994; Elwell 1984; Grabowski and Hirth 2002; Zinn 1994) and lend credence to the 
theory that nonprofit facilities have higher costs because they have higher quality. 
The use of a retrospective reimbursement method is negative and statistically 
significant in the AIDES and NURSTAFF models.  If costs are passed through to the 
insurer as is the case with retrospective reimbursement, then having fewer nurses’ aides 
which cost less than certified nurses implies that facilities are again substituting toward 
more highly trained and costly inputs.  However, even though all of the coefficients of 
the other three models are positive, none are statistically significant. 
Both prospective, facility-specific and prospective class reimbursement methods 
lead to more RN hours and licensed nurse hours (LICNUR) and less aides and nursing 
staff (NURSTAFF) hours.  Additionally, a class method results in more LPN hours.  The 
  102
coefficient on the dummy variable for a combination method (METHOD4) is positive 
and statistically significant in the facility fixed effects model for RNS and is negative and 
statistically significant for both the AIDES and NURSTAFF models in both the state and 
fixed effects models.  Taken together the results of the reimbursement method variables 
do not give a clear picture as to which method of reimbursement provides higher quality 
of care. 
The use of case-mix reimbursement provides rather interesting results.  Assuming 
that compensating for the case-mix of the resident population should improve the quality 
of care because the costs of such care are accounted for, it is surprising to find in the 
models for which the value is statistically significant that the coefficient is negative rather 
than positive.  However these results are similar to ones obtained  in a panel study with 
data from 1991 to 1998 using state fixed effects (Grabowski 2002; 2004).  Perhaps the 
increased rate that facilities receive for the case-mix of the residents is spent on other 
amenities rather than providing a more professional level of nursing staff. 
 
5.3 The Effect of Certificate of Need and Construction Moratorium Policies on the 
Access to Care in Nursing Homes 
 
The results of the estimation for both the state and facility fixed effects models 
show that nursing homes in those states without CON and/or construction moratorium 
policies have a statistically significant higher percentage of Medicaid residents.  As 
shown in Table 6 on the following page, the coefficient on CON_MORT is significant at 
less than the 1 percent level for both models.  In the state fixed effects model, nursing
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Table 6 
Main Regression Results for Access and Heavy-Care Models 
Dependent 
Variable       PCTMCAID ADLINDEX 
 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Facility Fixed 
Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Std Error)a 
CON_MORT 0.95788 
(0.34786)*** 
1.55143 
(0.29731)*** 
-0.12390 
(0.02821)*** 
-0.10086 
(0.02636)*** 
RATE -0.00507 
(0.00777) 
0.00302 
(0.00616) 
0.00109 
(0.00069) 
0.00081 
(0.00064) 
CONTROL2 -9.38626 
(0.34208)*** 
-0.91782 
(0.27432)*** 
0.06312 
(0.02116)*** 
0.02638 
(0.02532) 
CONTROL3 0.79328 
(0.60256) 
0.92467 
(0.65133) 
0.32173 
(0.04918)*** 
0.08470 
(0.06216) 
METHOD0 -1.91870 
(0.48414)*** 
-1.97860 
(0.40190)*** 
0.04236 
(0.04044) 
0.02111 
(0.03785) 
METHOD1 -0.22563 
(0.23044) 
-0.40020 
(0.18285)** 
0.06795 
(0.01859)*** 
0.03508 
(0.01670)** 
METHOD2 -1.40048 
(0.37974)*** 
-0.78225 
(0.31524)** 
-0.04475 
(0.03208) 
-0.05763 
(0.03013)* 
METHOD4 0.21310 
(0.36760) 
0.62293 
(0.29102)** 
-0.11659 
(0.03047)*** 
-0.09409 
(0.02806)*** 
CASEMIX -0.08600 
(0.17625) 
-0.09821 
(0.14293) 
0.20506 
(0.01521)*** 
0.20339 
(0.01400)*** 
N   150,571   150,571   150,571   150,571 
R2 0.2016 0.0060b 0.2424 0.0556b 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
homes in states without CON and/or construction moratorium policies have .96 percent 
more Medicaid residents than those nursing homes in states with some type of regulation.  
This percentage increases to 1.55 percent in the facility fixed effects model.  These 
results hold while controlling for excess demand in the market and support the hypothesis 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
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that Medicaid-eligible individuals in nursing homes in those states without CON and/or 
moratorium policies have better access to nursing home beds than those individuals in 
states that still have these policies.  While the magnitude of these results is not large the 
results do indicate that there is a difference in the access to care for Medicaid-eligible 
individuals between those states without CON and/or moratorium policies and those with 
these policies. 
With respect to the access to care for heavy-care residents in a facility, facilities in 
those states without CON and/or moratorium policies actually have residents with a lower 
level of dependency in both the state and facility fixed effects models.  Medicaid 
residents are often believed to be more dependent in their functional abilities than 
private-pay residents and therefore are not the type of residents that nursing homes want 
to have fill their empty beds.  This result in conjunction with the result of the access 
model indicates that Medicaid residents are not necessarily more dependent than private-
pay residents.  Or perhaps the facilities that are in states without these polices are “cream-
skimming.” 
 
5.3.1 Other Findings 
Results of several of the other explanatory variables are worth mentioning.  The 
annual, average per diem Medicaid reimbursement rate was not significant in either of the  
state or facility fixed effects models for the access to care (PCTMCAID) or heavy-care 
(ADLINDEX) models.  While earlier work has shown that increasing the reimbursement 
rate has increased the access to care for Medicaid residents (Aaronson, et al. 1994; 
Gertler 1989, 1992) these results do not support the same finding.  Additionally, the 
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results do not seem to support the theory that the Medicaid reimbursement rate is “too 
low” to provide nursing homes with the incentive to admit Medicaid residents.  
Furthermore, these results do not show that increasing the reimbursement rate will 
improve access for heavy-care residents. 
In both the state and facility fixed effects models nonprofit nursing homes have a 
significantly lower percentage of Medicaid residents than for-profit facilities.  This result 
supports the theory that to the extent higher costs and quality are associated with 
increased demand by private-pay and Medicare residents, nonprofit facilities are more 
oriented toward those residents while for-profit facilities are more oriented toward 
Medicaid residents. 
It is relevant to also note that the effect of income on access is statistically 
significant in both models.  However, it is negative in the state fixed effects model and 
positive in the facility fixed effects model.  While one expects that an increase in the per 
capita personal income in the county in which the nursing homes is located would lead to 
fewer Medicaid residents, perhaps this result helps to explain why the effect of 
CON_MORT is rather small. 
With respect to the heavy-care model, nonprofit and government-owned facilities 
have residents with a statistically significant higher level of dependency than for-profit 
facilities in the state fixed effects model.  While the coefficients are positive for both 
nonprofit and government ownership in the facility fixed effects model they are not 
statistically significant.  This result supports the idea that one of the reasons nonprofit and 
government nursing homes have higher costs than for-profit facilities is because they 
serve a more impaired resident population. 
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The effect of the reimbursement method in the access model was fairly consistent 
across the various measures for both the state and facility fixed effects models.  For both 
models, nursing homes in states that employed either a retrospective or prospective class 
reimbursement method had a statistically significant lower percentage of Medicaid 
residents compared to those states that employed an adjusted method.  Since retrospective 
reimbursement is less restrictive than an adjusted method (the base group) the result for 
retrospective is not of the expected sign.  However the fact that those states with a 
prospective class method have a lower percentage of Medicaid residents is expected since 
that method is the most restrictive of all.  While only statistically significant in the facility 
fixed effects model, the negative sign on the coefficient for the prospective facility-
specific method is also expected since this method is more stringent than an adjusted 
method.  Lastly, while only statistically significant in the facility fixed effects model, the 
positive sign on the coefficient for the combination method is also expected since this 
method is also more stringent than an adjusted method.  Finally, having a method that 
accounts for resident case-mix does not appear to have any effect on the percentage of 
Medicaid residents in a facility.  This is the same result found by Cohen and Dubay 
(1990). 
With respect to the heavy-care model, one would expect that the more stringent 
the reimbursement method the less functionally dependent is the resident population 
since caring for more disabled residents implies higher costs for the facility.  In contrast 
one would expect to see a more disabled resident population with a retrospective method 
since it is the least restrictive payment method.  As expected, the coefficient on the 
retrospective method is positive in both the state and facility fixed effects model but 
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neither value is statistically significant.  As expected, the coefficient on METHOD2 is 
negative in both models but is only statistically significant tin the facility fixed effects 
model.  Again as expected, the coefficients on METHOD4 are negative and statistically 
significant in both the state and facility fixed effects model indicating that states 
employing a combination method have residents that have less functional disabilities than 
those residents in states using an adjusted method.  Finally, in both the state and fixed 
effects models those states that use a case-mix adjustment have residents with more 
functional disabilities.  This could be an important policy implication since one could 
interpret the results to mean that nursing homes reimbursed in this way are provided with 
an incentive to accept heavy-care residents. 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
In order to check for the robustness of the main findings the models were 
estimated without the reimbursement method to alleviate any concern over potential 
multicollinearity between the state fixed effects and the reimbursement method.  The 
results of these models are consistent with the results of the main estimations for the main 
variable of interest, the effect of CON and/or construction moratorium policies on access 
to care and quality of care.  Specifically, all the coefficients of CON_MORT are of the 
same sign and the same level or better of statistical significance in the quality, access, and 
heavy-care state and fixed effects models.  The full results of these estimations are in 
Tables A.18-A.27 in Appendix A. 
An alternative method to control for excess demand is to separate the data into the 
least and most restrictive markets.  The first step was to assign a unique identifier to each 
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ARF state and county combination.  Then the median of EMPTYELDERLY (the number 
of empty nursing homes beds per 1,000 noninstitutionalized elderly (aged 65+) in a 
county) was calculated for each county over the period 1991-2003.  Next the annual 
median level for the entire data set was calculated for the entire period of 1991 through 
2003.  Those observations that were below the median value of EMPTYELDERLY for 
the entire data set were classified as the most restrictive markets while those observations 
above the median were classified as the least restrictive markets.  This follows a similar 
method used in recent work to proxy for excess demand (Grabowski 2002, 2004). 
The results for the effect of CON_MORT in both the least and most restrictive 
markets show that nursing homes in those states without CON and/or construction 
moratorium policies have a higher percentage of Medicaid residents.  The coefficients are 
statistically significant in all of the models except for the least restrictive state fixed 
effects model.  In the most restrictive markets nursing homes in states without CON 
and/or moratorium policies have 2 percent and 3 percent more Medicaid residents in the 
state and facility fixed effects models, respectively.  This suggests that regardless of the 
tightness of the market, CON policies may restrict access to care for Medicaid residents.  
The results for the heavy-care access model are the same as the results using the full 
sample. 
It seems logical that those nursing homes in least restrictive markets would be apt 
to compete for residents on the basis of quality for both private-pay and Medicaid 
residents while there may not be such an incentive in the most restrictive markets.  
However, the results of the quality models in both the least and most restrictive markets 
are quite similar to those in the main findings using the full sample.  The two notable 
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exceptions are that in the most restrictive markets the proportion of residents with 
catheters is higher and the number of deficiencies is lower in nursing homes in those 
states without CON and/or construction moratorium policies.  The full results of these 
estimations are in Tables A.28-A.47 in Appendix A. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the effects of certificate of need and 
construction moratorium policies on quality of care and access to care in the nursing 
home industry and discusses their potential policy implications.  Additionally, the 
limitations of this current research as well as opportunities for future research are 
discussed. 
 
6.1 Main Findings 
This dissertation is the first attempt to employ panel data to analyze the 
differences in the quality of care and access to care in nursing homes in those states 
without certificate of need and/or construction moratorium policies and nursing homes in 
those states still retaining such policies.  This data set includes observations for all 
Medicaid and Medicare-certified freestanding nursing homes in the United States over 
the thirteen year period of 1991-2003.   
While controlling for excess demand in the market, the results of the quality of 
care estimations in this dissertation show that nursing homes in those states without CON 
and/or construction moratorium policies have higher quality of care than nursing homes 
in those states without these policies when quality is a process-based measure.  Nursing 
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homes in states without these types of policy have residents with a lower proportion of 
residents with urethral catheters, feeding tubes, and physical restraints.  These results 
support the hypothesis that the elimination of CON leads to higher quality of care.  
Additionally, the results of the estimations using structure-based measures of quality also 
support this hypothesis.  Nursing homes in states without CON policies have more 
registered and licensed practical nurse hours per resident day while substituting away 
from aide hours per resident day. 
The composite-based measure of quality, facility deficiencies, was positive but 
only statistically significant in the facility fixed effects model.  This result does not 
support the hypothesis of higher quality of care in nursing homes in states without CON 
policies.  The only outcome measure of quality used in this dissertation, the proportion of 
residents with pressure sores, was not statistically significant in either the state or facility 
fixed effects models.  Unfortunately the data used in this dissertation for the years prior to 
1997 from OSCAR do not include many other outcome measures of quality.  This is one 
area of research where perhaps the Minimum Data Set, which provides a comprehensive 
assessment of each resident's functional capabilities in each Medicare or Medicaid 
certified nursing home, will be beneficial. 
The results of the estimation for both the state and facility fixed effects access to 
care models show that nursing homes in those states without CON and/or construction 
moratorium policies have a statistically significant higher percentage of Medicaid 
residents.  These results hold while controlling for excess demand in the market and 
support the hypothesis that Medicaid-eligible individuals in those states without CON 
and/or moratorium policies have better access to nursing home beds than those 
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individuals in states that still have these policies.  While it may be true that the occupancy 
rates of nursing homes have declined over recent years, it appears that Medicaid-eligible 
individuals still face access restrictions in those states having CON and/or moratorium 
policies. 
With respect to the access to care for heavy-care residents, facilities in those states 
without CON and/or moratorium policies actually have residents with a lower level of 
dependency in both the state and facility fixed effects models.  Medicaid residents are 
often believed to be more dependent in their functional abilities than private-pay residents 
and therefore are not the type of residents that nursing homes want to have fill their 
empty beds.  This result in conjunction with the result of the access model indicates that 
Medicaid residents are not necessarily more dependent than private-pay residents.  
Another explanation is that facilities which are in states without these policies are better 
able to “cream-skim.” 
 
6.2 Policy Implications 
While the primary goals of the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act (P.L. 93-641) of 1974 were to (1) contain health care costs and (2) 
increase the accessibility and quality of health services, it is not evident that today those 
goals are being achieved through the use of certificate of need and construction 
moratorium policies in the nursing home industry.  The results of this research with 
respect to quality of care and access to care, coupled with recent work on the effect of 
these policies on the cost of care in nursing homes (Grabowski, et al. 2003; Miller, et al. 
  113
2002; Miller, et al. 2001), indicate that perhaps this type of supply regulation is no longer 
meeting its original purposes.   
While it is true that there has been a significant decline in nursing home 
utilization over the last two decades (Bishop 1999), it is also true that the baby boomer 
generation is beginning to retire resulting in an aging population that will need long term 
care.  With the risk of becoming a nursing home resident at the age of 65 at 44 percent 
and at the age of 85 at 53 percent (Spillman and Lubitz 2002) perhaps those states that 
still have these policies in place should consider the costs and benefits of retaining such 
regulations.  It is also true that quality of care continues to be a major concern with 
continued reports of nursing homes with serious deficiencies as well as survey and 
oversight shortcomings (GAO2005).  From the results of this research on the effects of 
CON and/or moratorium policies on quality of care and access to care in the nursing 
home market, it is no longer clear that the benefits of these policies outweigh the costs. 
Substitutes to long term nursing home care exist in the market today that did not 
exist two decades ago.  Medicaid now provides for alternatives such as home health care 
and assisted living facilities.  If it is indeed true that changing market conditions have 
rendered CON and construction moratorium policies less important in the market for 
nursing home care, one might then question the relevancy of states maintaining these 
types of regulation.  Perhaps the costs associated with maintaining CON regulation 
agencies could be better spent on other aspects of ensuring the dignity and quality of care 
for nursing home residents rather than on the administration of a policy that may no 
longer be relevant in today’s nursing home market. 
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6.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations to this research that should be noted.  The first is that 
while the OSCAR system is one of the most comprehensive, longitudinal information 
sets available for all Medicare-/Medicaid-certified nursing homes in the United States, it 
must be recognized that it was created for the purpose of provider certification.  
However, much research in the nursing home industry has utilized this data since its 
implementation.  Due to the acknowledgment of the usefulness of such data and 
recognizing the importance of the accuracy and reliability of survey data used in research, 
emphasis has been placed on state survey procedures to ensure both the accuracy and 
reliability in the survey and data input processes.  However, concerns still remain today 
with the reliability of the findings of nursing home surveys (GAO2005).  Therefore it is 
important to realize that the results obtained from using data from a system such as 
OSCAR must be viewed with the acknowledgment of the data limitations. 
The second limitation is the use of a binary indicator for the main variable of 
interest, CON_MORT, which does not capture the complexity or effectiveness of a 
state’s policy.  Although these policies theoretically restrict or prohibit growth in the 
nursing home market it is not always the case in practice.  Many states have exceptions 
for their moratorium policy that allow for additional beds or expansion if it is deemed a 
critical need.  Additionally, my survey of states’ regulatory agencies indicated that states 
vary on the restrictiveness of their CON policies.  In some states the CON actually acts as 
a moratorium while in other states it appears that the CON is simply a formality and most 
applications for additional or new beds get approved.   
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The third limitation is the use of only one outcome measure of quality, the 
proportion of residents with pressure sores.  Since the results using this measure of 
quality are not significant in either the state or facility fixed effects models, without 
another outcome measure to test it is not readily evident whether or not there is no 
significant difference between states with and without CON and/or moratorium policies 
or whether there is a lack of precision in the estimation. 
The final limitation to mention concerns the reimbursement rate.  While other 
work accounts for the fact that the rate utilized by some states covers various ancillaries  
(Harrington, et al. 2000b; Swan, et al. 1993) I did not collect this information when I 
surveyed each of the states’ Medicaid reimbursement agencies.   
 
6.4 Future Research 
Future research should address several of the limitations mentioned above.  First, 
in order to eliminate any concern with the use of a single binary indicator for the 
existence of a CON and/or construction moratorium policy, future work should include a 
measure of the effectiveness of the policy.  Although these policies theoretically restrict 
or prohibit growth in the nursing home market it is not always the case in practice.  Many 
states have exceptions for their moratorium policy that allows for additional beds or 
expansion if it is deemed a critical need.  My survey of states’ regulatory agencies 
indicates that states vary on the restrictiveness of their CON policies.  In some states the 
CON actually acts as a moratorium while in other states it appears that the CON is simply 
a formality and most applications for additional or new beds get approved.  This 
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difference in the effectiveness of the regulation should be accounted for in future research 
to try and eliminate any omitted variable bias that might influence the results. 
Second, follow on work from this dissertation should include an attempt to use 
other outcome-based measures of quality.  While it may not be possible to achieve this 
with OSCAR data that cover the same time period as in this study, it should be possible 
to construct a panel with data from the mid-1990s through 2005.  Since reports of 
inadequate quality of care continue to be published it is important to look at more 
outcome-based measures that are more focused directly on residents’ “quality of life” 
(Nyman 1988c) along with their quality of care.  Perhaps the use of the Minimum Data 
Set (MDS) will be an additional source of data to contribute toward this need to provide 
better outcome-based measures of quality at the resident level. 
Third, future work with this data should investigate the relationship of ownership 
and quality of care as well as access to care.  Though not the main variable of interest in 
this dissertation, the results indicate that nonprofit nursing homes provide higher quality 
of care (for most of the quality measures) than for-profit homes and that nonprofits have 
fewer Medicaid residents than for-profit facilities but more heavy-care residents.  An 
interesting model to investigate would be a matching of nonprofit and for-profit nursing 
homes in states with and without CON and/or moratorium policies to see whether or not 
any behavioral patterns with respect to quality and access emerge. 
While much work has been done on the quality of care in the nursing home 
industry and some work on the access to care, future work must continue and attempt to 
clarify for policymakers those policies that are effective in assuring adequate care to our 
aging population and those that may not be achieving their intended goals. 
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Table A.1  
CMS’ Deficiency Classification System 
CMS deficiency category Level of severity 
Compliance status of home 
cited for this deficiency 
Immediate jeopardy to resident health or 
safety 
Most serious Noncompliant 
Actual harm that does not put resident 
in immediate jeopardy 
Serious Noncompliant 
No actual harm, with potential for more 
than minimal harm 
Less serious Noncompliant 
No actual harm, with potential for 
minimal harm 
Minimal Substantially compliant 
Adapted from the GAO (1998b) report. 
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Table A.2 
Illustrative Measures of Quality of Care in Nursing 
Structural Measures 
Staffing levels (nurses, PTs, OTs, etc.) Governance 
Staffing turnover Age/condition of plant, equipment  
(include mobility development) 
Wages/benefits Payer mix (percent mix, etc.) 
Management/leadership Case mix 
Facility: size, location, ownership Accreditation 
Availability of private rooms Teaching status 
Volunteers  
Process Measures 
Assists with ADL/IADL (includes 
bathing, skin care) 
Bladder training 
Injury (staff and patient) Delivery of “hotel” services (sanitation) 
Infection control (includes residents 
and staff) 
Assessment (includes care planning), 
frequency and completeness 
Resident services: special care to 
prevent problems 
Abuse prevention 
Overuse of restraints Quality assurance (RA and MDS) 
Use of urinary catheters Access and use of medical care 
 Residents rights 
Outcome Measures 
Mortality Urinary incontinence 
Hospitalization Weight loss 
Facility-acquired pressure sore, skin 
breakdown 
Infectious disease 
Functional status Patient satisfaction 
Pain control Family satisfaction 
Depression  Thefts/abuse 
Injuries Staff injuries/illness 
 Staff satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ADL = activities of daily living; IADL = instrumental activities of daily living; 
OT = occupational therapist; PT = physical therapist; RA = resident assessment; MDS 
= minimum data set 
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Table A.3 
Certificate of Need and Moratorium Policies for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
AL 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 
AK 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
AR* 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
CT 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
DE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
FL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
GA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IN 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KY 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
LA 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
MA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
MD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ME 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
MI 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
MN 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
MO 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
MS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
MT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ND 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
NE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
NH 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
NJ 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NV1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
OH 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
OK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RI 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
TN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TX 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
UT 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Legend: 
0 = no CON and no moratorium 2 = no CON but moratorium  *permit of approval law 
1 = CON but not no moratorium 3 = CON and moratorium 
 
1Nevada eliminated certificate of need in its two largest counties beginning in 1996 and is thus labeled as 1 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
Certificate of Need and Moratorium Policies for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
VT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WV 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
WI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
WY* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
0 = no CON and no moratorium 2 = no CON but moratorium  *intent to construct law 
1 = CON but not no moratorium 3 = CON and moratorium 
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Table A.4 
Reimbursement Method for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
AL pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
AK adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
AR1 pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pfs pfs pfs 
AZ2 pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl 
CA pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl 
CO adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
CT adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
DE pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
FL pfs pfs adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
GA adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
HI adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
IA adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
ID adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
IL adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
IN adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
KS pfs pfs adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
KY adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
LA pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pfs 
MA com com pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
MD adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
ME com com adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
MI adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
MN pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
MO adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
MS pfs pfs adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
MT adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
NC com com com com com com com com com com com com com 
ND adj adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
NE com ret ret ret ret ret ret ret ret ret pfs pfs pfs 
NH adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
NJ adj adj adj adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
NM adj adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
NV adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
NY adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
OH adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
OK pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl pcl 
OR com adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
PA ret ret ret ret ret com adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
RI pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
SC adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
SD pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
TN com com com com com com com pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
TX pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pcl pcl pcl pcl 
UT pcl pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
VA com com com com com com com com com com com com pfs 
VT adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
WA adj adj adj pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: ret = retrospective; pfs = prospective, facility-specific; pcl = prospective, class; com = combination; adj = 
prospective, adjusted 
1Harrington, et al. (2000) classifies 1992-1998 as pfs but Medicaid agency contact classified method as pcl. 
2Harrington, et al. (2000) classifies as pfs but Medicaid agency contact classified method as pcl. 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
Reimbursement Method for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
WI pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs pfs 
WV adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
WY adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj adj 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: ret = retrospective; pfs = prospective, facility-specific; pcl = prospective, class; com = combination; adj = 
prospective, adjusted 
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Table A.5 
Case-mix Reimbursement for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
AL No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
AK No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
AR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AZ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
CO No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
CT No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
DE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FL No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GA No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes 
HI No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
IA Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ID No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
IL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IN No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KS No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LA No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes 
MA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ME No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MI No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
MN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
MO No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
MS No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NC No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes 
ND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NH No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NJ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NM No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
NV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OH Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OK No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
OR No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
PA No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RI No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
SC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SD No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TN No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
TX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UT No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes 
VA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VT No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WA No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WI1 No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
WV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WY No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 
 
 
 
 
1Harrington, et al. (2000) classifies 1993-1998 as having casemix reimbursement but Medicaid agency contact 
classified as not having case-mix.  
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Table A.6 
Average Per Diem Medicaid Reimbursement Rates for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
AL 52.58 62.48 68.75 75.37 82.76 85.57 94.73 98.69 103.54 107.18 112.54 119.61 126.98 
AK 205.04 217.19 221.27 211.21 214.77 225.38 237.47 261.67 265.23 275.00 303.71 320.95 329.21 
AR 42.22 49.05 54.86 58.02 60.28 61.98 61.98 61.98 64.51 69.01 76.92 94.73 102.51 
AZ 69.24 72.30 71.93 77.80 82.36 88.23 88.23 91.88 95.53 100.30 105.83 108.17 117.16 
CA 65.32 70.60 72.28 76.27 79.71 79.77 81.54 88.78 91.32 110.19 113.13 113.60 118.05 
CO 64.46 72.55 71.28 73.59 75.93 90.31 90.31 101.55 105.88 111.15 114.68 123.37 130.98 
CT 112.38 116.57 118.00 120.27 125.06 129.62 133.82 137.06 147.97 154.37 158.51 161.25 167.95 
DE 77.53 81.80 86.16 90.10 93.78 99.14 104.15 102.09 105.22 117.66 133.46 157.91 171.62 
FL 71.80 76.71 80.48 86.45 87.95 90.62 95.95 97.99 101.74 110.37 119.54 129.36 142.90 
GA 61.03 63.49 67.02 68.85 72.99 77.15 72.60 76.30 86.56 88.50 95.10 105.24 117.59 
HI 95.03 100.54 105.76 119.39 124.05 129.65 132.59 127.12 131.06 134.86 140.05 146.85 154.04 
IA 50.32 53.10 56.27 57.72 58.87 64.62 68.11 72.78 78.61 85.15 85.90 91.96 95.38 
ID 62.28 65.47 74.67 75.45 81.28 88.03 86.29 98.42 104.65 112.65 123.90 130.63 137.66 
IL 52.26 62.23 70.08 70.08 70.08 70.22 70.28 77.62 81.44 86.05 90.06 94.86 89.92 
IN 60.43 64.02 66.56 71.28 78.48 81.75 80.32 80.32 92.16 94.58 100.39 104.25 101.66 
KS 47.72 50.55 51.24 56.14 60.08 63.68 67.11 72.71 76.72 84.12 91.65 97.38 101.04 
KY 55.21 59.50 64.03 69.32 73.44 76.00 83.00 80.62 86.34 89.26 100.35 101.76 107.76 
LA 50.48 63.82 65.26 60.60 63.78 63.52 61.12 62.48 61.51 71.99 76.67 79.28 80.24 
MA 94.77 96.07 96.04 98.84 100.73 103.35 111.92 114.68 119.24 124.47 132.60 140.04 154.26 
MD 73.07 77.52 79.33 81.35 89.16 94.19 98.88 106.62 111.93 122.15 134.42 150.64 162.49 
ME 84.94 87.25 87.00 101.40 105.85 114.09 113.41 115.77 113.83 116.20 130.32 130.37 158.10 
MI 58.21 64.88 67.12 71.01 74.25 79.46 84.17 91.49 101.43 107.10 117.44 125.08 134.43 
MN 78.32 82.06 81.91 88.21 92.24 95.61 101.79 106.47 111.03 117.31 123.04 129.62 138.34 
MO 42.65 52.89 57.93 58.15 70.39 73.18 83.35 87.81 89.60 92.32 96.42 96.84 97.01 
MS 52.20 55.44 58.07 58.08 68.00 72.89 76.77 83.02 86.40 90.22 97.38 104.46 115.63 
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Table A.6 (continued) 
Average Per Diem Medicaid Reimbursement Rates for the Years 1991-2003 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
MT 56.39 63.22 69.69 74.62 80.15 83.09 85.89 87.55 90.39 93.39 96.97 102.13 106.29
NC 78.66 86.75 76.68 79.20 83.53 86.87 92.82 93.12 111.94 116.27 122.14 126.36 126.36
ND 66.51 71.98 74.29 75.92 80.86 85.77 90.86 94.13 97.68 104.94 115.03 127.05 129.71
NE 56.82 60.37 60.07 62.03 66.17 70.99 76.70 84.19 90.67 97.97 107.02 113.83 118.94
NH 92.66 95.58 98.94 105.36 105.34 104.00 108.47 109.22 114.58 116.94 119.24 121.99 126.42
NJ 88.86 88.86 91.61 100.35 102.35 102.35 112.01 115.76 119.39 123.93 130.03 137.57 145.29
NM1 68.03 73.84 64.72 75.79 77.69 86.80 111.31 129.04 . . . . . 
NV 65.83 68.58 75.85 76.35 79.33 82.51 85.71 86.17 92.16 97.20 110.04 102.88 126.59
NY 117.01 122.90 128.10 134.48 138.94 150.15 148.91 156.83 162.76 160.66 166.57 172.05 177.33
OH 79.29 84.63 88.81 93.74 99.54 106.14 112.00 120.52 126.63 134.97 145.15 153.01 152.72
OK 43.90 46.40 48.90 49.70 52.50 54.94 56.77 64.20 66.38 66.57 84.46 93.58 94.61 
OR 58.81 67.37 69.55 75.36 76.54 76.54 81.88 88.21 93.52 97.60 108.09 111.35 111.35
PA 63.46 68.04 78.82 88.07 96.19 102.13 109.13 114.23 119.54 126.14 132.86 140.65 145.57
RI 105.09 110.88 85.76 103.78 98.00 101.50 101.50 109.75 109.25 113.44 119.43 129.97 135.71
SC 58.20 65.24 64.99 67.57 71.22 74.69 78.08 84.85 88.38 94.80 96.07 103.11 107.57
SD 46.85 54.32 60.00 64.37 68.89 77.91 74.26 75.88 77.43 79.60 83.57 86.62 91.61 
TN 55.29 62.32 68.99 56.18 62.75 77.91 87.74 86.02 89.58 95.69 98.80 102.70 111.21
TX 51.62 54.51 56.17 60.55 63.34 66.52 71.12 75.15 78.62 83.53 88.50 96.10 95.80 
UT 59.68 67.18 67.53 70.38 74.24 76.76 78.53 83.11 85.67 89.11 90.05 94.19 105.55
VA 60.47 63.57 65.50 71.01 72.97 75.07 77.37 79.48 82.60 89.10 99.12 106.33 112.06
VT 76.91 76.19 84.90 89.78 94.24 97.20 100.46 104.10 105.51 113.19 118.20 132.93 139.75
WA 78.74 86.53 85.60 92.74 98.91 104.96 109.03 112.90 116.89 119.55 123.64 127.64 129.23
WI 66.93 71.93 73.41 76.32 80.05 85.85 85.85 95.47 97.68 100.76 105.11 112.09 119.15
WV 68.83 72.28 78.13 80.86 77.27 89.93 101.04 106.57 110.02 117.86 125.34 134.94 141.50
WY 65.77 70.66 70.06 73.06 75.84 90.09 92.41 93.72 95.15 97.89 105.13 117.11 119.43
 
 
 
1New Mexico has missing values for 1999-2003. 
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Table A.7 
Nursing Home, County, and State-level Characteristics (1991-2003)a by CON_MORT 
Variable Description CON_MORT = 1 CON_MORT = 0 
Access Measure N Mean  
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD N Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
PCTMCAID Percent of Medicaid residents 22,682 65.29 19.98 8.58 128,023 69.59 18.25 8.29 
Quality Measures 
PROPPRESSORE Proportion of residents with decubitus ulcer 22,669 0.07 0.05 0.04 127,902 0.06 0.05 0.04 
PROPPARENTERAL Proportion of residents with feeding tubes 22,669 0.06 0.07 0.03 127,902 0.06 0.06 0.03 
PROPCATHETER Proportion of residents with catheters  22,669 0.07 0.06 0.04 127,902 0.07 0.05 0.04 
PROPMOBLREST Proportion of residents with physical restraints  22,669 0.17 0.16 0.12 127,902 0.16 0.15 0.12 
DEFS1TOT Number of health deficiencies  22,675 9.98 9.46 7.44 127,995 6.25 6.62 5.43 
RNS 
Registered nurse (RN) hours per resident 
day  22,682 0.34 0.27 0.17 128,023 0.34 0.32 0.19 
LPNS Licensed practical nurse (LPN) hours per resident day  22,682 0.66 0.37 0.26 128,023 0.68 0.42 0.28 
AIDES Nurses’ aides hours per resident day 22,682 2.09 0.85 0.68 128,023 2.15 1.04 0.73 
LICNUR RN and LPN hours per resident day 22,682 0.92 0.43 0.29 128,023 0.94 0.43 0.29 
NURSTAFF RN, LPN, and aide hours per resident day 22,682 2.86 0.96 0.74 128,023 2.92 1.10 0.77 
Facility Characteristics 
TOTRES Number of residents  22,682 86.88 44.77 9.82 128,023 95.47 50.40 11.51 
CENMCAID Number of Medicaid residents  22,682 57.32 36.42 9.84 128,023 66.95 41.78 11.24 
CENMCARE Number of Medicare residents  22,682 5.95 6.68 3.92 128,023 6.58 7.98 4.82 
CENOTHER Number of private-pay residents  22,682 23.61 19.63 8.00 128,023 21.94 19.45 8.57 
TOTBEDS Total number of beds  22,682 101.88 53.12 9.96 128,023 110.95 55.97 8.94 
CONTROL1 =1 if for-profit facility (base) 22,682 0.75 0.43 0.12 128,023 0.74 0.44 0.12 
CONTROL2 =1 if nonprofit facility 22,682 0.22 0.42 0.12 128,023 0.21 0.41 0.12 
CONTROL3 =1 if government facility 22,682 0.02 0.15 0.05 128,023 0.04 0.21 0.05 
MULTI =1 if chain facility  22,682 0.61 0.49 0.23 128,023 0.56 0.50 0.23 
ADLINDEX ADL index  22,669 10.05 1.70 0.88 127,902 9.75 1.48 0.88 
OCCUPANCY Number of residents/total number of beds 22,682 86.27 12.29 7.83 128,023 86.61 14.48 8.35 
 
 
 
aThe data are from the Online, Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) system unless otherwise noted. 
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Table A.7 (continued) 
Nursing Home, County, and State-level Characteristics (1991-2003)a by CON_MORT 
Variable Description CON_MORT = 1 CON_MORT = 0 
Market (County) Characteristics 
POP65UP Elderly population (aged 65+)b  22,682 215,562 329,335 13,286 128,023 53,346 94,543 3,022 
EMPTYELDERLY Number of empty beds per 1000 noninstitutionalized elderlyd 22,682 7.17 8.85 4.23 128,023 8.61 10.17 4.51 
INCOME Per capita personal income (2003 $)c 22,682 28,284 6,518 1,774 128,023 27,102 7,200 2,220 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index 22,682 0.18 0.23 0.06 128,023 0.26 0.27 0.08 
State-level Characteristics 
RATE Average, annual Medicaid per diem reimbursement rate (2003 $)e 22,682 101.68 21.58 12.73 128,023 104.41 26.34 10.55 
RATEMISSING =1 when New Mexico’s rate is missing 22,682 0.01 0.10 0.08 128,023 0.00 0.00 0.00 
METHOD0 =1 if state uses retrospective reimbursemente 22,682 0.00 0.00 0.00 128,023 0.32 0.18 0.08 
METHOD1 =1 if state uses prospective, facility-specific reimbursemente 22,682 0.17 0.37 0.17 128,023 0.37 0.48 0.25 
METHOD2 =1 if state uses prospective, class reimbursemente 22,682 0.50 0.50 0.00 128,023 0.08 0.27 0.14 
METHOD3 =1 if state uses prospective, adjusted reimbursemente (base) 22,682 0.34 0.47 0.17 128,023 0.44 0.50 0.17 
METHOD4 =1 if states combines retrospective and prospective reimbursemente 22,682 0.00 0.00 0.00 128,023 0.08 0.26 0.13 
CASEMIX =1 if state uses case-mix Medicaid reimbursemente 22,682 0.42 0.49 0.23 128,023 0.55 0.50 0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe data are from the Online, Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) system unless otherwise noted. 
bThis variable is from the Area Resource File (ARF). 
cThis variable is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional Economic Information System (REIS). 
dThis variable is constructed using OSCAR and ARF files. 
eThese variables are from the 1998 State Data Book on Long-Term Care Program and Market Characteristics 
(Harrington, et al. 2000b) and the author’s state surveys. 
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Table A.8 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
State Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.00957 0.00132*** -0.00096 0.00111 -0.05028 0.00321*** 
RATE -0.00002 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00003 -0.00061 0.00008*** 
RATEMISSING 0.00336 0.00512 -0.00902 0.00461** -0.07038 0.01653*** 
CONTROL2 -0.01008 0.00072*** -0.01040 0.00093*** 0.00309 0.00151* 
CONTROL3 -0.00772 0.00141*** -0.00241 0.00252 0.01414 0.00339*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00007 5.74e-06*** 0.00008 8.03e-06*** 0.00001 0.00001 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00005 0.00003 -0.00019 0.00004*** 0.00018 0.00007*** 
MULTI  0.00423 0.00056*** 0.00306 0.00067*** -0.01193 0.00118*** 
ADLINDEX  0.01005 0.00027*** 0.01606 0.00068*** 0.02203 0.00050*** 
HHI -0.00442 0.00119*** -0.02634 0.00160*** 0.01163 0.00258*** 
INCOME -2.47e-07 4.98e-08*** 9.48e-08 7.54e-08 -8.80e-08 1.06e-07 
METHOD0 -0.00122 0.00172 -0.00119 0.00149 0.01015 0.00451** 
METHOD1 0.00154 0.00080* -0.00275 0.00067*** 0.01518 0.00183*** 
METHOD2 -0.00370 0.00158** 0.00236 0.00135* 0.04824 0.00357*** 
METHOD4 -0.00177 0.00132 0.00114 0.00120 0.00679 0.00337** 
CASEMIX 0.00195 0.00064*** -0.00380 0.00059*** 0.01002 0.00166*** 
CONSTANT -0.00209 0.00386 -0.09614 0.00677*** 0.06852 0.00866* 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.1449 0.2941 0.2351 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.9 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
Facility Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.01037 0.00133*** -0.00194 0.00099** -0.04827 0.00325*** 
RATE -0.00002 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00002* -0.00063 0.00008*** 
RATEMISSING 0.00589 0.00493 -0.01060 0.00414*** -0.08244 0.01552*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00278 0.00111** -0.00091 0.00093 0.01006 0.00324*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00069 0.00282 -0.00098 0.00165 0.01138 0.00791 
TOTBEDS  0.00002 0.00002 -5.90e-06 0.00001 0.00005 0.00004 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00016 0.00004*** 0.00003 0.00002 0.00047 0.00008*** 
MULTI  -0.00121 0.00060** 0.00056 0.00051 -0.00460 0.00163*** 
ADLINDEX  0.00564 0.00016*** 0.00668 0.00016*** 0.01409 0.00046*** 
HHI 0.00570 0.00160*** 0.00153 0.00130 0.02149 0.00444*** 
INCOME 5.17e-07 1.31e-07*** -5.82e-07 1.66e-07*** -3.08e-06 5.44e-07*** 
METHOD0 -0.00133 0.00171 -0.00034 0.00127 0.01356 0.00457*** 
METHOD1 0.00094 0.00077 -0.00274 0.00057*** 0.01701 0.00183*** 
 METHOD2 -0.00567 0.00154*** 0.00121 0.00126 0.04961 0.00360*** 
METHOD4 -0.00214 0.00129* 0.00079 0.00105 0.00772 0.00339** 
CASEMIX 0.00252 0.00061*** -0.00181 0.00049*** 0.01198 0.00168*** 
CONSTANT 0.01455 0.00484*** -0.00014 0.00525 0.19108 0.01719*** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.0535b 0.0785b 0.1571b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.10 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
State Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00081 0.00109 0.11049 0.15330 
RATE -0.00018 0.00002*** -0.00801 0.00370** 
RATEMISSING -0.02305 0.00464*** -0.66741 0.62357 
CONTROL2 -0.00752 0.00048*** -1.33765 0.06161*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00701 0.00102*** -1.46497 0.11455*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00005 3.76e-06*** 0.01388 0.00054*** 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.00007 0.00002*** -0.00015 0.00285 
MULTI  0.00512 0.00039*** 0.13362 0.05319** 
ADLINDEX  0.00735 0.00017*** 0.03289 0.01819* 
HHI -0.00910 0.00082*** -0.71961 0.11509*** 
INC03 1.29e-07 3.47e-08*** 7.14e-06 4.47e-06 
METHOD0 -0.00213 0.00144 -0.34340 0.19223* 
METHOD1 9.75e-06 0.00073 1.04717 0.11105*** 
METHOD2 -0.00112 0.00123 1.11955 0.17030*** 
METHOD4 -0.00085 0.00110 -0.01786 0.16576 
CASEMIX 0.00008 0.00058 0.46302 0.08352*** 
CONSTANT 0.00340 0.00279 7.20068 0.38482*** 
N 150,571 150,537 
R2 0.1209 0.1830 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.11 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
Facility Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00032 0.00104 0.34217 0.14785** 
RATE -0.00018 0.00002*** -0.11655 0.00366* 
RATEMISSING -0.02165 0.00465*** -0.57068 0.63383 
CONTROL2 0.00036 0.00106 0.10461 0.16863 
CONTROL3 0.00244 0.00201 -0.74093 0.44590* 
TOTBEDS  0.00004 0.00001*** 0.02200 0.00198*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00008 0.00003*** -0.00677 0.00362* 
MULTI  0.00137 0.00057** -0.20407 0.08834** 
ADLINDEX  0.00448 0.00015*** 0.10078 0.02063*** 
HHI 0.00203 0.00157 0.55473 0.21274*** 
INCOME 4.98e-08 9.26e-08 0.00010 0.00002*** 
METHOD0 -0.00191 0.00143 -0.09740 0.19073 
METHOD1 0.00015 0.00072 1.18294 0.11003*** 
METHOD2 -0.00165 0.00123 1.32699 0.17023*** 
METHOD4 -0.00094 0.00111 0.01779 0.16702 
CASEMIX 0.00090 0.00057 0.49594 0.08272*** 
CONSTANT 0.03044 0.00387*** 2.98307 0.77156*** 
N 150,571 150,537 
R2 0.0142b 0.0441b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.12 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
State Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00638 0.00548 0.02957 0.00844*** -0.05294 0.01833*** 
RATE 0.00028 0.00015* 0.00081 0.00020*** -0.00203 0.00051*** 
RATEMISSING 0.07977 0.02639*** 0.02723 0.03697 -0.23163 0.09461** 
CONTROL2 0.05902 0.00472*** 0.02486 0.00587*** 0.24987 0.01392*** 
CONTROL3 0.03751 0.00909*** 0.02317 0.01017** 0.25495 0.02299*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00029 0.00003*** -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00022 0.00010** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00063 0.00012*** 0.00198 0.00021*** 0.00209 0.00046*** 
MULTI  0.01110 0.00311*** 0.02901 0.00408*** -0.02409 0.00974** 
ADLINDEX  0.02223 0.00162*** 0.02508 0.00216*** 0.10279 0.00429*** 
HHI -0.02315 0.00627*** -0.12060 0.00879*** -0.13185 0.02094*** 
INCOME 6.40e-06 3.72e-07*** -7.57e-08 4.41e-07 5.66e-06 1.03e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.00055 0.00915 0.00711 0.01065 -0.21510 0.02744*** 
METHOD1 0.01893 0.00407*** -0.00109 0.00506 -0.03343 0.01333** 
METHOD2 0.02780 0.00548*** 0.03998 0.01221*** -0.05716 0.02830** 
METHOD4 0.00961 0.00664 -0.00171 0.00865 -0.04944 0.02158*** 
CASEMIX 0.00019 0.00391 -0.01649 0.00453*** -0.08810 0.01114*** 
CONSTANT -0.24675 0.02062*** 0.38955 0.02663*** 1.06145 0.06128*** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.1954 0.1266 0.0944 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.13 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Facility Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00998 0.00489* 0.03114 0.00705*** -0.04119 0.01646** 
RATE 0.00050 0.00013*** 0.00093 0.00018*** -0.00200 0.00049*** 
RATEMISSING 0.10221 0.02429*** 0.05815 0.03099* -0.18694 0.08930** 
CONTROL2 -0.00428 0.00481 0.00214 0.00703 -0.00376 0.01855 
CONTROL3 0.00289 0.00805 -0.00374 0.01696 0.07022 0.04590 
TOTBEDS  -0.00062 0.00010*** -0.00037 0.00013*** -0.00095 0.00037*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00163 0.00014*** 0.00307 0.00023*** 0.00462 0.00057*** 
MULTI  0.00068 0.00274 0.00492 0.00397 -0.00912 0.01062 
ADLINDEX  0.00571 0.00090*** 0.01196 0.00126*** 0.04015 0.00330*** 
HHI 0.04683 0.00677*** 0.06716 0.01164*** 0.10397 0.02990*** 
INCOME -3.20e-06 7.40e-07*** -1.45e-06 7.04e-07** -6.55e-06 2.23e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.00417 0.00790 0.00382 0.00952 -0.20872 0.02595*** 
METHOD1 0.01398 0.00348*** 0.00132 0.00457 -0.03751 0.01214*** 
METHOD2 0.02154 0.00503*** 0.01061 0.00933 -0.12369 0.02245*** 
METHOD4 0.00950 0.00572* -0.00374 0.00777 -0.05187 0.01879*** 
CASEMIX -0.00016 0.00357 -0.01119 0.00427*** -0.07188 0.01076*** 
CONSTANT 0.35169 0.02612*** 0.44031 0.02968*** 2.20549 0.08781*** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.0130b 0.0273b 0.0105b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.14 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
State Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.03481 0.00933*** -0.00769 0.02114 
RATE 0.00111 0.00021*** -0.00066 0.00055 
RATEMISSING 0.12539 0.04245*** -0.05558 0.10582 
CONTROL2 0.08555 0.00639*** 0.34693 0.01591*** 
CONTROL3 0.08903 0.01234*** 0.39290 0.02981*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00038 0.00005*** -0.00075 0.00011*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00241 0.00021*** 0.00429 0.00052*** 
MULTI  0.00660 0.00426 -0.07697 0.01060*** 
ADLINDEX  0.03611 0.00288*** 0.11776 0.00571*** 
HHI -0.10736 0.00907*** -0.18517 0.02210*** 
INCOME 4.64e-06 4.89e-07*** 7.79e-06 1.10e-06*** 
METHOD0 -0.00234 0.01300 -0.22118 0.03186*** 
METHOD1 0.00896 0.00554 -0.03159 0.01429** 
METHOD2 0.04853 0.01068*** -0.02749 0.02894 
METHOD4 0.00476 0.00962 -0.03836 0.02250* 
CASEMIX -0.01297 0.00288*** -0.08851 0.01241*** 
CONSTANT 0.28647 0.03166*** 1.57380 0.07170*** 
N 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.1127 0.1193 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.15 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Facility Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.03915 0.00788*** 0.00704 0.01845 
RATE 0.00134 0.00019*** -0.00052 0.00052 
RATEMISSING 0.15351 0.03558*** -0.01243 0.10158 
CONTROL2 0.00402 0.00748 0.00929 0.02027 
CONTROL3 0.01347 0.01682 0.10864 0.05227** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00103 0.00015*** -0.00213 0.00041*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00430 0.00026*** 0.00833 0.00064*** 
MULTI  -0.00309 0.00427 -0.02712 0.01138** 
ADLINDEX  0.01542 0.00149*** 0.05049 0.00379*** 
HHI 0.10038 0.01351*** 0.18436 0.03242*** 
INCOME -4.01e-06 9.45e-07*** -9.07e-06 2.52e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.00311 0.01167 -0.20223 0.02967*** 
METHOD1 0.00934 0.00506* -0.03033 0.01311** 
METHOD2 0.02981 0.00626*** -0.08105 0.02468*** 
METHOD4 0.00582 0.00880 -0.03369 0.02013* 
CASEMIX -0.00810 0.00149*** -0.06977 0.01193*** 
CONSTANT 0.76865 0.03599*** 2.89170 0.09794*** 
N                 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.0174b 0.0109b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.16 
Regression Results for Access Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
  
PCTMCAID State Fixed Effects Facility Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.95788 0.34786*** 1.55143 0.29731*** 
RATE -0.00507 0.00777 0.00302 0.00616 
RATEMISSING -0.42287 1.64902 1.78212 1.27866 
CONTROL2 -9.38626 0.34208*** -0.91782 0.27432*** 
CONTROL3 0.79328 0.60256 0.92467 0.65133 
TOTBEDS  0.01952 0.00235*** -0.01413 0.00460*** 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.04217 0.01136*** 0.02472 0.00735*** 
MULTI  -0.96125 0.22794*** -0.17373 0.14230 
ADLINDEX  -1.10705 0.09050*** 0.15339 0.03652*** 
HHI 0.70194 0.46441 0.39247 0.35295 
INCOME -0.00038 0.00003*** 0.00012 0.00003*** 
METHOD0 -1.91870 0.48414*** -1.97860 0.40190*** 
METHOD1 -0.22563 0.23044 -0.40020 0.18285** 
METHOD2 -1.40048 0.37974*** -0.78225 0.31524** 
METHOD4 0.21310 0.36760 0.62293 0.29102** 
CASEMIX -0.08600 0.17625 -0.09821 0.14293 
CONSTANT 96.13814 1.30675*** 64.50688 1.19857*** 
N 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.2016 0.0060b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.17 
Regression Results for Heavy-Care Access Model 
Dependent 
Variable   
ADLINDEX State Fixed Effects Facility Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.12390 0.02821*** -0.10086 0.02636*** 
RATE 0.00109 0.00069 0.00081 0.00064 
RATEMISSING -0.06513 0.13310 -0.06249 0.13122 
CONTROL2 0.06312 0.02116*** 0.02638 0.02532 
CONTROL3 0.32173 0.04918*** 0.08470 0.06216 
TOTBEDS  0.00210 0.00017*** -0.00069 0.00036* 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.00769 0.00085*** 0.00070 0.00070 
MULTI  0.06928 0.01599*** -0.03014 0.01354** 
HHI -0.11673 0.03379*** 0.05923 0.03650 
INCOME -1.24e-07 1.70e-06 -1.12e-06 2.52e-06 
METHOD0 0.04236 0.04044 0.02111 0.03785 
METHOD1 0.06795 0.01859*** 0.03508 0.01670** 
METHOD2 -0.04475 0.03208 -0.05763 0.03013* 
METHOD4 -0.11659 0.03047*** -0.09409 0.02806*** 
CASEMIX 0.20506 0.01521*** 0.20339 0.01400*** 
CONSTANT 9.24604 0.07997*** 9.34348 0.09638*** 
N 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.2424 0.0556b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.18 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models without Method 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
Coefficie
nt 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.00869 0.00119*** -0.00116 0.00113 -0.05192 0.00314*** 
RATE -0.00002 0.00003 -0.00003 0.00003 -0.00072 0.00007*** 
RATEMISSING 0.00451 0.00508 -0.00905 0.00455** -0.08074 0.01637*** 
CONTROL2 -0.01008 0.00072*** -0.01040 0.00093*** 0.00309 0.00151** 
CONTROL3 -0.00773 0.00141*** -0.00241 0.00252 0.01420 0.00339*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00007 5.74e-06*** 0.00008 8.03e-06*** 0.00001 0.00001 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00005 0.00003 -0.00019 0.00004*** 0.00015 0.00007** 
MULTI  0.00425 0.00056*** 0.00304 0.00067*** -0.01205 0.00118*** 
ADLINDEX  0.01006 0.00027*** 0.01605 0.00068*** 0.02202 0.00050*** 
HHI -0.00443 0.00119*** -0.02633 0.00160*** 0.01191 0.00258*** 
INCOME -2.45e-07 4.98e-08*** 9.25e-08 7.53e-08 -8.94e-08 1.06e-07 
CASEMIX 0.00203 0.00063*** -0.00361 0.00058*** 0.00571 0.00164*** 
CONSTANT -0.00267 0.00365 -0.09779 0.00680*** 0.10298 0.00798** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.1446 0.2939 0.2339 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.19 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models without Method 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.00948 0.00118*** -0.00239 0.00092*** -0.05112 0.00316*** 
RATE -0.00001 0.00003 -0.00003 0.00002 -0.00076 0.00008*** 
RATEMISSING 0.00737 0.00490 -0.01109 0.00409*** -0.09399 0.01537*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00287 0.00112** -0.00083 0.00093 0.01021 0.00325*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00088 0.00282 -0.00088 0.00163 0.01249 0.00793 
TOTBEDS  0.00002 0.00002 -54.51e-06 0.00001 0.00005 0.00004 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00017 0.00004*** 0.00003 0.00002 0.00040 0.00008*** 
MULTI  -0.00113 0.00061* 0.00051 0.00051 -0.00500 0.00164*** 
ADLINDEX  0.00566 0.00016*** 0.00666 0.00016*** 0.01406 0.00046*** 
HHI 0.00551 0.00160*** 0.00162 0.00130 0.02269 0.00446*** 
INCOME 5.55e-07 1.36e-07*** -6.20e-07 1.70e-07*** -3.10e-06 5.41e-07*** 
CASEMIX 0.00274 0.00060*** -0.00161 0.00049*** 0.00742 0.00167*** 
CONSTANT 0.01175 0.00490** -0.00020 0.00534 0.21883 0.01670*** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.0529b 0.0779b 0.1553b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.20 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models  
without Method 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00162 0.00101 0.40607 0.13719*** 
RATE -0.00017 0.00002*** -0.00955 0.00360*** 
RATEMISSING -0.02197 0.00459*** -0.53315 0.61513 
CONTROL2 -0.00751 0.00048*** -1.33853 0.06162*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00702 0.00102*** -1.46728 0.11458*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00005 3.76e-06*** 0.01389 0.00054*** 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.00007 0.00002*** -0.00037 0.00285 
MULTI  0.00512 0.00039*** 0.13460 0.05320** 
ADLINDEX  0.00735 0.00017*** 0.03510 0.01817* 
HHI -0.00910 0.00082*** -0.71115 0.11508*** 
INC03 1.30e-07 3.47e-08*** 7.59e-06 4.47e-06* 
CASEMIX 0.00021 0.00056 0.33073 0.08227*** 
CONSTANT 0.00292 0.00259 8.36010 0.35627*** 
N 150,571 150,537 
R2 0.1209 0.1821 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.21 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
without Method 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00111 0.00098 0.56605 0.13340*** 
RATE -0.00018 0.00002*** -0.00925 0.00356*** 
RATEMISSING -0.02056 0.00461*** -0.53416 0.62653 
CONTROL2 0.00034 0.00106 0.09161 0.16870 
CONTROL3 0.00238 0.00201 -0.73398 0.45020 
TOTBEDS  0.00004 0.00001*** 0.02153 0.00197*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00008 0.00003*** -0.00757 0.00362** 
MULTI  0.00139 0.00057** -0.20468 0.08854** 
ADLINDEX  0.00449 0.00015*** 0.10394 0.02064*** 
HHI 0.00199 0.00156 0.57849 0.21298*** 
INCOME 6.00e-08 9.29e-08 0.00011 0.00003*** 
CASEMIX 0.00104 0.00056* 0.33201 0.08151*** 
CONSTANT 0.02885 0.00379*** 3.56265 0.79317*** 
N 150,571 150,537 
R2 0.0142b 0.0425b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.22 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models without Method 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00832 0.00567 0.02713 0.00750*** 0.01921 0.01565 
RATE 0.00023 0.00015 0.00073 0.00019*** -0.00109 0.00050** 
RATEMISSING 0.08015 0.02618*** 0.01457 0.03639 -0.12940 0.092981 
CONTROL2 0.05881 0.00472*** 0.02487 0.00587*** 0.24992 0.01392*** 
CONTROL3 0.03749 0.00808*** 0.02326 0.01017** 0.25434 0.02300*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00029 0.00003*** -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00022 0.00010** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00063 0.00012*** 0.00195 0.00021*** 0.00215 0.00046*** 
MULTI  0.01107 0.00311*** 0.02886 0.00409*** -0.02387 0.00974** 
ADLINDEX  0.02225 0.00162*** 0.02503 0.00216*** 0.10275 0.00422*** 
HHI -0.02297 0.00627*** -0.12038 0.00878*** -0.13214 0.02093*** 
INCOME 6.41e-06 3.72e-07*** -8.50e-08 4.41e-07 5.67e-06 1.03e-06*** 
CASEMIX -0.00246 0.00382 -0.01938 0.00440*** -0.07356 0.01064*** 
CONSTANT -0.22148 0.01966*** 0.40798 0.02593*** 1.06145 0.06128*** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.1953 0.1264 0.0940 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.23 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models without Method 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00971 0.00465** 0.03047 0.00636*** 0.02952 0.01448** 
RATE 0.00046 0.00013*** 0.00089 0.00017*** -0.00104 0.00047** 
RATEMISSING 0.10148 0.02409*** 0.05301 0.03048* -0.07747 0.08755 
CONTROL2 -0.00434 0.00481 0.00220 0.00703 -0.00406 0.01859 
CONTROL3 0.00310 0.00805 -0.00337 0.01698 0.06594 0.04602 
TOTBEDS  -0.00063 0.00010*** -0.00037 0.00013*** -0.00090 0.00037** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00161 0.00014*** 0.00306 0.00023*** 0.00489 0.00058*** 
MULTI  0.00057 0.00275 0.00482 0.00397 -0.00766 0.01062 
ADLINDEX  0.00572 0.00090*** 0.01196 0.00126*** 0.04024 0.00330*** 
HHI 0.04725 0.00676*** 0.06745 0.01164*** 0.10258 0.02989*** 
INCOME -3.15e-06 7.33e-07*** -1.47e-06 7.03e-07** -6.39e-06 2.21e-06*** 
CASEMIX -0.00221 0.00338 -0.01234 0.00412*** -0.05326 0.01065*** 
CONSTANT 0.36358 0.02548*** 0.44642 0.02882*** 2.04959 0.08531*** 
N 150,571 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.0128b 0.0272b 0.0097b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
 160
Table A.24 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models without Method 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.03653 0.00850*** 0.06552 0.01778*** 
RATE 0.00106 0.00021*** 0.00029 0.00053 
RATEMISSING 0.11969 0.04206*** 0.04740 0.10447 
CONTROL2 0.08555 0.00639*** 0.34698 0.01591*** 
CONTROL3 0.08906 0.01234*** 0.39228 0.02982*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00038 0.00005*** -0.00075 0.00011*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00238 0.00021*** 0.00433 0.00052*** 
MULTI  0.00646 0.00426 -0.07686 0.01060*** 
ADLINDEX  0.03608 0.00287*** 0.11767 0.00571*** 
HHI -0.10708 0.00907*** -0.18531 0.02209*** 
INCOME 4.64e-06 4.89e-07*** 7.79e-06 1.10e-06*** 
CASEMIX -0.01629 0.00514*** -0.07500 0.01182*** 
CONSTANT 0.31231 0.03110*** 1.46827 0.06787*** 
N 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.1126 0.1190 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.25 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models without Method 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.03885 0.00689*** 0.07442 0.01590*** 
RATE 0.00129 0.00019*** 0.00040 0.00050 
RATEMISSING 0.14931 0.03518*** 0.09160 0.10011 
CONTROL2 0.00414 0.00748 0.00934 0.02032 
CONTROL3 0.01409 0.01682 0.10533 0.05243** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00103 0.00015*** -0.00209 0.00041*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00425 0.00026*** 0.00853 0.00064*** 
MULTI  -0.00333 0.00427 -0.02611 0.01139** 
ADLINDEX  0.01539 0.00149*** 0.05048 0.00379*** 
HHI 0.10117 0.01351*** 0.18417 0.03240*** 
INCOME -4.03e-06 9.45e-07*** -9.03e-06 2.52e-06*** 
CASEMIX -0.01043 0.00476** -0.05356 0.01128*** 
CONSTANT 0.78275 0.03519*** 2.75653 0.09567*** 
N                 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.0173b 0.0103b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.26 
Regression Results for Access Model without Method 
Dependent 
Variable   
PCTMCAID State-Fixed Effects Facility-Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 1.54133 0.33592*** 2.07968 0.28453*** 
RATE 0.00561 0.00768 0.01424 0.00612** 
RATEMISSING 0.88529 1.64061 3.06620 1.27895** 
CONTROL2 -9.38668 0.34207*** -0.91092 0.27417*** 
CONTROL3 0.78491 0.60253 0.88465 0.65033 
TOTBEDS  0.01949 0.00235*** -0.01368 0.00459*** 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.04113 0.01135*** 0.02621 0.00735*** 
MULTI  -0.95677 0.22788*** -0.16680 0.14229 
ADLINDEX  -1.10707 0.09045*** 0.15052 0.03656*** 
HHI 0.69350 0.46433 0.39209 0.35261 
INCOME -0.00038 0.00003*** 0.00012 0.00003*** 
CASEMIX 0.13168 0.17320 0.12142 0.14065 
CONSTANT 94.7137 1.27952*** 63.19044 1.18258*** 
N 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.2015 0.0053b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.27 
Regression Results for Heavy-Care Access Model without Method 
Dependent 
Variable   
ADLINDEX State-Fixed Effects Facility-Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.11325 0.02709*** -0.09062 0.02483*** 
RATE 0.00060 0.00068 0.00053 0.00063 
RATEMISSING -0.10095 0.13164 -0.08152 0.13003 
CONTROL2 0.06315 0.02117*** 0.02452 0.02536 
CONTROL3 0.32201 0.04919*** 0.08328 0.06255 
TOTBEDS  0.00210 0.00017*** -0.00071 0.00036** 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.00762 0.00085*** 0.00086 0.00070 
MULTI  0.06996 0.01599*** -0.02900 0.01356** 
HHI -0.11670 0.03380*** 0.05660 0.03657 
INCOME -6.10e-08 1.70e-06 -2.80e-07 2.50e-06 
CASEMIX 0.19390 0.01489*** 0.19775 0.01369*** 
CONSTANT 9.31124 0.07808*** 9.33862 0.09448*** 
N 150,571 150,571 
R2 0.2423 0.0551b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 15892 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.28 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00460 0.00219** 0.00157 0.00258 -0.05470 0.00724*** 
RATE -0.00013 0.00004*** 0.00010 0.00004*** -0.00052 0.00011*** 
RATEMISSING -0.00940 0.00636 0.00403 0.00614 -0.05932 0.01840*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00813 0.00097*** -0.01004 0.00135*** 0.00050 0.00219 
CONTROL3 -0.00253 0.00214 0.00092 0.00421 0.01412 0.00511*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00007 7.47e-06*** 0.00007 0.00001*** 0.00001 0.00002 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00058 0.00012*** 0.00051 0.00015*** 0.00023 0.00029 
MULTI  0.00442 0.00076*** 0.00166 0.00106 -0.01235 0.00178*** 
ADLINDEX  0.00958 0.00038*** 0.01805 0.00096*** 0.02253 0.00071*** 
HHI -0.00436 0.00162*** -0.02604 0.00247*** 0.01167 0.00367*** 
INCOME -2.11e-07 5.99e-08*** -1.93e-08 9.83e-08 2.29e-07 1.33e-07* 
METHOD0 0.01183 0.00249*** 0.00455 0.00258* 0.01899 0.00810** 
METHOD1 0.00779 0.00116*** -0.00313 0.00116*** 0.02467 0.00289*** 
METHOD2 0.00241 0.00447 0.01799 0.00602*** 0.01887 0.01505 
METHOD4 0.00761 0.00181*** 0.00306 0.00178* -0.00120 0.00447 
CASEMIX 0.00280 0.00097*** -0.00431 0.00101*** 0.02536 0.00248*** 
CONSTANT 0.00028 0.00836 -0.07501 0.01266*** 0.10057 0.01931*** 
N 75,904 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.1500 0.3093 0.2488 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.29 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00153 0.00206 -0.00203 0.00224 -0.05707 0.00715*** 
RATE -0.00009 0.00004** 0.00008 0.00003** -0.00566 0.00011*** 
RATEMISSING -0.00226 0.00630 0.00077 0.00544 -0.06747 0.01859*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00250 0.00147* -0.00231 0.00135* 0.00222 0.00469 
CONTROL3 0.00096 0.00443 -0.00008 0.00304 -0.00959 0.01371 
TOTBEDS  8.66e-06 0.00003 2.20e-06 0.00003 0.00011 0.00007 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00045 0.00010*** 0.00006 0.00009 2.09e-06 0.00031 
MULTI  -0.00074 0.00088 0.00097 0.00080 -0.00510 0.00249** 
ADLINDEX  0.00447 0.00022*** 0.00705 0.00024*** 0.01400 0.00065*** 
HHI 0.00591 0.00210*** 0.00030 0.00184 0.00263 0.00647 
INCOME 6.32e-07 1.98e-07*** -6.86e-07 2.51e-07*** -2.89e-06 6.93e-07*** 
METHOD0 0.01147 0.00240*** 0.00528 0.00233** 0.01965 0.00805** 
METHOD1 0.00701 0.00113*** -0.00395 0.00094*** 0.02512 0.00288*** 
METHOD2 0.00421 0.00439 0.01335 0.00582** 0.02095 0.01515 
METHOD4 0.00621 0.00178*** 0.00138 0.00156 -0.00115 0.00447 
CASEMIX 0.00425 0.00092*** -0.00709 0.00083 0.02815 0.00251*** 
CONSTANT 0.02018 0.00775*** -0.01031 0.00871 0.20482 0.02576*** 
N 75,904 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.0508b 0.0910b 0.1881b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.30 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00424 0.00210** -0.94130 0.34912*** 
RATE -0.00015 0.00003*** -0.04641 0.00477*** 
RATEMISSING -0.01783 0.00593*** -5.2114 0.73940*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00746 0.00069*** -1.28071 0.08418*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00773 0.00156*** -1.33318 0.17198*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00005 5.28e-06*** 0.01491 0.00073*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00036 0.00010*** 0.01668 0.01348 
MULTI  0.00520 0.00058*** 0.05069 0.07705 
ADLINDEX  0.00756 0.00024*** 0.07397 0.02582*** 
HHI -0.00815 0.00115*** -0.51059 0.15554*** 
INCOME 2.54e-08 4.25e-08 0.00002 5.31e-06***
METHOD0 0.00167 0.00241 -1.66448 0.37454*** 
METHOD1 0.00171 0.00113 -0.19344 0.17132 
METHOD2 0.00660 0.00387* 1.35087 0.67555** 
METHOD4 0.00044 0.00157 -0.87429 0.24996*** 
CASEMIX 0.00148 0.00091 0.42792 0.13086*** 
CONSTANT 0.00184 0.00554 9.29651 0.66411*** 
N 75,904 75,890 
R2 0.1258 0.2310 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.31 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00152 0.00200 -0.62845 0.35597* 
RATE -0.00015 0.00003*** -0.04333 0.00475*** 
RATEMISSING -0.01595 0.00601*** -4.86745 0.75864*** 
CONTROL2 0.00056 0.00158 0.29073 0.26288 
CONTROL3 0.00245 0.00308 0.07535 0.81683 
TOTBEDS  0.00005 0.00002** 0.02368 0.00333*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00322 0.00010*** 0.00384 0.01354 
MULTI  0.00144 0.00085* -0.37322 0.13841*** 
ADLINDEX  0.00405 0.00021*** 0.06487 0.03035** 
HHI 0.00275 0.00204 0.54486 0.29289* 
INCOME 7.46e-08 1.15e-07 0.00009 0.00003*** 
METHOD0 0.00064 0.00232 -1.33310 0.38046*** 
METHOD1 0.00144 0.00111 -0.00531 0.17215 
METHOD2 0.00605 0.00107 1.68600 0.67179** 
METHOD4 -0.00038 0.00158 -0.82442 0.25577*** 
CASEMIX 0.00249 0.00087*** 0.44276 0.13181*** 
CONSTANT 0.03010 0.00581*** 7.00379 1.11310*** 
N 75,904 75,890 
R2 0.0128b 0.0384b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
 168
Table A.32 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.02150 0.01254* -0.00421 0.01615 -0.00521 0.03494 
RATE 0.00038 0.00020* 0.00126 0.00025*** 0.00015 0.00063 
RATEMISSING 0.07942 0.03237** 0.09096 0.04279** 0.02671 0.12215 
CONTROL2 0.04987 0.00621*** 0.01504 0.00711** 0.24503 0.01510*** 
CONTROL3 0.03924 0.01052*** 0.03386 0.01349** 0.30788 0.02922*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00042 0.00004*** -0.00015 0.00005*** -0.00052 0.00010*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00546 0.00077*** 0.00868 0.00111*** 0.01348 0.00271*** 
MULTI  0.01280 0.00436*** 0.02266 0.00517*** -0.03736 0.01107*** 
ADLINDEX  0.01839 0.00204*** 0.01958 0.00293*** 0.08297 0.00475*** 
HHI -0.01733 0.00797* -0.10584 0.01233*** -0.05532 0.02404** 
INCOME 5.05e-06 4.07e-07*** -1.10e-06 4.77e-07** 3.33e-06 9.78e-07*** 
METHOD0 -0.01118 0.01567 -0.02707 0.01798 -0.15958 0.04261*** 
METHOD1 0.00803 0.00702 -0.00684 0.00795 -0.05563 0.02065*** 
METHOD2 -0.00216 0.01415 0.00336 0.03250 -0.09861 0.09063 
METHOD4 0.00185 0.00955 -0.00537 0.01127 -0.04464 0.02801 
CASEMIX -0.00652 0.00761 -0.03475 0.00819*** -0.09060 0.01702*** 
CONSTANT -0.04645 0.03496 0.33916 0.07850*** 1.33449 0.17449*** 
N 75,904 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.1675 0.1390 0.0922 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.33 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00468 0.00986 -0.02867 0.01518* -0.02507 0.03303 
RATE 0.00059 0.00017*** 0.00161 0.00023*** 0.00095 0.00061 
RATEMISSING 0.10579 0.03030*** 0.14160 0.04085*** 0.15987 0.11567 
CONTROL2 -0.00755 0.00727 0.00388 0.01000 0.01446 0.02342 
CONTROL3 -0.01929 0.01188 -0.00514 0.02073 -0.04004 0.05818 
TOTBEDS  -0.00093 0.00020*** -0.00032 0.00022 -0.00169 0.00068** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00592 0.00066*** 0.00789 0.00094*** 0.01594 0.00259*** 
MULTI  -0.00055 0.00398 0.00668 0.00584 -0.01841 0.01456 
ADLINDEX  0.00378 0.00119*** 0.00861 0.00152*** 0.02963 0.00340*** 
HHI 0.05282 0.01053*** 0.06519 0.01819*** 0.12331 0.04984** 
INCOME -3.86e-06 1.13e-06*** 2.76e-07 9.11e-07 -3.68e-06 2.40e-06 
METHOD0 -0.02156 0.01294* -0.05077 0.01729*** -0.16466 0.04107*** 
METHOD1 0.00528 0.00637 -0.00892 0.00763 -0.05429 0.02066*** 
METHOD2 -0.01374 0.01445 0.00056 0.02705 -0.10632 0.08343 
METHOD4 0.00845 0.00873 -0.01852 0.01086* -0.04671 0.02744* 
CASEMIX -0.01382 0.00708* -0.03321 0.00801*** -0.08781 0.01711*** 
CONSTANT 0.47167 0.04296*** 0.39456 0.04326*** 2.13435 0.11889*** 
N 75,904 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.0146b 0.0318b 0.0124b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.34 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.01867 0.01847 0.02890 0.03945 
RATE 0.00161 0.00027*** 0.00170 0.00675** 
RATEMISSING 0.19055 0.04897*** 0.24058 0.13770* 
CONTROL2 0.07804 0.00814*** 0.33726 0.01819*** 
CONTROL3 0.10005 0.01446*** 0.45467 0.03623*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00058 0.00006*** -0.00121 0.00012*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.01186 0.00119*** 0.02148 0.00268*** 
MULTI  0.00162 0.00579 -0.09267 0.01289*** 
ADLINDEX  0.03048 0.00406*** 0.09855 0.00728*** 
HHI -0.09248 0.01268*** -0.10792 0.02783*** 
INCOME 2.83e-06 5.47e-07*** 4.55e-06 1.14e-06***
METHOD0 -0.04651 0.02134** -0.20704 0.04935*** 
METHOD1 0.00044 0.00936 -0.04879 0.02310** 
METHOD2 -0.00148 0.02642 -0.10236 0.09013 
METHOD4 -0.00453 0.01351 -0.03657 0.03118 
CASEMIX -0.03662 0.00996*** -0.11244 0.01958*** 
CONSTANT 0.35313 0.07087*** 1.75655 0.17854*** 
N 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.0854 0.1063 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.35 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Most Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.01321 0.01605 -0.01135 0.03594 
RATE 0.00210 0.00025*** 0.00291 0.00065***
RATEMISSING 0.24970 0.04667*** 0.40824 0.13043***
CONTROL2 0.00375 0.01064 0.02791 0.02593 
CONTROL3 0.00047 0.02033 0.00779 0.05970 
TOTBEDS  -0.00119 0.00027*** -0.00290 0.00074***
EMPTYELDERLY 0.01107 0.00105*** 0.02226 0.00240***
MULTI  -0.00538 0.00640 -0.03971 0.01600** 
ADLINDEX  0.01204 0.00181*** 0.03988 0.00446***
HHI 0.09287 0.02183*** 0.17693 0.05187***
INCOME -3.09e-06 1.06e-06*** -5.83e-06 2.71e-06** 
METHOD0 -0.06496 0.01991*** -0.21151 0.04662***
METHOD1 -0.00370 0.00910 -0.05162 0.02313** 
METHOD2 -0.01073 0.02333 -0.10881 0.08425 
METHOD4 -0.01380 0.01280 -0.04150 0.02983 
CASEMIX -0.03627 0.00954*** -0.10217 0.01942***
CONSTANT 0.81163 0.05067*** 2.84249 0.13258***
N 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.0157b 0.0121b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.36 
Regression Results for Access Model 
Most Restrictive Sample 
Dependent 
Variable   
PCTMCAID State-Fixed Effects Facility-Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 2.10167 0.71449*** 3.68244 0.56805*** 
RATE 0.01873 0.00995* 0.01122 0.00795 
RATEMISSING 3.35836 1.95300* 3.64824 1.51695** 
CONTROL2 -8.50022 0.48757*** -1.11712 0.40088*** 
CONTROL3 4.35162 0.77855*** 1.91969 1.08148* 
TOTBEDS  0.02720 0.00312*** -0.02642 0.00707*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.09504 0.04670** 0.00670 0.02408 
MULTI  -1.76661 0.33569*** -0.59560 0.21049*** 
ADLINDEX  -0.74316 0.12425*** 0.16310 0.05107*** 
HHI 3.26867 0.65618*** -0.41052 0.49224 
INCOME -0.00041 0.00003*** 0.00008 0.00004** 
METHOD0 -1.01304 0.77661 -0.75264 0.61478 
METHOD1 0.18235 0.38161 -0.07545 0.29549 
METHOD2 -1.95926 1.21465 0.31312 1.12446 
METHOD4 1.11780 0.53190** 1.45567 0.41672*** 
CASEMIX -0.30968 0.28800 -0.22946 0.23233 
CONSTANT 88.31466 2.67226*** 66.41340 1.63747*** 
N 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.1823 0.0099b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.37 
Regression Results for Heavy-Care Access Model 
Most Restrictive Sample 
Dependent 
Variable   
ADLINDEX State-Fixed Effects Facility-Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.26803 0.06390*** -0.27698 0.05058*** 
RATE 0.00284 0.00093*** 0.00298 0.00085*** 
RATEMISSING 0.27901 0.16209* 0.38902 0.15658** 
CONTROL2 -0.03202 0.03121 0.05377 0.03643 
CONTROL3 0.37891 0.07373*** 0.19462 0.10332* 
TOTBEDS  0.00194 0.00024*** -0.00095 0.00060 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.02158 0.00347*** 0.00127 0.00254 
MULTI  0.05436 0.02401** -0.03056 0.02029 
HHI -0.13302 0.04773*** 0.02480 0.05278 
INCOME -7.02e-07 2.12e-06 2.26e-06 3.13e-06 
METHOD0 0.06635 0.07163 0.04578 0.06057 
METHOD1 0.01923 0.03098 -0.03994 0.02674 
METHOD2 -0.07406 0.10565 -0.05278 0.09838 
METHOD4 -0.21592 0.04542*** -0.18824 0.03970*** 
CASEMIX 0.22287 0.02457*** 0.22514 0.02285*** 
CONSTANT 10.06110 0.18597*** 9.45304 0.14257*** 
N 75,904 75,904 
R2 0.2087 0.0606b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 8089 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.38 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.01149 0.00163*** -0.00202 0.00123* -0.04263 0.00386*** 
RATE 0.00009 0.00004** -0.00018 0.00004*** -0.00072 0.00011*** 
RATEMISSING 0.01318 0.00883 -0.01973 0.00714*** -0.07095 0.03727* 
CONTROL2 -0.12296 0.00106*** -0.01023 0.00126*** 0.00616 0.00206*** 
CONTROL3 -0.01268 0.00183*** -0.00522 0.00276* 0.01455 0.00449*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00007 8.83e-06*** 0.00008 0.00001*** 0.00002 0.00002 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00002 0.00004 -0.00015 0.00004*** 0.00007 0.00007 
MULTI  0.00398 0.00082*** 0.00441 0.00079*** -0.01153 0.00155*** 
ADLINDEX  0.01075 0.00040*** 0.01366 0.00095*** 0.02130 0.00070*** 
HHI -0.00310 0.00187* -0.02137 0.00185*** 0.00882 0.00384** 
INCOME -3.42e-07 9.73e-08*** 7.09e-07 1.15e-07*** -9.00e-07 1.85e-07*** 
METHOD0 -0.00649 0.00247*** -0.00307 0.00162* -0.01969 0.00633*** 
METHOD1 -0.00324 0.00113*** -0.00087 0.00077 -0.00174 0.00263 
METHOD2 -0.00804 0.00182*** 0.00477 0.00142*** 0.02468 0.00414*** 
METHOD4 -0.00942 0.00232*** 0.00142 0.00172 0.01808 0.00668*** 
CASEMIX 0.00156 0.00090* -0.00180 0.00076** -0.00319 0.00238 
CONSTANT -0.00917 0.00566 -0.08346 0.01001*** 0.12087 0.01181*** 
N 74,667 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.1447 0.2648 0.2271 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.39 
Regression Results for Process-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable PROPCATHETER PROPPARENTERAL PROPMOBLREST 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.01161 0.00166*** -0.00116 0.00114 -0.03956 0.00388*** 
RATE 0.00006 0.00004 -0.00015 0.00004*** -0.00071 0.00012*** 
RATEMISSING 0.011187 0.00789 -0.02018 0.00670*** -0.09721 0.03043*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00286 0.00166* 0.00028 0.00127 0.01808 0.00437*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00165 0.00371 -0.00131 0.00190 0.02390 0.00929*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00003 0.00002* -0.00003 0.00002** 0.00008 0.00005 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00011 0.00004*** 0.00009 0.00003*** 0.00033 0.00009*** 
MULTI  -0.00169 0.00083** 0.00026 0.00064 -0.00396 0.00213* 
ADLINDEX  0.00686 0.00023*** 0.00623 0.00021*** 0.01436 0.00064*** 
HHI 0.00568 0.00239** 0.00483 0.00184*** 0.03207 0.00607*** 
INC03 1.94e-07 2.13e-07 -5.28e-07 2.12e-07*** -2.72e-06 7.34e-07*** 
METHOD0 -0.00793 0.00253*** -0.00256 0.00150* -0.01614 0.00639** 
METHOD1 -0.00421 0.00108*** -0.00046 0.00071 0.00125 0.00262 
METHOD2 -0.01100 0.00176*** 0.00477 0.00133*** 0.02808 0.00416*** 
METHOD4 -0.00942 0.002270*** 0.00194 0.00164 0.02057 0.00656*** 
CASEMIX 0.00152 0.00084* -0.00062 0.00062 -0.00106 0.00241 
CONSTANT 0.00987 0.00680 0.00698 0.00633 0.16933 0.02151*** 
N 74,667 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.0598b 0.0686b 0.1282b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models have year fixed effects. 
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Table A.40 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00030 0.00138 0.39374 0.18673** 
RATE -0.00023 0.00004*** 0.04098 0.00579*** 
RATEMISSING -0.03164 0.00743*** 5.45617 1.18333*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00742 0.00066*** -1.37505 0.09018*** 
CONTROL3 -0.00579 0.00133*** -1.50386 0.15082*** 
TOTBEDS  0.00005 5.36e-06*** 0.01253 0.00078*** 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.00008 0.00002*** -0.00303 0.00299 
MULTI  0.00511 0.00051*** 0.19029 0.07275*** 
ADLINDEX  0.00716 0.00023*** -0.00824 0.02499 
HHI -0.00652 0.00122*** -0.98078 0.17867*** 
INCOME 4.48e-07 6.65e-08*** -8.47e-06 9.21e-06 
METHOD0 -0.00328 0.00212 0.66507 0.27790** 
METHOD1 -0.00777 0.00103* 2.36500 0.16135*** 
METHOD2 -0.00412 0.00148*** 2.64283 0.21232*** 
METHOD4 -0.00157 0.00203 0.78846 0.37235** 
CASEMIX -0.00136 0.00079* 0.40608 0.11215*** 
CONSTANT 0.00410 0.00398 4.49264 0.55528*** 
N 74,667 74,647 
R2 0.1123 0.1322 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.41 
Regression Results for Outcome and Composite-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
Outcome-Based 
PROPPRESSORE 
Composite-Based 
DEFS1TOT 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.00053 0.00131 0.57946 0.17650***
RATE -0.00023 0.00004*** 0.04103 0.00579***
RATEMISSING -0.02894 0.00697*** 5.27053 1.24988***
CONTROL2 0.00010 0.00141 0.00142 0.21261 
CONTROL3 0.00179 0.00262 -1.2186 0.50713** 
TOTBEDS  0.00004 0.00002** 0.01941 0.00241***
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00004 0.00003 -0.00192 0.00383 
MULTI  0.00133 0.00075* -0.07906 0.11193 
ADLINDEX  0.00495 0.00021*** 0.12874 0.02773***
HHI 0.00096 0.00239 0.78495 0.31125** 
INCOME 1.07e-07 1.69e-07 0.00011 0.00003***
METHOD0 -0.00376 0.00214* 0.73696 0.27617***
METHOD1 -0.00168 0.00103 2.42352 0.15862***
METHOD2 -0.00463 0.00149*** 2.71901 0.20974***
METHOD4 -0.00205 0.00206 0.62906 0.37838* 
CASEMIX -0.00071 0.00080 0.44168 0.11078***
CONSTANT 0.02692 0.00576*** -0.97425 0.95677 
N 74,667 74,647 
R2 0.0167b 0.0594b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.42 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.01613 0.00622*** 0.03371 0.01030*** -0.10149 0.02246*** 
RATE -0.00002 0.00023 0.00011 0.00033 -0.00463 0.00084*** 
RATEMISSING 0.09933 0.04898** -0.04867 0.06762 -0.49284 0.14188*** 
CONTROL2 0.05067 0.00701*** 0.03390 0.00944*** 0.25115 0.02382*** 
CONTROL3 0.03758 0.01212*** 0.01614 0.01531 0.21321 0.03490*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00021 0.00006*** 0.00003 0.00007 -0.00004 0.00017 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00069 0.00013*** 0.00186 0.00022*** 0.00239 0.00049*** 
MULTI  0.01052 0.00436** 0.03598 0.00625*** -0.00926 0.01580 
ADLINDEX  0.02704 0.00255*** 0.03211 0.00319*** 0.12633 0.00734*** 
HHI 0.00292 0.00982 -0.10605 0.01289*** -0.14898 0.03551*** 
INCOME 9.92e-06 7.79e-07*** 2.54e-06 1.04e-06** 0.00001 2.75e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.03198 0.01521** -0.00364 0.01650 -0.09587 0.05340* 
METHOD1 0.03232 0.00512*** -0.00100 0.00701 0.01901 0.01928 
METHOD2 0.03896 0.00655*** 0.04920 0.01350*** 0.01122 0.03252 
METHOD4 0.01640 0.01490 -0.01700 0.02268 -0.02571 0.05974 
CASEMIX 0.00279 0.00430 -0.00201 0.00571 -0.06514 0.01613*** 
CONSTANT -0.39987 0.03457*** 0.27847 0.04265*** 0.78037 0.10672*** 
N 74,667 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.2152 0.1239 0.0868 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.43 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable RNS LPNS AIDES 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.00163 0.00567 0.04317 0.00826*** -0.07180 0.02016*** 
RATE 0.00260 0.00020 0.00011 0.00028 -0.00526 0.00078*** 
RATEMISSING 0.10920 0.04122*** -0.03028 0.04021 -0.55575 0.12313*** 
CONTROL2 -0.00175 0.00636 -0.00092 0.00981 -0.02562 0.02829 
CONTROL3 0.01877 0.01057* -0.000264 0.02461 0.15239 0.06428** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00043 0.00011*** -0.00046 0.00016*** -0.00082 0.00041* 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00126 0.00014*** 0.00286 0.00024*** 0.00461 0.00060*** 
MULTI  0.00205 0.00378 0.00406 0.00540 0.00122 0.01529 
ADLINDEX  0.00793 0.00135*** 0.01519 0.00201*** 0.04990 0.00523*** 
HHI 0.05089 0.00900*** 0.08529 0.01550*** 0.13731 0.03593*** 
INCOME -1.56e-06 8.62e-07* -4.71e-06 1.62e-06*** -0.00001 3.68e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.02305 0.01378* -0.00318 0.01558 -0.08624 0.04947* 
METHOD1 0.02040 0.00415*** -0.00030 0.00600 0.00722 0.01605 
METHOD2 0.03040 0.00584*** 0.01798 0.01053* -0.05596 0.02578** 
METHOD4 0.02335 0.01105** -0.00775 0.01928 0.00952 0.04192 
CASEMIX 0.00836 0.00376** 0.00501 0.00513 -0.03480 0.01470** 
CONSTANT 0.23228 0.03220*** 0.52687 0.05031*** 2.3422 0.12998*** 
N 74,667 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.0147b 0.0262b 0.0142b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
All models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.44 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
State-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.01996 0.01120* -0.06266 0.02578** 
RATE 0.00022 0.00034 -0.00372 0.00089*** 
RATEMISSING 0.04489 0.08459 -0.39278 0.15122*** 
CONTROL2 0.09157 0.00980*** 0.35219 0.02631*** 
CONTROL3 0.08222 0.01979*** 0.34392 0.04659*** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00024 0.00008*** -0.00043 0.00019** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00234 0.00022*** 0.00450 0.00055*** 
MULTI  0.01314 0.00617** -0.05823 0.01663*** 
ADLINDEX  0.04333 0.00405*** 0.14083 0.00905*** 
HHI -0.07646 0.01296*** -0.18579 0.03471*** 
INCOME 9.13e-06 1.04e-06*** 0.00002 2.67e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.01423 0.02306 -0.09974 0.06211 
METHOD1 0.01211 0.00715* 0.00638 0.01983 
METHOD2 0.05533 0.01207*** 0.02602 0.03324 
METHOD4 -0.00092 0.02199 -0.02582 0.05568 
CASEMIX 0.00155 0.00640 -0.05651 0.01754*** 
CONSTANT 0.11218 0.04982*** 1.25096 0.11896*** 
N 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.1359 0.1180 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
Both models have state and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.45 
Regression Results for Structure-Based Quality Models 
Least Restrictive Sample 
Facility-Fixed Effects 
Dependent 
Variable LICNUR NURSTAFF 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT 0.03729 0.00927*** -0.02571 0.02242 
RATE 0.00029 0.00031 -0.00447 0.00084*** 
RATEMISSING 0.03999 0.04586 -0.49537 0.14552*** 
CONTROL2 0.00254 0.01049 -0.01420 0.03066 
CONTROL3 0.02189 0.02452 0.18073 0.07651** 
TOTBEDS  -0.00096 0.00018*** -0.00196 0.00047*** 
EMPTYELDERLY 0.00383 0.00027*** 0.00806 0.00070*** 
MULTI  -0.00020 0.00570 -0.01345 0.01608 
ADLINDEX  0.01890 0.00236*** 0.06067 0.00612*** 
HHI 0.12451 0.01697*** 0.24296 0.04002*** 
INCOME -5.11e-06 1.69e-06*** -0.00002 4.26e-06*** 
METHOD0 0.01518 0.02154 -0.07700 0.05775 
METHOD1 0.00965 0.00620 0.00536 0.01675 
METHOD2 0.03673 0.01044*** -0.02269 0.02817 
METHOD4 0.01071 0.02070 0.01221 0.04577 
CASEMIX 0.01012 0.00581* -0.02672 0.01621* 
constant 0.75621 0.05415*** 3.01955 0.14603*** 
N 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.0234b 0.0150b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
Both models include year fixed effects. 
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Table A.46 
Regression Results for Access Model 
Least Restrictive Markets 
Dependent 
Variable   
PCTMCAID State-Fixed Effects Facility-Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.62873 0.41804 0.66737 0.36207* 
RATE -0.03963 0.01215*** -0.01374 0.00971 
RATEMISSING -6.97784 2.6512*** -3.31099 2.36212 
CONTROL2 -10.13519 0.47517*** -0.73226 0.37400** 
CONTROL3 -2.57698 0.86979*** 0.12175 0.77340 
TOTBEDS  0.00728 0.00346** -0.00706 -0.00706 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.03419 0.01192*** 0.02668 0.00798*** 
MULTI  -0.20703 0.30485 0.20340 0.19248 
ADLINDEX  -1.50868 0.13121*** 0.14916 0.05219*** 
HHI -1.75475 0.64923*** 1.03556 0.50782** 
INCOME -0.00028 0.00004*** 0.00019 0.00005*** 
METHOD0 -1.74078 0.71196** -0.81800 0.59639 
METHOD1 -0.36103 0.29609 -0.27111 0.24335 
METHOD2 -1.35941 0.43857*** -0.76737 0.36560** 
METHOD4 -0.34194 0.71408 0.17570 0.58264 
CASEMIX 0.20832 0.23109 0.01360 0.19147 
CONSTANT 101.29370 1.89618*** 62.32554 1.41084*** 
N 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.2364 0.0047b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-
home correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 
clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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Table A.47 
Regression Results for Heavy-Care Access Model 
Least Restrictive Market 
Dependent 
Variable   
ADLINDEX State-Fixed Effects Facility-Fixed Effects 
Explanatory 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora Coefficient 
Standard 
Errora 
CON_MORT -0.04861 0.03376 -0.00141 0.03263 
RATE -0.00005 0.00104 -0.00061 0.00098 
RATEMISSING -0.56527 0.23961** -0.69092 0.22297*** 
CONTROL2 0.16315 0.02835*** -0.00477 0.03503 
CONTROL3 0.26759 0.06476*** -0.00948 0.07494 
TOTBEDS  0.00223 0.00025*** -0.00057 0.00045 
EMPTYELDERLY -0.00539 0.00090*** 0.00160 0.00076** 
MULTI  0.08487 0.02107*** -0.03106 0.01809* 
HHI -0.11583 0.04907** 0.10844 0.05091** 
INCOME 1.36e-06 2.96e-06 -5.07e-06 4.32e-06 
METHOD0 -0.16837 0.06291*** -0.16757 0.06172*** 
METHOD1 0.07910 0.02506*** 0.07337 0.02270*** 
METHOD2 -0.03807 0.03722 -0.02008 0.03482 
METHOD4 -0.03295 0.05968 -0.04687 0.05667 
CASEMIX 0.21721 0.02042*** 0.20908 0.01879*** 
CONSTANT 9.17985 0.11400*** 9.15576 0.13787*** 
N 74,667 74,667 
R2 0.1949 0.0537b 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe standard errors represent the Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for intra-home 
correlation using the cluster option in Stata 9 S/E.  Each regression contains 7821 clusters. 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
bThis value is the R2 within. 
The state fixed effects model includes state and year fixed effects. 
The facility fixed effects model includes year fixed effects. 
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